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Foreword

Rēzekne Academy of Technology in cooperation with the State Border Guard College successfully cooperates in the field of studies and science. The organization of joint conferences is an important result of cooperation.

The conferences aim to provide a platform for researchers to share their knowledge and ideas on the latest trends in border security and management, which are particularly relevant in the current social and political context.

We have invited scientists from different countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, Spain, Poland, and Italy, to the Scientific Organization Committee of the conference. Latvian and foreign scientists, academic staff, as well as officials of the State Border Guard present their research in the collection of articles.

The role of the border guard, as well as its development, has received special attention today. Problems related to border security are topical both at the level of Latvia and Europe. Therefore, it is important to analyze and search for common solutions to current issues related to the future challenges and opportunities of immigration, Integrated border management, Cooperation in the field of border security and management, Information technologies in border security and management, Formation of border guard education, Ethical issues and psychological aspects in border management. The research conducted by the authors is a significant contribution to the development of science in the field of civil defense and security.

The results of the study may be of interest to professionals, students, faculty, and scholars interested in the fields of border security and management. The editorial board hopes that the International Scientific and Practical Conference BORDER SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT and the Journal of Internal Security and Civil Defense Sciences: Border Security and Management will become more and more recognizable every year and will make a significant contribution to the development of the territory. The editorial board expresses its greatest appreciation to the authors, reviewers, and cooperation partners for their contribution to the creation of the Journal.

Dr.oec. professor, Iluta Arbidāne
Chief Editor of the Journal

PECULIARITIES OF JOINT PATROLLING AT THE LITHUANIAN-POLISH STATE BORDER

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Abstract. *Lithuanian border guards carry out joint patrols with officials of both neighboring European Union countries – Poland and Latvia. And although the legal basis is similar, the practical implementation of joint patrols is significantly different. In this article, the author introduces the joint patrol on the Lithuanian-Polish state border carried out by the officers of the State Border Guard Service. A historical overview of joint patrolling is provided. The training system for joint patrol officers is explained and an overview of the previous training has been presented. Aspects of the legal regulation and practical activities of the joint patrols carried out by the officers of the Lithuanian and Polish border guard services are analyzed. Good practice and issues are presented. It is suggested how to improve the efficiency of joint patrol training and improve the implementation of joint patrolling.*

Keywords: *joint patrol, training, international cooperation, state border, State Border Guard Service.*

Introduction

Lithuania, which became a member of the Schengen Area in 2007, has an internal border with two European Union (hereinafter – EU) countries: the Republic of Poland in the southwest (length of the border – 104 km) and the Republic of Latvia in the north (length of the land border – 588 km). The Schengen Area provides more opportunities for people to travel freely, but requires closer international cooperation between law enforcement authorities in ensuring public security.

State border control is performed by a law enforcement institution - the State Border Guard Service under the Ministry of the Interior (hereinafter – SBGS). Among other functions, SBGS officers carry out joint patrols with officials of the Polish and Latvian border authorities. The legal basis for joint patrolling is similar in both countries, but its practical implementation differs. This is due to the different lengths of the state border, the different number of units at the state border, and the experience of bilateral cooperation.

Police officers of neighboring countries also patrol the Lithuanian-Polish border. In addition, not only border guards or police officers of the two countries can also patrol, but also border guards with police officers. Such

patrols may be organized as required, but no such quadripartite patrols have yet been organized and conducted in practice.

Joint patrols at the state border with Poland are carried out frequently, with about 13-14 joint patrols per month. This is also due to the close cooperation between border services in the past (joint patrols have been carried out since 2004). It should be noted, that joint patrols are not carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The aim of the article is to describe the pattern of joint patrols on the Lithuanian-Polish border. To achieve aforementioned purpose in this article were applied theoretical (analysis of legal acts, analysis of scientific literature, comparison) research methods.

Exchange of experts as a form of joint patrol until Lithuania becomes a member of Schengen Area

In 2000 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Poland have signed the "Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime and Other Serious Crimes" (1). The agreement provided for the exchange of experts for professional development, in particular in the field of forensic techniques and methods of combating crime. On the basis of this agreement, the Commander of the frontier district "Lazdijai" of the State Border Guard Service and the Commandant of the Polish Border Guard frontier district "Podlask" signed an agreement "On Cooperation in the Exchange of Experts" (hereinafter – Agreement) (4).

The Agreement provided that the parties would cooperate in exchanging experts, improving their professional qualifications and finding new ways of combating crime. The aim of the Agreement is to build trust, gain experience and seek new forms of cooperation pending the entry into force of international legislation on cross-border cooperation, which is currently being drafted.

The Agreement was implemented by seconding experts to the neighboring country to carry out a joint border service. The joint border service was carried out by using surveillance vehicles with surveillance equipment, a motorboat and portable thermal vision equipment. The host country has provided the officials of the sending country with the equipment needed to carry out the service and has trained them to use it.

The Agreement provided for a joint service once every 10 days. However, this way of cooperation between the two border guard services has

been intensified and an average of 9-10 joint services per month have been organized. The terms, time and place were alternately agreed upon by the commanders of frontier stations. The dispatch to the service, with the participation of experts and the reception after the service, was carried out by the shift leader of the border crossing point (hereinafter – BCP) or the shift leader of the frontier station, in the territory of which the service was performed, respectively.

Experts crossed the state border through BCP with permits issued by border delegates. They performed their duties in the territory of the other country with a service uniform, without weapons and other coercive measures. The protection and safety of the expert of sending country in the territory of the other country was ensured by the experts of the hosting country in whose territory the service was performed. Expert of sending country was an observer. Joint service was carried out by two officers of hosting country and one officer of sending country.

Such performance of the joint service can be considered as the beginning of a joint patrol at the Lithuanian-Polish state border.

Training of Joint Patrol Officers

Much attention is paid to the training of joint patrol officers. The author of this article, as a representative of the Border Guard School, has been involved in the training of joint patrols from the very beginning.

In order to properly train joint patrol officers, the development of a training concept and training program for joint patrols has started at about the same time as the drafting by the border guard services of both countries a bilateral agreement on joint patrols. The first working group meetings took place in the second half of 2007. Representatives of the Border Guard School from Lithuania and representatives of the Central Training Unit in Koszalin from Poland worked together. In Poland, there are three border guard training institutions within the Border Guard structure: Training Center in Ketrzyn, Central Training Unit in Koszalin and Specialized Training Center in Luban. In accordance with the internal principles of the Polish Border Guard, joint patrol training may be entrusted to any of these training institutions.

The working group developed a training concept and training program for joint patrol. Initially, the following concept of joint patrol training was proposed: representatives of training institutions from both countries will train the instructors together (2 officers from each frontier station), and later the instructors will train officers of their frontier stations. The instructor

training program was to last 10 training days. Topics from the field of law, border enforcement and training methodology were covered.

However, later on, due to the small number of units at the state border, it was decided to abandon the training of instructors, and frontier stations officers must be trained jointly by representatives of the border training institutions of both countries.

It should be noted that neither this nor other joint patrol training programs have been approved jointly by the authorized officials of both countries (heads of the Border Guard Services or heads of border training institutions). Subsequently, each state training institution developed and validated its joint patrol training program.

The Border Guard School has developed a joint patrol curriculum. The curriculum consists of two parts: theoretical and practical. The first part is devoted to training on the border guard service of a neighboring country, the powers, rights and responsibilities of officers of neighboring country, paying particular attention to the conditions and grounds for the use of firearms and coercive measures, and the organization of a joint patrol service. The second part is devoted to practical training on the tactical actions of joint patrols: inspection of pedestrians, stopping and inspection of vehicles, detention and convoying of offenders, use of coercive measures. The training lasts 2 days. An evaluation is kept at the end of the training. Certificates confirming the successful graduation of the training are issued to officers who have successfully completed the training. After the training, monitoring is performed and the effectiveness of the training is assessed. As the training is organized for officers of both countries at the same time, and the training is conducted by representatives of educational institutions of both countries, the training program may be amended in accordance with the proposals of the Polish training institution. Representatives of educational institutions of both countries usually meet before and discuss future trainings.

Although, it was prepared for the training, neither the joint patrol training nor the joint patrol itself took place, because no joint patrol agreement was signed. And it was only in early 2012, after the agreement on joint patrols (3) was signed in December 2011, that the first joint training took place. They were conducted by the representatives of the Lithuanian Border Guard School and the Polish Specialized Training Center in Luban. Prior to that, representatives of training institutions discussed and agreed on training topics. The training lasted two days. The first day was dedicated to theoretical training. On the first day, the border guards of both countries were trained separately. The representatives of the Border Guard School

trained Polish border guards, and the representatives of the Polish Specialized Training Center in Luban trained Lithuanian border guards. The second day was devoted to practical training. A joint training group of border guards from both countries was formed, and representatives of both training institutions conducted practical training together. In 2012 such training was conducted twice.

In 2013, the legal regulation on the use of firearms and coercive measures in Poland has changed. One common law for officials of all institutions was adopted. Until then, the rules and procedures for the use of firearms and coercive measures were laid down in the law governing the activities of each law enforcement agency. In order to introduce Lithuanian border guards participating in the joint patrol with the changes in legal regulations, the representatives of the Specialized Training Center in Luban went to Lithuania in addition in 2013 and trained Lithuanian border guards about the changed legislation for the use of firearms and coercive measures. It is of great importance, because firearms or coercive measures are used in accordance with the law of the hosting country.

The training provided by the teachers of the Border Guard School and the Polish Border Guard Training Center in Ketrzyn in 2015, 2016 and 2019 should be mentioned as productive joint patrol training. Three groups of officers were trained during them. The training lasted 3 days. On the first day, representatives of the Border Guard School trained Polish Border Guard officers on the legal regulations in force in Lithuania, while representatives of the Polish Border Guard Training Center trained Lithuanian SBGS officers. On the second day, Lithuanian representatives trained SBGS officers on the organization of joint patrols, while Polish representatives trained Polish border guards. On the third day, representatives of both training institutions taught a joint training group consisting of officers from both states. Joint patrols were formed and tactical actions of joint patrol were trained.

After the training, monitoring was performed and the effectiveness of the training was assessed to improve training in the future. Questionnaires were prepared and officials who participated in the training were interviewed. The absolute majority of the participants evaluated the trainings as positive.

The theoretical part of the training takes place separately in each state, in the training classes of frontier stations. Practical training takes place at the state border, usually in the territory of the Border, Customs and Police Cooperation Center (Poland) or the territory of the SBGS frontier station "Kalvarija". The services of interpreters are used during the training, if

necessary. The interpreters are officers working at the Border, Customs and Police Cooperation Center.

EU funded projects are also used for training. In 2019-2021, the SBGS together with the Polish Border Guard frontier district "Podlask" implemented Interreg V-A project no. LT-PL-3R-199 "Cooperation between Lithuanian and Polish Border Guard Services" (5). During it, various equipment and tools for border guarding activities were purchased. Training for officers has also been provided in order to train them to work together to achieve a common security objective, that requires specific institutional capacity. During the training, officers from both countries learned to perform various tactical tasks together. In the training groups were included officers already trained for joint patrols and new officers. The training lasted 5 days per group and was exclusively practical. 6 groups were trained. Training was provided on joint patrols, inspections and surveys of areas and buildings, search, pursuit and detention of persons and vehicles, rout blockades and detentions of dangerous persons.

Police joint patrol training also should be mentioned. In 2013-2015, the Lithuanian Police Department together with partners from Poland, Latvia and Estonia implemented the project HOME/2012/ISEC/FP/C1/ 4000003828 "Implementation of the smart cross-border cooperation model" (6). The SBGS also was a project partner. During this training, joint patrols were formed consisting of border guards and police officers of both countries, as the agreement on joint patrols provides for the possibility of such type of joint patrols.

Joint patrols may only be carried out by properly trained officers. The representatives of the training institutions of both countries have a clear vision that a joint training group consisting of the border guards of both countries must be formed from the very beginning. It is very important for officers to get to know each other and find common ground. This is especially facilitated by formal and informal communication during and especially after the training, through joint lunches, dinners and other common activities. However, as business trips of officials abroad are expensive, no State Border Guard Service wants to send its officers abroad. Joint patrol training from various project funds is the most effective, in such case commanders of units are willing to send officers abroad, and a joint training group of officers from both countries can be formed at the beginning.

However, it should be noted that there is no single clear concept for joint patrol training. Training is more on-demand when new staff need to be trained due to changes in the border guard staff. Also, they are being carried

out during the implementation of various projects and in that case, they become a "soft" part of a project.

Legal regulation of joint patrols

Joint patrols are established in the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Poland "On Cooperation in Combating Organized and Other Crime and on Joint Action in Border Areas", signed in 2006 (hereinafter – Intergovernmental Agreement) (2). This Intergovernmental agreement replaced the previous agreement signed in 2000 (1).

Joint patrols are regulated by chapter "Joint actions in border areas" of the Intergovernmental agreement. Competent authorities, including the State Border Guard Service and the relevant authorities of neighboring country, can sign executive agreements with each other and specify the conditions and procedures of cooperation.

On the basis of this Intergovernmental agreement, back in 2007, before joining the Schengen Area, the SBGS, together with the Polish Border Guard, drafted an agreement on joint patrols. However, the agreement was not signed, because the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania proposed a general agreement to be signed, including police institutions.

On December 7, 2011 the Commander of the State Border Guard Service, the Commissioner General of the Police Department of the Republic of Lithuania and the Chief Commandant of the Border Guard of the Republic of Poland, the Chief Commandant of Police of the Republic of Poland signed an agreement "On Joint Patrol" (3). This agreement between the four institutions details the activities of the joint patrol and sets out how the border institutions will organize and carry out joint patrols. The agreement allows for joint patrols of border guards and police officers from both countries. In practice, however, this type of joint patrol is not organized.

An important source of legal regulation of joint patrols is the minutes of the meetings of the border delegates, which specify the operational issues of joint patrols.

Powers of joint patrol officers

The officers carrying out joint patrols shall have the powers provided for in the Intergovernmental agreement (2):
   1.   Joint patrol officers shall be treated in the same way as officers of

another state if they have been convicted of a criminal offense or are themselves criminal offenders.

2. Joint patrol officers shall have the right to wear a uniform or visible official insignia, to use official means of communication, technical surveillance equipment, official vehicles and craft, and other technical means. They may also possess service weapons which may be used only in self-defense and coercive measures which they may use in accordance with the national law of the state in whose territory the joint patrol takes place.
3. Joint patrol officers shall have the right to cross the border at any point with a service ID card.
4. A joint patrol may also be conducted with an aircraft.

The powers are not great enough, in order to make the joint patrol more effective, they should be specified and expanded.

Organization and conduct of joint patrols

At the state border with Poland one SBGS frontier station "Kalvarija" has been established. On the Polish side, meanwhile, three Polish frontier stations operate. Two of them are at the state border – frontier station "Sejny" and frontier station "Rutka Tartak". Frontier station "Augustow" is allocated about 50 kilometers from the state border (Lepeška et al., 2017). Joint patrols are carried out with all three Polish frontiers stations.

Joint patrols in border areas shall be carried out in accordance with the national law of the state in whose territory the service is performed.

A joint patrol usually consists of one Lithuanian border guard and one Polish border guard. The officers of the joint patrol are subordinate to the official of the border authority of the state in whose territory the patrol takes place.

The main tasks of joint patrol are:
1. The provision of emergency assistance to victims of crime, other offenses, natural disasters or similar acts.
2. Prevention of illegal migration.
3. Traffic safety supervision.
4. Prevention of criminal offenses and other offenses.

Joint patrols may be carried out on foot or by service vehicles. In practice, however, a joint pedestrian patrol is not organized.

Joint patrols are initiated and organized by the commanders of frontier stations, who actively exercise this right. Initially, the commanders shall agree on the organization of a joint patrol by telephone, then send

electronically a request for a joint patrol and information including, inter alia:

1) the planned number of officers;
2) the proposed place and time of patrol;
3) the main tasks to be performed;
4) methods, routes and technical equipment used.

After approving the request for joint patrol, at least 72 hours before the planned joint patrol begins, the commanders of the frontier stations shall exchange information on the officers, indicating their ranks/ positions, names, surnames, the names of the organizational units in which they perform their duties, the type and number of service weapon, other necessary information.

In the event of an emergency, the request for a joint patrol may be made orally and subsequently confirmed in writing within 24 hours. This procedure may be used in unforeseen circumstances and may replace or correct information already transmitted.

Cooperation may be refused if it is decided, in accordance with an Intergovernmental agreement, that the carrying out of joint patrol would be likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security or other essential interests of the requested state or to undermine its rule of law.

Officers carrying out joint patrol shall be headed by an official of the border authority in whose territory they are carried out. If several officers of border authorities of the same state are involved in a joint patrol, the officer of the institution that requested it shall be in charge, unless the border authorities agree otherwise. If a joint patrol crosses a state border, the patrol shall be headed by an official of the country in whose territory it is being carried out.

Leading officer:

1) coordinates the actions of the joint patrol;
2) immediately informs the commander of the frontier station about the necessity to change the route of the joint patrol or cross the state border.

The briefing, the allocation of tasks to the joint patrol and its actions at the end of the patrolling shall be assessed by an official of the border authority which requested the joint patrol. Depending on the location where the joint patrol will take place, the joint patrol may be instructed by the commander of the frontier station, shift leader of the frontier station or the leader of the patrol. In case if there is a joint patrol in an area far from the frontier station, it is not appropriate for an official of another state to travel lot of kilometers just to do the briefing. In this case, the briefing shall be given

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by the patrol leader (host state official), previously instructed by the commander of frontier station or the shift leader of frontier station.

Upon completion of the patrol, the patrol leader shall prepare a written report and submit it to the commander of his frontier station. A copy of the report shall be forwarded to the commander of frontier station of the neighboring state within 7 days at the latest.

All joint patrol documentation is transmitted through the Border, Customs and Police Cooperation Center.

Service in a joint patrol is usually carried out on a "one-to-one" basis. The joint patrol consists of one Lithuanian border guard and one Polish border guard. Both officers are armed with service firearms, have coercive measures and other necessary technical equipment. Officers work together throughout the shift, 12-14 hours.

The service is often organized as a so-called "doublet". Two joint patrols are formed on the same road or area, one on the Lithuanian side and the other on the Polish side.

Conclusions and suggestions

Joint patrols are not a purely political matter. It is a real tool for public safety. During it, officers identify and detain offenders.

However, such cross-border cooperation is still not a routine, day-to-day activity. This requires additional knowledge, preparation and training. And most importantly, a willingness to cooperate is needed.

There are 160-170 joint patrols per year, which is a really large number. In order to further intensify the joint patrolling, it is beneficial to establish a common Lithuanian-Polish frontier station and it is planned to do so. This would be an even closer level of cross-border cooperation between the two border guard services and two countries.

In order to make joint patrols even more effective, the Intergovernmental agreement (signed in 2006) should be updated, and the powers of officers should be more clearly defined and specified.

One of the challenges is lack of mutual communication and understanding. Effective common actions of officers are very important in working situations. During a joint patrol, officers usually communicate with each other in Polish, English, Russian or Lithuanian. Communication in a so-called "tactical language" is popular also. The working language of the joint patrol should be English.

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THE IMAGE OF THE BORDER GUARD IN SOCIETY

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Abstract. *The profession of border guard is one of the oldest professions and plays an important role in the functioning of the state. Its image is shaped by public perceptions of the professional activities, behaviors and attitudes of its members. In principle, it is a set of opinions about the reputation, prestige and popularity of the profession. In order to find out and study the public opinion on the image and prestige of the border guard profession in today's changing conditions, the authors of the article both discusses theoretical findings on the image of the profession and, by analyzing the results of a survey, studies the public opinions on the image of the border guard profession. The public values professionalism, the highest human values (honesty, justice, patriotism, loyalty, etc.), kind and responsive communication, visual image, as well as positive publicity about the sector, achievements of border guards and other positive events.*

Keywords: *image of the Latvian border guard, popularity, public opinion, reputation and attractiveness of the profession.*

Introduction

Border guards are one of the oldest professions in the world, dating back many millennia to ensure the security and integrity of each country's borders. Today, the main task of a border guard has remained unchanged, but the working methods have changed. However, globalisation and the mobility of workers around the world have contributed to changes in the range of professions and their popularity.

The State Border Guard has also raised the issue of attracting new staff to the service and the need to promote the profession of border guard more widely and actively, as the lack of qualified staff threatens the further successful implementation of the main function of the State Border Guard - "to ensure the integrity of the state border and prevent illegal migration" (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020). One of the solutions, supported by the State Border Guard Service itself, is to promote the visibility of the profession of a border guard in society and to create a positive image in a targeted manner.

In today's highly competitive professional environment (Rozario et al., 2019), it is important to clarify and explore public perceptions of the image

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and popularity of the border guard profession in today's changing circumstances, as these have been under-researched, although they are important in the continuity of the profession. Therefore, the authors of the study presented both theoretical and scientific knowledge on the image of the professional and, by analysing the results of a survey, researched and identified public opinions on the image of the Latvian border guard.

The aim of the study - to investigate the public opinion on the image of the Latvian border guard profession today.

Hypothesis - in today's changing conditions, the image of the border guard is still positive and the profession is competitive.

Research methods used in the study: the theoretical presentation used literature analysis to assess the topic of the study in the published materials, practical experimental part conducted a questionnaire.

Theoretical basis

Every profession is worthy of respect - each has a vital role to play in the full functioning of society, its growth and well-being (Latvijas Izglītības un zinātnes darbinieku arodbiedrības Padome, 2020). According to Richard Tavney's opinion, a profession is "not just a collection of individuals who earn their living doing the same job ", but also "a collection of people who carry out their work in accordance with rules designed to establish standards both for the better protection of its members and for the better service of society" (Armstrong, 2019; Tawney, 1982). The British sociologist M. Sacks has a similar view of the concept of profession, calling it a special kind of occupation (or profession) that can be filled only after special training, embodying both a professional ethos and special skills (Saks, 2012). To describe it, he highlights the following characteristics: it has unique and positive qualities, including distinctive knowledge and skills (Saks, 2012). In a similar vein, Austrian researcher Lee Armstrong argues that the profession is based on a traditionally structured professional status, linked to a defined educational system and an established professional code of ethics that defines certain core values of the professional culture: integrity, honesty and responsibility (Armstrong, 2019). Whereas Iranian researchers F. Ghadirian, M. Salsali, M. A. Cheraghi highlight factors such as: 1) a pool of knowledge acquired through formal education, 2) a high level of competence, 3) inclusion criteria, 4) a professional certification process and 5) a set of behavioural and attitudinal norms known as professionalisation (Ghadirian et al., 2014). According to the British researcher M. Sack, a profession that possesses the above-mentioned professional image factors and characteristics enjoys full public trust (Saks, 2012), which can be seen as both a kind of validation that ensures the status and prestige of the

profession, and as a challenge that the profession has to overcome to maintain its viability.

An image is a kind of representation of societal perceptions and stereotypes that have been created through experience. Sociologist Alexei Vorobyov, agreeing with the ideas of French scientist Gustave Lebon, highlights the importance of the image in shaping public opinion: "An image is an emotionally saturated idea that embodies vitality and subsequently triggers action" (Vorobjovs, 2002). In A. Vorobjovs' opinion, an image is that which inspires and influences a certain part of society, which willingly submits to a certain character through its emotional experience and attitude (Vorobjovs, 2002). An image can thus be defined as a public image with a certain stimulating message and which has its own credibility weight.

The image of the profession also includes concepts such as 'professional image' (these are also mutually influential), defined by American professor Laura Morgan Roberts, whose research focuses on organisational management and leadership, as a set of traits and skills that reflect perceptions of competence and character as judged by key constituencies (i.e. customers, bosses, subordinates, colleagues) (Roberts, 2017). This concept refers to one's externally oriented public persona, mainly focusing on reflected evaluations (how others perceive one) rather than one's self-image. L. M. Roberts concludes that a professional's image is formed in interpersonal interactions (Roberts, 2017), because "people are constantly observing [...] behaviour and developing theories about [...] competence, character and commitment which are quickly spread throughout the [...] workplace (Stark, 2020; quoted from an interview with L. M. Roberts, 2020)". Austrian researcher Lee Armstrong, on the other hand, in her publication "A New Image for a New Profession: Self-image and Representation in the Professionalisation of Design in Britain, 1945-1960" (2019) in the context of a professional image, Valerie Fournier recognises that being a professional is not just about acquiring knowledge, but about acting and constituting oneself accordingly (Armstrong, 2019; Fournier, 1999). So, when a person pursues a profession, he or she needs to develop a professional self-image, or a professional's perception of him or herself (Armstrong, 2019). Similarly, the theme of Armstrong's professional image and identity is also highlighted in the insights of British sociologist Geoffrey Millerson. He stresses that professional image has 3 dynamics: self-perception, which determines and reinforces the content of professional behaviour and adherence to it; self-esteem; public (including other professionals) evaluation (Armstrong, 2019; Millerson, 1964). He also offers his interpretation of professional identity as "a set of perceptions, attitudes and beliefs about educational achievements and background, working conditions, life style, belonging and loyalty". (Armstrong, 2019; Millerson,

1964). In her publication "Theoretical Foundations of Teacher's Professional Identity" (2019), Latvian psychology professor M. Vidnere highlights the importance of professional self-awareness (it is one of the key factors) in constructing the image of a professional, defining it as a person's self-awareness, for whom a particular professional activity is the main means of realising one's personal value as a formative personality (Vidnere, 2019). In principle, professional self-awareness is a self-assessment of one's own professionalism, which M. Vidnere describes as the objective ability to evaluate the scope of one's work on the basis of one's developed skills, professional mastery, quality, professional performance (Vidnere, 2019). It can be concluded that professionalism is a critical element in the image of the professional, which is a measure of the degree of self-actualisation. Professionalism in its expression reflects the demand of society. The relationship between the professional and the public, on the other hand, must be built on culture, integrity, honesty and the values of accountability (Armstrong, 2019). Similar thoughts are shared by L. M. Roberts in her article "Changing faces: building a professional image in different organisational environments" (Roberts, 2017) stresses that a positive professional image is shaped by both personal and social identity (Roberts, 2017). In particular, she highlights the importance of social identity in the successful management of an impression, which effectively performs two tasks: building credibility and maintaining authenticity (Roberts, 2017). The question arises, how can this be achieved when, in the public's estimation, the only respectable basis for demonstrating professionalism is ability and knowledge? (Armstronga, 2019) L. M. Robert's view of making a positive impression is to try to "educate others about the positive qualities of a given identity group, to advocate on behalf of the members of the identity group and to incorporate one's own identity experiences into workplace interactions and innovation"(Stark, 2020; from an interview with L. M. Roberts). Thus, to gain public trust, a professional must demonstrate a professional performance that promotes a purposeful representation of the profession, highlighting all the unique characteristics and advantages of the profession, including the professional's opportunities for self-realisation.

The impression factor plays an important role in evaluating the image of a profession in order to influence public opinion positively. Public perceptions of image are influenced by a set of interrelated factors: each individual's living and working environment, emotional experience, visual appearance, world view, value system, behavioural culture, verbal and non-verbal communication. These factors determine the attitudinal position (i.e. positive/negative; valuable/less valuable, etc.). Visual perceptions, or "visual codes" according to L. Armstrong, are important for forming impressions about the image of a profession (Armstrog, 2019), which is symbolic of the

character. Each of us has our own signature of professional presence - an indelible statement we make as soon as we appear. It is the energy we bring to a room, and the confidence and initiative we demonstrate. It gives us the opportunity to instantly connect (Women in Business, 2001).

Positive representation of the profession provides feedback, which in turn has a positive impact on its prestige. It is a specific public evaluation, made up of members of the profession itself, clients, the general public and other professional groups (Latvijas Izglītības un zinātnes darbinieku arodbiedrības, 2016). Many factors are taken into account when assessing the attractiveness of an occupation: working conditions - employment status, pay and hours (Eiropas Izglītības un kultūras izpildaģentūra, 2015), and the working environment and conditions in which the industry must work (Latvijas Izglītības un zinātnes darbinieku arodbiedrības Padome, 2016) and opportunities for self-realisation. Positive evaluation builds public trust and confidence.

The theoretical findings provide a general idea of the key features and factors of the image of a profession and the image of a professional or an industry representative, which is the basis for further research on the topic.

The image of the Latvian border guard in the context of legislation

A border guard is an official having a state power and who ensures the protection of an object of national importance - the state border. It is one of the oldest professions, which has been praised, revered and idealised, as well as vilified and vilified, at different points in history. This image also permeates mythological narratives. In Latvia, for example, we identify the profession with the literary image of *Tālavas Taurētājs* (Bugler of Tālava) who stands guard day and night at the borders of the country. It is his mission to monitor and protect the borders of his homeland from enemies so that his people feel safe. In essence, a country cannot exist without this profession.

This profession has existed in Latvia since 7 November 1919, when the first border guards started to form the service and guard the state border. In the historical context, border guards as a profession have been both a Ministry of Defence (1919-1922 and 1991-1997) and the Ministry of the Interior, where it was assigned certain social roles: soldier, civil servant, public official. Currently, a border guard is a profession representing the professional public service of the Ministry of the Interior. According to Article 10 (1) and (2) of the Law of the Republic of Latvia "On State Border Guard Law" of 5 November 2020, "a border guard is an officer of the State Border Guard who has been granted a special rank of service" (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020) and which perform tasks delegated by the State Border Guard in the field of state border control and border surveillance and the prevention

of illegal migration. Whereas the status of an official is defined in Section 32(1) of the Law on the Structure of Public Administration - "In the public administration, officials are included in a single hierarchical system in which one official is subordinate to another official. An official shall act within the limits of his competence and shall perform his duties and exercise his rights independently (Valsts pārvaldes iekārtas likums, 2002). Accordingly, Section 2(6) of the Law on Remuneration of Officials and Employees of State and Local Government Institutions provides that persons who [...] are employed by [...] institutions on the basis of an employment contract, who [...] perform public service, who are appointed, confirmed or have been appointed to an office or otherwise perform certain duties, shall be considered officials (service, work) duties in a state or local authority (Valsts un pašvaldību institūciju amatpersonu un darbinieku atlīdzības likums, 2009). The statutory social status sets limits on the profession's activities, which are inherently restrictive in order to strengthen public confidence in the profession.

Given the important mission of the Latvian border guard, it is a certain image with its own positive and unique qualities. There are certain selection criteria for the suitability of the image of the profession. It is a citizen of the Republic of Latvia, aged between 18 and 40 years, who has at least secondary education and who, by his/her personal qualities, physical fitness and state of health, is suitable for service in the State Border Guard (Valsts robežsardzes koledžas Padome, 2022). It should be noted that a border guard leaves the service at the age of 50, which is another feature of the profession's image.

A person who wishes to become a border guard and serve in the Border Guard shall confirm his/her desire to serve his/her homeland by a solemn oath: "I, border guard (name, surname), swear to be honest and truthful, faithful to the Republic of Latvia, to perform my duties in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, international treaties, laws and other normative acts, to spare no effort, health and life, to protect the Republic of Latvia and its independence and to serve the general interests of society" (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020). It is a symbolic act of a person voluntarily choosing to join the service and to serve his country and society by expressing his readiness. Given the historical tradition of service, society has traditionally looked forward to this pledge, which sets out symbolic codes of values: honesty, justice, loyalty, strength, health, life and service.

The uniform is characteristic of the border guard profession. The uniform is a direct symbol of the idea and power of the State (Students, 1940). The uniform is an integral attribute of the service, having both a functional use and conveying non-verbal messages about the wearer's professional identity and status. The uniform, with all its distinctive insignia, gives a visual

impression of the importance and necessity of the profession, both to the wearer and to society as a whole.

A border guard is under the protection of the state - his life and health are protected by the state (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020). But in return, they are required to keep their word when they take the oath and to carry out their duties in a professional manner. According to the modern Latvian legislation, in order to protect the interests of the State, the State has: delegated certain tasks and responsibilities to border guards, and granted certain rights (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020). The State provides that border guards shall be armed during the performance of their duties and, if necessary, may use their service weapon in certain situations (Valsts robežsardzes likums, 2020).

The Border Guard's course of service and professional code of ethics prescribe a model of internal relations and hierarchical order based on military principles, as well as positive, courteous and "gentlemanly behaviour", so that during service a border guard has only the opportunity to professionally self-realise and represent himself within this model.

The image of the border guard in itself represents the image of the defender of the state, who is entrusted by both the state and its people with the surveillance and control of a strategically important state object - the state border, as well as its protection from the enemy. This determines the status and importance of the profession. In terms of the mission of the profession, this image inherently conveys a very favourable and positive image of itself, which generates full public confidence in the profession and in the sector as a whole.

Study results and analysis

A semi-structured questionnaire was used to collect the primary data needed for the study. To obtain qualitative data, the authors of the study defined the criteria for the participants: people who use computers, mobile phones and social networks on a daily basis; young people aged 15 and older; adults aged up to 69; people from different regions of Latvia. A random sampling method was used to study the elements of the cluster. To identify public opinion, the authors spoke to people of different ages, genders and educational backgrounds. From 14 April to 18 April 2022 VisiDati.lv an anonymous survey was published on the survey service's website. In order to obtain public opinion on the topic, the authors invited members of the target audience to participate in a survey using the social networking tool www.facebook.lv Messenger. As a result, almost half of the 150 respondents invited to take part in the survey responded to the invitation, that is 69 persons (46%). Of these, only 28 were men aged 17-50 and 41 women aged

17-62. The average age of the respondents was 36.9 years. The respondents were from Jelgava, Valmiera, Rezekne, Daugavpils, Jurmala, Riga, the Baltic Sea Region and other small towns, sparsely populated areas, rural areas. As it was important to find out what contemporary society thinks about the image of the Latvian border guard, the authors did not focus on a detailed analysis of demographic data, but instead analysed the content of the surveys.

The authors deliberately asked the participants in question 1 to provide associations (first thoughts and impressions) about the border guard as an image. Taking into account the fact that the participants had not yet explored the topic of the questionnaire, the answers of the respondents can be considered as intuitive associations. Each respondent could write down three associations. The most frequently mentioned terms were: "state border/border and border" - 24 mentions of; "uniform" - 21; "national security" - 17; "national defence" - 8; "passport control" - 6; "border control" - 5; "service dog" - 5; "corruption" - 5; "patriot" - 4; "courage" - 4; "guard" - 4; "smuggling" - 4; "national image" - 3; "national calling card" - 3; "homeland" - 3; "responsibility" - 3; " duty car" - 3; "green" - 3. Among the answers were the following qualities of a border guard: 'courageous', 'honest', 'well-groomed', 'helpful', 'suave', 'orderly', 'poised', 'professional' and 'manly'; service values: 'team spirit', 'strength', 'responsibility', 'courage', 'selflessness', 'endurance' and 'respect'; expressions such as 'Your documents, please! "Please, your documents!", "Lie down!" and "Honour to serve Latvia!"; associations related to belonging: 'My grandfather S.B. was a Latvian border guard', 'Latgale', 'East'; other associations describing the profession: 'the most popular profession in the border area', 'a secure job with social guarantees', 'stressful work', 'useless profession', 'weapons', 'battle', 'discipline', 'forest life' and 'big boots'. These first-moment associations give a general idea of how the profession is visually perceived by the public. This is broadly in line with the image of border guards presented in the media.

When further questions were processed, the following situation emerged:

- Question 2 "Who is a border guard?" 9 participants answered "soldier", 50 - "law enforcement officer of a security authority", 10 - "civil servant".
- Using a Likert scale, participants gave their ratings on the 4 statements in question 3:
  - *For statement 1 "The border guard profession is important for national security", 41 respondents (59.4% of the total number of respondents) answered "strongly agree", 18 participants (26.1%) - "rather agree", 8 participants (11.6%) - "strongly disagree",*

1 participant (1.4%) "rather disagree" and 1 participant (1.4%) "neither agree nor disagree";

- *In statement 2 "Border guard is a prestigious profession in Latvia today", the most frequent answers were "rather agree" - 22 participants (31.9%) and "neither agree nor disagree" - 22 participants (31.9%). 18 respondents (26.1%) answered "rather disagree", 4 participants (5.8%) - "strongly disagree" and 3 participants (4.3%) - "strongly agree";*
- *Statement 3 "The prestige and reputation of the border guard profession depends on each individual border guard" was most frequently answered "strongly agree" by 28 participants (40.6%) and "rather agree" by 21 participants (30.4%). 12 participants (17.4%) answered "strongly disagree", 5 participants (7.2%) - "neither agree nor disagree" and 3 participants (4.3%) - "rather disagree".*

The answers provided show that the public is aware of the status of the professional identity of a border guard. It is a law enforcement officer. The data from the survey show that the general public is aware of the importance of the profession of border guard in maintaining national security, but they are not convinced that this profession is prestigious. The overwhelming majority of respondents agree that the actions, behaviour and attitudes of each border guard affect the prestige and reputation of the profession.

- In questions 4, 5 "Name three factors that positively influence the image of a border guard", "Name three factors that negatively influence the image of a border guard", the participants' answers were summarised and systematised into groups. The article presents the 10 most frequently mentioned positive and 10 negative factors. It should be noted that the answers of the respondents for many of the negative factors were identical or very similar, therefore the number of answers is higher than the number of answers for the positive factors. There was a wide range of opinions on the positive factors, suggesting that members of the public see many positive advantages and features of the profession that may have the potential to further promote the image of border guards.

<p style="text-align: center;">Table 1 **Factors influencing the profession of border guard**</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">(created by the authors)</p>

Positive factors		Negative factors	
Name of the factor	**Number of responses**	**Name of the factor**	**Number of responses**
Professionalism and competence of the border guard	14	Corrupt crime, bribe-taking	30
Tidy external, visual appearance	12	Rude, bold behaviour, intolerant, unkind attitude, disrespect	13
Honesty, justice	11	Messy, dirty uniform, ruthless wearing of it	13
Publicity about the work of border guards, their achievements and other positive things	8	Incompetence, unprofessionalism, ineptitude, lack of knowledge and skills of border guards	11
Uniform	8	Low, uncompetitive pay	10
Stable, good remuneration	7	Superficiality, negligence, carelessness in the performance of official duties	5
Communication skills	7	Negative attitude of the border guard himself towards the service and the state, making negative statements in public	5
Positivity, smile	5	Abuse of power	5
Education	5	Drinking alcohol (outside work) in public places	5
Responsiveness	5	Insufficient physical fitness	4

According to the survey data, it can be concluded that the public, firstly, appreciates the appearance, physical fitness level, communication skills and professionalism of a border guard, secondly, is informed about the specifics and achievements of a border guard, thirdly, likes to learn positive things about border guards, fourthly, is not satisfied with negative news and observations about the inaction or criminal behaviour of a border guard.

- The answers to the hierarchical question 6 "Rank in order of priority from 1 to 10 the factors that are important for the positive image of border guards (1 - "least important", 10 - "most important")" are summarised in Table 2 and revealed the public opinion on the positive factors of the profession (as defined by the authors).

Table 2 **Public assessment of factors influencing the positive image of border guards** (created by the authors)

Factor name by order of importance	Place	Points
Professional honesty and justice	10	512
Responsibility and competence	9	468
Patriotism, loyalty	8	447
Good physical fitness	7	419
Ability to communicate in a foreign language	6	379
Discipline	5	368
Maintained appearance, uniform in order	4	368
Communicability	3	342
Agility	2	272
Eloquence	1	220

At the beginning of the study, the authors put forward their own positive influences on the border guard profession, with the aim of assessing public opinion. They concluded that, in general, the factors identified by the respondents were in line with those identified by the authors. Of the positive factors identified by the authors, the survey respondents ranked professional integrity and fairness, responsibility and competence, and patriotism and loyalty highest. These are high values in society.

- In question 7 "Please rate to what extent the following factors influence your opinion of the State Border Guard Service and border guards?" respondents rated the levels of influence of the factors using a Likert scale. Using a Likert scale, the respondents gave their ratings on 4 channels of information:
  - *"Personal experience" 44 respondents (63.8%) answered "very influenced", 14 participants (20.3%) "somewhat influenced", 7 participants (10.1%) "neutral", 4 participants (5.8%) "not influenced" and no participants (0%) "rarely influenced";"Experiences told by relatives, friends and acquaintances" 27 respondents (39.1%) answered "somewhat influenced", 18 participants (26.1%) - "very influenced", 17 participants (24.6%) - "neutral", 4 participants (5.8%) "rarely influenced" and 3 participants (4.3%) "not influenced";*
  - *"Information in the media (TV, radio, press and internet news portals)" 23 respondents (33.3%) answered "neutral", 20 participants (29%) "somewhat influenced", 14 participants (20.3%) "very influenced", 9 participants (13%) "rarely influenced" and 3 participants (4.3%) "not influenced";*

- *"Information, comments, feedback on social networks and blogs" 22 respondents (31.9%) answered "neutral", 12 respondents (17.4%) "very influential", 12 respondents (17.4%) "somewhat influential", 12 respondents (17.4%) "not influential" and 11 respondents (15.9%) "rarely influential".*

The data show that respondents say they rely on their personal experience as a priority, and listen a little to the opinions of relatives, friends and acquaintances. The majority of respondents are neutral about the media, social networks and blogs. However, there is a section of society that is very much or very little influenced by the information disseminated in the media.

- In the closed-ended question 9, 53 respondents chose the answer "Yes". This is 76.8% of the total number of respondents. 16 respondents chose the answer "No". This represents 23.2% of the total number of respondents. The data show that the overwhelming majority of respondents trust the opinion expressed by border guards in the media.
- In the closed-ended question 10, "Is the image of border guards generally positively portrayed in the media?", 56 respondents (81.2%) chose the answer "Yes", while 13 respondents (18.8%) chose the answer "No". The data show that an overwhelming majority of respondents appreciate that the image of the border guard is positively represented in the media.
- In closed-ended question 11, "Does the media provide objective information about border guards?", 46 respondents (66.7%) chose the answer "Yes", while 23 respondents (33.3%) chose the answer "No". The data show that the overwhelming majority of participants agree that the border guard is the country's identity card.
- In the closed-ended question 12 "Do you agree with the award "Border Guard is the country's calling card"?", 56 respondents (81.2%) chose the answer "Yes", while 13 respondents (18.8%) chose the answer "No"..
- The answers to the open-ended question 13 "Name professions with similar prestige as border guards" are summarised in Table 3.

Participants mainly identified public sector professions that play an important role in the life of the country and society, and professions that do not require similar skills and knowledge.

- In closed-ended question 14, "Is border guarding a popular profession nowadays?" 37 respondents (53.6%) chose the answer "Yes", while 32 respondents (46.4%) chose the answer "No". The results show that, at the moment, by a small margin (7.2%),

respondents agree that the profession of border guard is popular and known.

Table 3 **Similar prestigious professions to border guards**
(created by the authors)

Name of the profession	Number of answers	Name of the profession	Number of answers
Police officer	46	President	1
Firefighter	23	Priest	1
NAF recruit	22	Lecturer	1
Customs officer	11	Lawyer	1
Home Guard	9	Municipal police officer	1
Teacher	8	Prison officer	1
Doctor	4	Security service officer	1
Security	2	Truck driver	1
Attorney	2	Janitor	1
Military police officer	2	Summer seasonal road worker	1
Forest ranger	2		

The data obtained enable the identification of factors influencing public opinion, as well as the necessary impulses for the development of a positive image of the Latvian border guard and the promotion of the profession.

Conclusions and proposals

This empirical study is comprehensive and representative, based on the thoughts and emotions of survey respondents at a given point in time. The study provides valuable insights into the public's assessment of the image of the Latvian border guard, and is a valuable source of data analysis for further representation of a positive image of the border guard.

The profession of border guard is a speciality that exists on a long-established model of professionalism. This involves establishing and maintaining traditional values, adhering to a professional code of ethics and maintaining a culture of interaction and communication characteristic of the service.

The image of the border guard is one of the key factors ensuring the competitiveness of the profession. It is the members of the profession who build and maintain the prestige and reputation of the profession.

The public values professionalism, the highest human values (honesty, justice, patriotism, loyalty, etc.), kind and responsive communication, visual

image, as well as positive publicity about the sector, the achievements of border guards and other positive events. The public generally has a positive image of Latvian border guards and trusts them, but also recognises that the image of the profession is negatively affected by the unprofessionalism, unethical behaviour and negative communication of border guards serving in the sector. In principle, the authors' hypothesis - that in today's changing public perception the image of border guards is still positive and the profession is competitive - has been confirmed. However, in today's changing circumstances, the continued competitiveness of the profession must contribute to the development of a positive image of the border guard. Border guards themselves need to carefully develop their professional image. The State Border Guard should organise more active and meaningful events and activities to bring border guards together, to strengthen their professional identity and belonging. The State Border Guard College should take the initiative to teach young cadets to take care of their image before they start their service in the State Border Guard services.

Summary

Border guards are one of the oldest professions in the world, ensuring the security and integrity of national borders. Today, the core task of a border guard has remained unchanged, but the working methods have changed. However, globalization and the mobility of workers around the world have contributed to changes in the range of professions and their popularity. Significant changes in the labour market have contributed to the emergence of new professions and the decline in popularity of many existing professions. The profession of border guard is also experiencing a decline in popularity. The image of the border guard is one of the key factors ensuring the competitiveness of the profession.

In today's highly competitive professional environment (Rozario et al., 2019), it is important to identify and explore public perceptions of the image of the border guard profession and its popularity in today's changing circumstances, as these have not been sufficiently explored to date, although they are important in the continuity of the profession. Therefore, the authors of the study both summarized scientific and theoretical findings on the image of the professional and, by analyzing the results of a survey, investigated and identified public opinions on the image of the Latvian border guard. The public values professionalism, the highest human values (honesty, justice, patriotism, loyalty, etc.), kind and responsive communication, visual image, as well as positive publicity about the sector, achievements of border guards and other positive events. The public generally has a positive image of Latvian border guards and trusts them, but also recognizes that the image of

the profession is negatively affected by the unprofessionalism, unethical behaviors and negative communication of border guards serving in the sector. In principle, the authors' hypothesis - that in today's changing circumstances, the image of border guards is still positive and the profession is competitive - has been confirmed.

In today's changing circumstances, the continued competitiveness of the profession must contribute to the development of a positive image of the border guard. Border guards themselves need to carefully develop their professional image. The State Border Guard should organize more active and meaningful events and activities to bring border guards together, strengthen their professional identity and belonging.

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DOCUMENT CHECK AT BORDER CONTROL AS A BASIC ELEMENT OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF LATVIA

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Abstract: *The aim of the current research is to make extensive study of the document check process, to examine it's legal and practical matters within the State Border Guard of Latvia and to define necessary actions to develop the process mentioned above. To achieve the aim, following objectives were defined: to study the legal matters of the document check process in State Border Guard, to evaluate State Border Guard's technical means in the field of document check, to study practical aspects in document check process according to data collected from respondents within State Border Guard, to analyze the problematics of the document check process in State Border Guard and to define the necessary development decisions. Following research methods were used: monographic or descriptive method, document analysis, logic- constructive method, analytic method, sociological survey method. Within the topic of Document check at border control as a basic element of internal security in the Republic of Latvia, the authors thoroughly examined the process of document check, its legal and practical aspects within the example of State Border Guard of Latvia and also defined necessary development actions in the period between years 2017 and November 2021.*

Keywords: *document check, effectiveness, technical means, second line.*

Introduction

Border guards perform border control and allow those persons, vehicles, loads and items to cross border, whose documents are drawn up correctly to cross border. Majority of the violations are stated and recorded in border crossing points. The special professional knowledge of border guards in the field of document technical check is one of the "weapons" in the process of document falsification. The process of travel document falsification is developing very fast and the criminal groups involved in this process are constantly introducing new falsification methods, for example, manipulations with counter-falsification devices and methods of bypassing biometric checks (Arnese-Vessere, 2021). Persons who travel with falsified documents are extremely dangerous because they conceal their true identity

and true purpose of travel. Already in 2016, the terrorist attack on Christmas market (www.apollo.lv, 2017) showed that there is a necessity for a thorough check of persons' identity and documents, and the amendments in the Schengen's Border Code were introduced. Observing current political situation in neighboring states, one should verify the positive intends of every person by conducting qualitative person and vehicle document check by using available resources.

Within current article, the authors analyzed legal aspects of document checks, the correspondence of infrastructure and technical means to different demands, and also different factors that influence theoretical and practical aspects of document check.

Legal basis of document check

The document check process in State Border Guard (further – the SBG) is organized according to demands of European Union (further – EU) and Latvian legal acts. In the current chapter the authors combine legal acts of the EU that state the process of document check and bounded conditions. Legal acts of the Republic of Latvia are composed according to the previous legal basis and shall not be addressed in the current research.

The EU has its common policy (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012) which assures that there are no border checks for persons crossing EU internal borders disregard their citizenship and that the border checks on external border are being performed and also that the common integrated external border management system will be introduced as it is stated in the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. By cancelling border control on internal borders, the accent is being placed on the untouchability of the external border of member states. It means that the common territory without control on internal borders – the Schengen area – needs common management of external borders. Border control is one of the strategic parts of the EU border management (Frontex, 2019) and it is still in hands of national authorities.

The Republic of Latvia is a full valued member of the Schengen area since December 21, 2007 (www.mfs.gov.lv, 2007) and it cancelled the border control on internal borders. So, the Schengen acquis is applicable for Latvia as well. The "Recommendations and best practices in correct implementation of Schengen acquis" were introduced in 2002 and were implemented in the Schengen Catalogue (Schengen Catalogue on External border control, 2009). It was drawn up in two columns, with the required for acquis level from one side and with the optimal experience for member states from the other – even if this experience is on desirable level and not on obligatory one (Gaveika, 2014). As to the access to data bases, it is

believed that border guards on the first line should have access to various data bases including the Visa Information System (further – VIS), national data bases and also to the falsified document data base.

Persons' movement within the Schengen area is regulated according to the Schengen Borders Code and it is supposed that there is no border control for persons who travel within internal borders between EU member states. The Code states regulations for the control of those persons who cross the external borders of the EU (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016). Persons who cross the external borders of the EU are being subjected to the border checks, or the accordingly regulated actions that are meant to state the probability of legal border crossing. The aim of these checks is to state and record the fact of border crossing and the fact of entry, stay, transit and exit as well as the fact that goods and items are being imported or exported from Latvia in legal way. The registration of the border crossing fact by checking the travel and entrusting document is performed by border guards.

The article 8 of the Schengen Borders Code (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016) states that all persons are being exposed to minimal check in order to proof their identity according to possessed travel documents. These checks are performed rapidly and to the purpose, if necessary, using technical means and data bases to prove the ownership and exclude the possibility of fraud. As to the third country nationals the full check is being performed. This check is performed to assure the observation of entry rules stated in the Schengen Borders Code and to perform document check that give the rights to stay and perform professional actions in the country. It is stated that during the border check one should assure that the person's document is valid for border crossing and that the person owns a visa or residence permit if needed. The entry and exit stamps, the travel route and – if necessary – the fact approval documents should be checked as well. Separate article states that thorough check should be performed to assure that the document is not falsified.

Under the pressure of internal security alerts the Schengen Borders Code was amended in 2017 by enhancing the checks at external borders with relevant data bases (Official Journal of the European Union, 2017). The amendments concerned the persons who have the rights for free movement, the border checks including the document checks. In order to assure that persons are not hiding their identity the travel documents are systematically checked through data bases and the check of person's identity, citizenship, document authenticity is being performed. The member states must perform travel documents through Schengen Information System (further – SIS) and Interpol data base. All the checks mentioned above must be performed to all persons that are crossing external border disregard their citizenship.

The organization of document check in State Border Guard

According to relevant literature, the process is a complex of different actions that are being performed to succeed a certain result, but the organization of the process is the planning of these actions and resources in current time and place. Slavinska (2005) mentions the organizational process as the concentration and division of resources the creation of structure in order to achieve certain goals in the most effective manner. The organization of a process could be defined as the complex of actions that assures the rational use of labor force that includes relevant arrangement of an employee in a relevant process, the cooperation, the coordination and stimulation of work, workplace design, the aliment and adjustment of workplace according to certain tasks (GOST 19605-74, 1974). In order to organize checks in different border crossing points, one should take into account not only the accordance of actions to certain legal regulation, but also the correspondence and effectiveness of these actions.

The Law on the State border of the Republic of Latvia (Latvijas Vestnesis, 2009) states that the relevant regime is actual in border crossing point (further – BCP) to ensure the security system and to provide appropriate conditions for the work of involved institutions. According to functional infrastructure of a BCP this regime is divided into border check zone regime, closed BCP territory regime and opened BCP territory regime. The document check is being performed within the border check zone regime. Only limited number of persons can stay in such zone thus assuring the appropriate work conditions for a border guard which is performing the check of persons, vehicles or documents. According to Wiśniewski (2019), these are opened places where, according to relevant documentation, it is allowed to cross the border.

The state's external land border BCPs are build up with lanes, road signs and different markings to provide correct directions for nationals of different countries. Similar infrastructure is provided in airport BCPs – with the help of informative signs, markings and interactive stands persons are being directed to corresponding queues and control booths. Returning to land BCPs, the infrastructure there (administrative building, control booths etc.) is similar, but is subordinated to passenger flows, e.g., the premises of Terehova BCP is larger than Paternieki one because the flows there are much more intensive.

Document check, as a part of border control, at a national level is regulated by the Setup of State Border Guard (Latvijas Vestnesis, 2005) which states that the organization of work is regulated by the State Border Guard Statute. Riga territorial board Statute (2017), Ludza territorial board Statute (2014) and Daugavpils territorial board Statute (2014) on their hand

state that BCPs are performing person and vehicle border checks according to the legal regulations. Analyzing mentioned statutes, it is clear that corresponding border crossing points are authorized to perform border checks, but the chiefs of these BCPs are leading and organizing the work of structural units according to relevant legal acts. The chiefs are organizing the service by resource planning, task preparation for involved border guards, providing instructions, controlling service performance, and by summarizing and analyzing the results. Border guards on duty, on their hand, are performing border checks at first line and, if the thorough check is needed – on the second line.

The document check process consists of several stages during each border guards perform document authentication test in order to state if the document is genuine, issued by an official institution, perform the document integrity test in order to state if nobody made any manipulations with the document or any kind of changes (partial or complete falsification) (Frontex, 2021) and also the check for the validity of the document in order to make sure that document is not declared as lost or stolen or if it is not a pseudo-document. The term "authenticity" was defined by Nastula (2018) as one including such notions as "authoritative", "true", "original".

Competence of personnel involved in the document check

The knowledge and abilities of personnel is a very subjective notion, especially if it concerns responsibilities to solve different individual issues that depend on a number of factors. The knowledge is one of key recourses. Same as capital assets the knowledge shorten time that is necessary to achieve a goal. Research, made in 2004 in 121 major companies in Poland, made clear that these companies suffered significant losses due to ineffective knowledge and information management (Nowakowski, 2006). The competence and knowledge of officials is a significant tool to state their effectiveness. The management and acknowledgement of employees' competence, in order to use this potential, is needed to ensure effective work of an institution (Dem'janchenko, 2012).

Authors made a survey among SBG officials involved in document check process and according to this survey, the qualification in the field of technical document examination is as follows:

1) First level document examination specialist (lower qualification level) – 44%
2) First level document examination specialist + qualification courses, seminars in the field of document authentication – 7,5%
3) Second level document examination specialist (higher qualification level) – 37,5%

4) Second level document examination specialist + qualification courses, seminars in the field of document authentication – 11%

More than a half of respondents – 55% – discovered a falsified document during recent 3 years (without taking in consideration COVID-19 period). The quantity of detected falsified among respondents is as follows:

1) 1-3 falsified documents – 66,2% of respondents
2) 4-6 falsified documents – 25,4% of respondents
3) 7-9 falsified documents – 5,6% of respondents
4) >10 falsified documents – 2,8% of respondents.

Among officials who detected 1-3 falsified documents 55% were Second level document examination specialists, among those who detected 4-6 documents 72% were Second level specialists. Among officials who detected 7-9 falsified documents the qualification level divides equally – 50% for each qualification level. On the other hand, only Second level specialists detected 10 or more falsified documents. As to experience level, 63% of respondents who detected a falsified document have more than 8 years long service experience. Thus, authors state that most falsified document detections are within officials who served in SBG for 8 years and longer and have higher document examination qualification.

Legal and practical application of technical means used for document examination

The effectiveness, quantity and quality of document check is highly dependent on such factors as season, intensity of passenger flow, available resources, risk analysis, competence of personnel, epidemic restrictions and technical resources. In this chapter authors touch upon the legal and practical implementation of document examination technical means available for State Border Guard as well as the correspondence of these means to different recommendations and standards.

Legally the technical means necessary for document primal examination are determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia (2010). According legislation state that primal document examination devices are:

1) Automatic document visual and codified signal reading devise. Practically these are stational document reader "Regula 7024" and portable document examinators "Regula 8333", "Regula 7337"
2) Optic magnification device with illumination. Practically – portable document examinator "Regula 1025"
3) Illumination devices with variable light wave length. Practically – the video spectral comparator "Regula 4205".

The Cabinet of Ministers (2010) also defines the border check and border surveillance technical means for falsification sign verification and

visualization in person, vehicle and authorization document during primal check at border crossing points. These are:

1) Automatic devices for document visual and codified signal checks
2) Microscopes with digital cameras
3) Video spectral comparators
4) Sets of measuring and auxiliary tools.

In September 21, 2021 the European Border and Coast guard agency, Frontex, (2021), set Frontex standards. Among others the technical standards for portable document examination equipment (Frontex, 2021) set minimal demands to compact magnifying devices with different illumination sources. At the current moment, border guards use devices that follow mentioned standards only partially. The devices almost correspond to the minimal demands of Frontex standards, but they consist many functions that are mentioned in the standards, e.g., infra-red illumination source with 980nm wave length, ultra-violet sources of 254nm, 313nm and 400nm. High functional concentration in several control buttons lower the practicality and simplicity of the devices, also there is no function of equal illumination in mentioned devices. According to the survey data, 79,6% of respondents recognize the portable document examination device "Regula 1025" as the most effective primal examination technical mean. Authors admit that mentioned device could be found in any specific border crossing point and could be applied on the spot.

Conclusion

Within current research, the authors made insight into the document check process. Authors analyzed the legal basis of the European Union that regulates the essence of document check, its volume and organization. Also, the document check organization process on the example of the State Border Guard of Latvia was visualized. Also, the document examination competence of the SBG personnel and the technical basis of the SBG were introduced within the current paper.

During the current research the authors made following conclusions. According to the fact that document check is supporting the internal security of the EU and it includes sensitive data handling, the process is strictly regulated with number of EU and national legal acts which set the volume and order of document check. The State Border Guard organizes the document check process at border crossing points according to a number of external and internal legal acts as well as taking into consideration available technical means, infrastructure and personnel competence. The personnel competence, on its hand, is on a high level which is proved by significant number of detected falsified documents. One should admit that the document

examination technical means available to the SBG are effective and subsistent, they correspond to the modern standards only partially.

Taking into consideration previous conclusions, the authors start following proposals. State Border Guard of Latvia and State Border Guard College should continue fulfilling qualification courses in the field of document examination for SBG officials, in order to maintain their high level of competence and work effectiveness. Anytime soon State Border Guard of Latvia should organize the procurement procedure in the field of modern document examination equipment in order to provide conditions of falsified document effective detection and to maintain high internal security level in the European Union.

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INNOVATIONS IN DATA EXCHANGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TASKS

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Abstract. *Information systems are becoming increasingly important in the functioning of law enforcement authorities. In addition to border control in the area, the exchange of information between national competent services is of particular importance. This process is ensured in the European Union through a number of tools, some of which the Schengen Information System, Passenger Name Record, the Europol's Secure Information Exchange Network Application are.*

Legal instruments such as the Prüm Decisions and the Swedish Initiative have been adopted to reduce legal barriers and accelerate the exchange of information between national competent services. However, criminal threats force to reassessment of the effectiveness of existing cooperation and for even more targeted action. Although existing resources and technological capabilities allow information to be searched online, to perform cross-checks for match detection and rapid data exchange, modern options have not been fully implemented yet. The aim of this article is to analyse the existing instruments for information exchange and to assess the novelties of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA.

Empirical research methods were used in the study. The author of the study comes to the conclusion that the implementation of the Directive requires significant improvements in national regulation.

Keywords: *information exchange, police cooperation, Schengen information system, Swedish Framework Decision.*

Introduction

In assessing the development of police cooperation, it should be noted that it is still relatively new and has not reached maturity. This is not the case to be accepted where 70% of organised crime groups operate in more than three Member States (Eiropols, 2021).

One of the key elements of law enforcement cooperation is the exchange of information. The European Union Security Union Strategy states that important legal, practical and support instruments and tools have already been introduced, but that they both need to be strengthened and better implemented. Significant progress has been made to improve information exchange and intelligence cooperation with Member States and to close the area where terrorists and criminals operate (Brisele, 2020).

The aim of this article is to analyse the existing instruments for information exchange and to assess the novelties of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. The object of research is the legal regulation of information exchange. The subject of the research is legal innovations in cross-border information exchange in Latvia. To achieve the aim set, the author gives an insight into the current instruments and tools in the field of information exchange, evaluates the existing achievements and provides proposals for the improvement of the legal framework at the national level. Empirical and theoretical research methods are used in the research. Analysis of legal documents, observation, as empirical methods. Axiom method of evaluating, analysing, improving informative material; aperception method, forming a personal judgment based on knowledge, as theoretical research methods.

The study has been carried out since the publication of the European Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA. The practical contribution of the article can also apparent in the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to material supporting the development of a common understanding in the field of information exchange.

Information Exchange Tools

The information exchange process covers three important areas: legal basis, information systems/databases, and communication channels.

Information is data or compilations of data, in any technically possible form of fixation, storage or transfer (Informācijas atklātības likums, 1998).

In the context of cross-border cooperation, information at the disposal of one country is relevant in another. National and international law provides a general framework for how such information is to be accessed and for what purposes. This is one of the reasons hindering equal access to information in the same way in the fight against crime.

Looking back at history, the data was initially structured manually, creating files that were replaced by the databases. A structured set of information is called a database. National authorities, in accordance with their competences and functions, establish information sets where data are processed for a specific purpose. The Schengen Information System (hereinafter – the SIS) was set up in the Schengen area, which provides for the free movement of more than 420 million people.

The Schengen Information System is an information system established in accordance with the legislation of the European Union in order to strengthen public order and security in the territory of Member States, ensuring the availability of reports to the competent authorities and institutions of Member States. The SIS is one of the main complementary measures contributing to the maintenance of a high level of security in the area of freedom, security and justice of the Union by supporting operational cooperation of competent national authorities, in particular border guards, police, customs, immigration authorities and authorities responsible for crime prevention, investigation or prosecution of them, or the execution of criminal penalties. The legal framework governing the operation of the SIS and the information exchange processes has been continuously developed through travel from the Convention to the Regulation.

At the national level, the Law on Operation of the Schengen Information System entered into force in 2007, which specifies the procedures for the maintenance and use of the SIS and SIRENE information system in Latvia, institutions and authorities responsible for ensuring of the operation thereof, as well as the functions of these institutions and authorities.

One of the major innovations in the SIS legal framework (Regulation 2018/1861/EU, 2018) provides that Europol will be entitled to access the SIS data and process them. On the other hand, the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA will not affect the provisions applicable to specific systems, such as the SIS.

At the national level, the police shall cooperate with the police (militia) of other countries, international organisations, unions or communities, and shall also participate in international missions and operations in accordance with international agreements which are binding on the Republic of Latvia (Likums "Par policiju", 1991). On the other hand, cooperation mechanisms and capabilities are not defined together in either this or any other law. It is clear that the situation is similar in other countries, because international rules do not regulate these issues together. Legislation is adopted at different times, regulates the defined scope and differs in legal force. In order to strengthen cooperation, the European Union will adopt the Police Cooperation Code in the near future, one of the key aspects of which is to modernise information exchange processes.

Accession to the European Union and to the Schengen area imposed a number of obligations on each Member State, but these are being met unequally.

The Stockholm Programme provided that the European Union Security Information Management Strategy would be based on development based on

professional law enforcement needs; a strict data protection regime in line with the data protection strategy; targeted data collection to protect citizens' fundamental rights and to avoid over-information to competent authorities; basic principles for information exchange policy with third countries for law enforcement purposes; interoperability and overall coherence of information technology systems (Stokholmas programma, 2010). On the basis of this programme, the structuring of the information exchange model has started, developing the legal framework and adapting the technical possibilities. On the basis of this programme, the structuring of the information exchange model has been launched, developing the legal framework and adapting the technical possibilities. In this respect, it must be agreed that "the creation of formal EU mechanisms for law-enforcement cooperation, however, has not changed the fact that policing within the EU is essentially a national function and that accountability for the conduct of law enforcement is primarily to national governments, legislatures and courts" (McCartney et al., 2011).

Analysing the decisions taken in the European Union, one can conclude that, in most cases, they are based on the principle of availability of information. Law enforcement officials in one Member State of the European Union may, in the performance of their duties, obtain information from another Member State in order to achieve an objective specified. However, Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA specifies a number of principles for information exchange:
-       principle of availability;
-       principle of equivalent access;
-       principle of confidentiality (Padomes Pamatlēmums 2006/960/TI, 2006).

The inclusion of new principles in the Directive highlights the problems in the area of the information exchange between Member States.

In 2019 the European Parliament and the Council adopted Regulation 2019/818 establishing a framework for interoperability between the Entry/Exit System, the Visa Information System, the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), EURODAC, the Schengen Information System and the European Criminal Records Information System – Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN) (Regulation 2019/818/EU, 2019).

The need for this Regulation was determined by the need to improve the Union's data management architecture in order to address structural weaknesses that hamper the work of national authorities and to ensure that law enforcement authorities have the necessary information at their disposal. This Regulation introduces new data processing activities aimed at

the correct identification of the persons concerned. These issues will not be addressed in this publication.

The structuring of data management was clearly influenced by the support of the Prüm decisions among Member States. The data exchange under the Prüm Decisions provides for the right of the competent services of the Member States to make requests for information online and to cooperate in the information exchange with their counterparts in other countries.

Back in 2011, studies and researches suggested that forensic DNA profiling and databasing have become increasingly significant resources for criminal investigations in many jurisdictions (McCartney et al., 2011).

The Prüm Decisions aim to promote law enforcement cooperation in the fight against terrorism and cross-border crime. The Prüm decisions introduced the automated information exchange with DNA profiles, dactyloscopic data, vehicle registration data; information exchange on major/significant events; information exchange to prevent terrorist activities, etc. However, in accordance with the procedures laid down at the national level, it is also necessary to draw up separate documents in the execution of these tasks and these arrangements are not uniform in the Member States. The data exchange system operates in a decentralized manner through the national contact points and the conditions for data protection are governed by national laws and regulations. Unfortunately, it has to be noted that there is also a mixed attitude towards automated data processing, with more negativity. This issue cannot be clearly assessed. The public security and the rights of the individual must be assessed. A democratic society plays a role in the public interest. At the international level, the issue of data security in the performance of police tasks is addressed on a hit/no hit basis.

Given that automated access to data is based on a hit/no hit principle or compliance/non-compliance system, it is necessary to ensure and establish procedures at the national level for the competent authorities of the Member States to obtain and exchange part of the coded information. The exchange of such information is intended for the investigation of criminal offences and is necessary for the identification of a natural person. Unfortunately, these facts show that police officers are faced with a dilemma: to carry out or not to carry out an inspection. This is at odds with all the European Union's legal efforts to strengthen police cooperation.

The Prüm system operates on the principle that the requesting country receives an automatic notification for the matching reference and is followed by cooperation on the Swedish Initiative to obtain personal data or other data related to the matching profile. (Padomes Lēmums 2008/615/TI, 2008).

Requesting DNA profiles and dactyloscopic data differs in that the DNA profile cannot be requested to prevent a criminal offence. Dactyloscopic data may also be required for this purpose, as unidentified fingerprints may be found at the scene or a person may need to be identified. Each country has contact points for DNA profile searches, which cannot impose stricter requirements for cooperation with other countries than at the national level.

At the national level, Cabinet Regulation No 620 provides for the procedures by which biological material is collected for the inclusion thereof in the National DNA Database. The information stored in the DNA National Database of the Forensic Service Department can be used to detect criminal offences, search for missing persons and identify unidentified corpses (corpse material).

The DNA profiles and data to be included in the National DNA Database are limited availability information and must be requested by the competent authorities with the consent of the public prosecutor.

On the basis of Cabinet Regulation No 698, investigative institutions have the right to receive information from the National DNA database by applying to the Forensic Service Department with a request approved by the Prosecution Office. The data processing procedure stipulates that requests shall be registered and stored at the Forensic Service Department for five years, as well as a copy of the reply provided shall be kept.

The Prüm Decisions clearly influenced the development of the Biometric Data Processing System (hereinafter – BDPS) at the national level. The Biometric Data Processing Law defines "biometric data" as a set of physical properties of a natural person (digitalized picture of a face, finger (palm) trails or prints). On the other hand, a slightly more detailed definition is provided in another law: "biometric data is personal data after specific technical processing which apply to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person and allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person." (Par fizisko personu datu apstrādi kriminālprocesā un administratīvā pārkāpuma procesā, 2019).

It follows that BDPS is a technological platform that provides the operation of several information systems, i.e. Biometric Data Processing System, Fingerprint Information System of Asylum Seekers and the State Border Guard Automatic Fingerprint Identification System.

Internal Regulations No 41 of the State Police of October 30, 2014, "Procedures for Collection and Inclusion of Biometric Data in the Biometric Data Processing System" of the State Police stipulate that the official who collects them shall be responsible for the authenticity and quality of biometric data. The collection of biometric data takes place during an operational action or an investigative action. The dactyloscopic card is sent to the Forensic Service Department that includes the data in the BDPS.

Some amount of vehicle registration data is available for automated online searches. The Information Centre of the Ministry of the Interior has been designated as the contact point for the exchange of vehicle registration data and the Road Traffic Safety Directorate has been established as the co-responsible authority for resolving technical issues.

Member States have agreed to establish and maintain a common system for the exchange of vehicle and driving licence data, known as the "European Vehicle and Driving Licence Information System" (hereinafter – "EUCARIS"). The purpose of EUCARIS is to ensure that the central registers of vehicles and driving licences of the Parties are accurate and secure; to assist in the prevention and investigation of violations and the prosecution of violations of national laws relating to the field of driving licences, vehicle registration and other vehicle-related counterfeiting and criminal offences; to ensure the rapid information exchange in order to increase the effectiveness of the administrative measures taken by the institutions in accordance with the legal and administrative procedures of the Parties. (Par Līgumu par Eiropas transportlīdzekļu un vadītāja apliecību informācijas sistēmu (EUCARIS), 2002).

Unlike EUCARIS, data on vehicle owners, keepers and vehicle insurance are also available under the Prüm Decisions.

...Prüm offers clear benefits for cross-border policing, it continues to present challenges of a technical and scientific nature as well as legal, ethical and socioeconomic concerns (Sallavaci, 2018).

Another system in which air passenger data is stored is the Passenger Name Record. Terrorist threats introduced innovations in the processing of passenger data on international flights, obliging airlines to transfer passenger data to the competent authority for processing. Passenger Name Record (hereinafter – PNR) was established to track terrorist financing programmes by controlling the flow of suspicious financial transactions. Directive 2016/681 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime provides for the processing of passenger data on external flights for the purpose of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime and holding criminally liable for them.

The Directive provides for the establishment of a passenger information unit (PIU) in each Member State, which is responsible for collecting, storing and processing data and transmitting the relevant data to the competent authorities, and for exchanging data with other EU countries and Europol. In addition, each Member State shall adopt a list of competent authorities that are entitled to request or receive from the PIU PNR data or the results of the processing of that data in order to further verify that information or to take

appropriate action to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist offences or serious crime and to hold criminally liable for them.

At the national level a written request must be made to the court for the location of the authority in order to obtain data from the register.

Finally, it is necessary to describe the contribution of the Swedish Initiative or Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA in the field of information exchange. The aim of the Swedish initiative was to develop rules for the efficient and expeditious exchange of information and intelligence data between law enforcement authorities of Member States in the investigation of criminal offences or collection intelligence data on them. The information and intelligence data shall be provided at the request of the competent law enforcement authority conducting the criminal investigation or collecting the intelligence on a criminal offence in accordance with the powers conferred by national law. Basis for a request of information is detection, prevention, investigation of a criminal offence, if there are factual reasons to believe that the relevant information and intelligence is available in another Member State. The request shall state the actual reasons and explain the purpose for which the information is requested, as well as the link between that purpose and the person who is the subject of the information or intelligence.

At the national level, Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA was implemented in 2009 by the Law on the Exchange of Information for the Prevention, Detection and Investigation of Criminal Offences (hereinafter – the Law on the Exchange of Information) (Noziedzīgo nodarījumu novēršanas, atklāšanas un izmeklēšanas ziņu apmaiņas likums, 2009), which lays down the procedures for requesting and providing information to a competent authority. The purpose of the law is to ensure the rapid information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Latvia and other Member States that investigate criminal offences. Cabinet Regulation No 886 of August 1, 2009, "Regulations on the Contents and Layout of Forms for the Provision of Information for the Prevention, Detection and Investigation of Criminal Offences" is subordinated to the Law on the Exchange of Information.

The Framework Decision provides that Member States may not impose stricter conditions than those existing at the national level. Member States must reply within seven days if they have information on the offences subject to the European Arrest Warrant. On the other hand, in urgent cases one must reply within eight hours. In other cases, a response must be provided within 14 days. In cases where it is not possible to reply within the time limit, the reasons for preventing it from being complied with must be stated. Member States should provide information spontaneously if there are grounds for believing that it will assist in the investigation or prevention of criminal

offences which have occurred or may occur in another country.

Evaluations, including evaluations carried out in accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 (Regulation 1053/2013/EU, 2013), show that Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is not sufficiently clear and does not ensure a proper and rapid exchange of relevant information between Member States. The evaluations also show that the Framework Decision is of little use in practice, partly because in practice there is no clear distinction between the scope of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and the scope of the Framework Decision (Directive 2006/960 /JHA, 2021)

The Framework Decision provided that any of the existing channels could be used for the information exchange, but there was a request to inform Europol or Eurojust if the information concerned the competence of those institutions.

When exchanging information in response to the Swedish initiative, Member States are not obliged to take any coercive measures to obtain information. Information obtained without the consent of the state may not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. Information received from a third country may not be shared without its consent.

Conclusions

The assessment that Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA is not sufficiently clear and does not ensure a proper and rapid exchange of relevant information between Member States confirms the need for a change of legal nature.

Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA limits the use of information as evidence in judicial proceedings and this restriction remains also in the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA.

Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA specifies a number of principles for information exchange:
-    principle of availability;
-    principle of equivalent access;
-    principle of confidentiality.

The inclusion of new principles in the Directive highlights the problems in the area of the information exchange between Member States.

The information exchange process covers three important areas: legal basis, information systems/databases, and communication channels.

Member States shall ensure that their single point of contact, as well as any of their law enforcement authorities that may be involved in the information exchange of information under the Directive, are directly connected to SIENA. However, the use of a single channel for all types of information exchange was also not supported by the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States, repealing Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA.

The general presumption in the Directive that the Directive does not apply to the information exchange between law enforcement authorities of Member States for the prevention, detection or investigation of criminal offences specifically governed by other Union laws and regulations is critical. (…) It allows avoiding uncertainty and specification in the information exchange.

On a positive note, Member States shall establish and regularly update a list of one or more official languages of the Union in which their single point of contact may provide information upon request or on its own initiative.

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THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONCEPT „INFORMATION"

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Abstract: *Information has always played a decisive role in the history of civilization development and has served as the basis for decision-making at all levels and stages of society and state development. In the history of societal development, several information revolutions can be distinguished, associated with cardinal changes in the sphere of production, processing, and transmission of information, leading to radical transformations of social relations. As a result of such transformations, society has in a certain sense acquired a new quality. The article present the specific range of social relations related to the role and importance of information on the field of national security.*

Keywords: *data, information, security, societal development.*

Introduction

Our modern times are characterized by increasing globalization, dynamics of social processes and information accessibility. With the constantly emerging problems and challenges of a different nature worldwide, all countries strive and make efforts to improve and improve the policies, means and methods to master, control and limit their negative impact on their safety and security.

Information has always played a decisive role in the history of civilization development and has served as the basis for decision-making at all levels and stages of society and state development. In the history of societal development, several information revolutions can be distinguished, associated with cardinal changes in the sphere of production, processing, and transmission of information, leading to radical transformations of social relations. As a result of such transformations, society has in a certain sense acquired a new quality.

Information revolution

The first information revolution was associated with the creation of writing, which led to a giant qualitative and quantitative leap in the information development of society. It became possible to fix knowledge on

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a tangible medium, thus separating it from the producer and allowing it to be transmitted from generation to generation.

The second information revolution (around the middle of the 16th century) was triggered by the invention of book-printing by Johannes Gensfleisch zur Laden zum Gutenberg (German: Johannes Gensfleisch zur Laden zum Gutenberg), the founder of modern book-printing. His invention of mechanical movable-type printing marked the beginning of a revolution in printing and is often referred to as one of the most important events of the Modern Age. His invention strongly influenced the development of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Scientific Revolution and laid the material foundations for the modern knowledge-based economy and the democratization of education, creating further opportunities for the inclusion of large segments of the population in cultural values.

The third information revolution (the end of the 19th century) was conditioned by the invention of electricity, thanks to which the telegraph, the telephone, and the radio appeared, which made it possible to transmit and accumulate information in significant volumes. As a consequence of this revolution, better dissemination of information and an extension of the informational "reach" of the population by communication means were achieved. The role of the mass media as a mechanism for disseminating messages and knowledge over large territories and providing the citizens living there with them has increased, and the accessibility of members of society to messages and knowledge has expanded. The role of information as a means of influencing the development of society and the state has grown substantially, and the possibility of better, faster, and more immediate communication between people has emerged.

The fourth information revolution (mid-twentieth century) was associated with the invention of computing and the appearance of the personal computer, the creation of communications networks, and telecommunications. Opportunities arose to accumulate, store, process, and transmit information in electronic form. The operability and speed of information creation and processing have increased, virtually unlimited amounts of information can be accumulated in computer memory, and the speed of information transmission, retrieval, and receipt has increased.

Today, the world is experiencing the fifth information revolution, which is influencing the formation and development of cross-border global information and telecommunication networks spanning all countries and continents, penetrating every home and impacting each individual as well as vast masses of people. The most striking example of such a phenomenon and

the result of the fifth revolution is the Internet (as well as social networks). The essence of this revolution consists in the integration, in a single information space around the world of software and hardware, telecommunication tools, information stocks or stocks of knowledge as single information and telecommunication infrastructure in which legal entities and individuals, public authorities and local governments are active. As a result, in today's information age, the speed and volume of information processing are increasing enormously, new unique opportunities for information production, transmission and dissemination are emerging, and new types of activities are taking place in these networks.

We are witnessing a significant increase in the role, place, and impact of information in the life of the individual, society, and the state. Information today has become a powerful tangible resource of even greater value than natural, financial, labour, and other resources. Information has become a commodity to be bought and sold. Information in the present plays a primary role as a non-traditional weapon, information wars are emerging, developing, and being terminated. A cross-border information network, the Internet, is rapidly developing and entering our lives.

Information, information data... these words are mentioned by all of us daily. At the same time, it is a well-known fact that until today there is no universally accepted definition of the term "information". And it is a methodological tool not only for communication science but for all human sciences. And if the method by definition is the general knowledge applied to the study of the particular or concrete, it turns out that private questions about man, among which cognition and communications, cannot be studied with an objectively worked out and generally valid method. Accordingly, the results of research on the particular questions of cognition and communications would hardly be able to establish themselves as an objective scientific argument. Here are some attempts to define the concept.

- Information includes all data, received and transmitted, stored in various sources.
- Information is the totality of data about the world around us, about all the various processes that take place in it, which can be perceived by living organisms, electronic machines, and other information systems.
- Information is all that can be added to our knowledge and assumptions.
- Information means data about anything, regardless of the form in which it is presented.

- Information is the data perceived by a person and (or) special devices as a reflection of facts in the material and spiritual world in the process of communication.
- Information is data organized in such a way that it makes sense to the person working with it.[1]

The same information message (a newspaper article, an advertisement, a letter, a telegram, a reference, an oral story, a drawing, radio or television broadcast, etc.) may contain different amounts and qualities of information for different people, depending on their prior knowledge, their level of understanding of the message and their interest in it.

The cases that refer to automated handling of information using some technical devices, it is not so much the content of the message that is of interest, but how many characters that message contains.

As applied to computer processing of data, information is understood to be some sequence of symbolic notations (letters, numbers, coded graphic images and sounds, etc.) carrying meaning and presented in a form understandable to the computer. Each new symbol in such a sequence of symbols increases the information volume of the message.

Obviously, at present, there is no single definition of information as a scientific term. From the point of view of different fields of knowledge, this concept is described by its own specific set of attributes. For example, the concept of "information" appears mainly in the specialized literature of computer science and it is impossible to define it by other, "simpler" concepts (similarly in geometry, for example, it is impossible to express the content of basic concepts such as "point", "line", "plane" by more elementary concepts).

The content of basic, fundamental concepts in any science must be explained with examples and shown by their comparison with the content of other concepts. In the case of the concept of "information", the problem of its definition is even more complicated, since it is a general scientific concept. This concept is used in different sciences (informatics, cybernetics, biology, physics, etc.), and in each science, the concept of 'information' is associated with different systems of concepts.

Two types of information are considered in modern science:
- Objective (primary) information, it is a property of material objects and phenomena (processes) to bring forth a variety of states, which through interaction (fundamental interactions) are transmitted to other objects and are imprinted in their structure.

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[1] Information - what is it? https://economic-definition.com/Media/Informaciya_Informa tion__eto.html

- Subjective (semantic[2], notional, secondary) information, that is, the notional content of objective information about objects and processes in the material world, formed by human consciousness with the help of notional images (words, images, sensations) and fixed on some tangible medium.

When the word information is used, it is usually understood as information about the world around us and the processes taking place in it, perceived by humans or by special devices.

Due to the lack of a uniform definition of information, in terms of different fields of knowledge, this concept is described with a specific set of attributes. According to Claude Elwood Shannon's concept, information is a resolved uncertainty, i.e. information that should, to one degree or another, resolve the user's uncertainty until they receive it, to expand their understanding of the object with useful information.

According to some computer scientists, the elementary unit of information is the "indistinguishable difference" or the actual difference for some large perceptual system. Differences that are not perceived are called "potential" and the perceived ones "actionable". From this point of view, "any perception of information necessarily appears to be the acquisition of information about differences" from previous states.

In terms of informatics, information has many fundamental properties: novelty, relevance, reliability, objectivity, completeness, value, etc. The science of logic deals, first of all, with the analysis of information.

The word "information" originates from the Latin word *informatio*, which means explanation, exposition, and awareness.

The concept of information has been considered since ancient philosophers. Until the beginning of the industrial revolution, philosophers were primarily concerned with defining the nature of the information. Later, the discussion of information theory issues became the prerogative of the new, for the time, science of cybernetics.

Sometimes, to get to the essence of a concept, it is useful to analyze the meaning of the word that concept denotes. Elucidating the internal form of a word and studying the history of its use can throw unexpected light on its

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[2] Semantics (Old Greek: σημαντικός [semantikós] - significant, σημαίνω [semaino] - to signify, indicate, σήμα [sema] - sign) studies meaning, usually in language. In this sense, semantics usually means linguistic semantics (as opposed to, for example, computational semantics), that is, the science studying the meaning of words, phrases, and other linguistic objects.

meaning, obscured by the habitual "technological" use of that word and modern connotations[3] .

In European languages, the word information has appeared since around the 14th century. In Russia, it was fixed for the first time in the so-called "Spiritual Regulation" in 1721 with the meaning "idea, the concept of something".

Based on this etymology, information can be considered any significant change of form, or in other words, any materially fixed traces formed by the interaction of objects or forces, and amenable to understanding. Information, in this way, is a transformed form of energy. The bearer of information is a sign, and the mode of its existence is the interpretation: the bringing to consciousness of the sign or sequence of signs.

Meaning can be recovered by the sign of the event that served as the cause of its occurrence (in the case of "natural" and involuntary signs, such as traces, clues, etc.), or by the message (in the case of conditional signs peculiar to the domain of language). It is the second variety of signs that constitutes the body of human culture, which, according to one definition, is "a totality of non-inherently transmitted information".

Messages may contain information about facts or interpretations of facts.

The living being receives information with the help of the organs of sensation and also through reflections or intuition. The exchange of information between subjects is interaction or communication (from Latin *communicatio* - message, transmission).

In practical terms, information is always a type of message. An information message is associated with a message source, a message recipient and a communication channel.

Information is the knowledge that can be stored, and transmitted and is the basis for the generation of new knowledge. The forms of knowledge conservation (historical memory) are various: from myths, annals, and pyramids to libraries, museums, and computer databases.

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[3] Connotation (from Late Latin connotatio, from Lat. con - together and noto - note, indicate) - a concomitant meaning of a linguistic unit. Connotation includes additional semantic or stylistic elements persistently connected with the main meaning in the minds of native speakers. Connotation is intended to express emotional or evaluative overtones of utterances and reflects the cultural traditions of the society. Connotations are in turn pragmatic information, reflecting not objects and phenomena themselves, but a certain attitude towards them. https://nbu-rechnik.nbu.bg/bg/obsht-spisyk-na-ponqtiq/konotaciq

Information is the knowledge about the world around us, about the processes taking place in it, which are perceived by living organisms, controlling machines, and other information systems. As was already mentioned, the word "information" is Latin. Over its long life, its meaning has changed by expanding and narrowing its boundaries. Originally, the word "information" meant: "representation", "understanding", then "knowledge", transmission of messages".

Information theory has been brought to life by the practice needs. Its emergence is associated with Claude Shannon's work "A Mathematical Theory of Connections", published in 1946. The foundations of information theory rest on results obtained by many scientists. By the second half of the twentieth century, the globe was buzzing with transmitted information running over telephone and telegraph wires, and radio channels. Later, electronic computing machines appeared and spread for processing the information. And for that time, the main task of information theory was primarily to increase the efficiency of the functioning of communication systems. The complexity in designing and operating the means, systems, and channels of communication is that it is not enough for the designer and engineer to solve the problem from physical and power positions. From this point of view, the system may be the most perfect and economical. But it is important to address, even in the design of transmitting systems, the amount of information that will pass through that transmitting system. Information can be quantified, it can be calculated. In such calculations, scientists proceed most ordinarily - they set aside the meaning of the message, just as they renounce concreteness in the arithmetical operations we are all accustomed to (as from adding two apples and three apples, they proceed to add numbers in general: 2+3).

Some scientists have stated that they "completely ignore human appreciation of information." On a series of 100 letters, for example, they attribute a certain meaning to the information, paying no attention to whether that information makes sense, and on the other hand, what the meaning is for its practical use. The quantitative approach is the best-developed branch of information theory. According to this definition, a set of 1000 letters from a newspaper, a Shakespeare play, or an Einstein theorem have exactly the same amount of information.

Such a definition of the quantity of information appears to be highly useful and practical for some. It corresponds exactly to the communication engineer who must convey all the information contained in a message, regardless of the value of that information to the addressee. The

communication channel is soulless. For the transmitting system, one thing is important: to transmit the right amount of information at the right time. How to calculate the amount of information in a particular message?

The estimation of the amount of information is based on the laws of probability theory, more precisely, it is determined by the probability of events. This is understandable. A message has value and carries information, only when one learns from it about the outcome of an event that has a random character when it is in some sense unexpected. A message about something already known contains no information. For example, if someone tells us that "Sofia is the capital of Bulgaria", such a message can only astonish you by the statement of something obvious and known to everyone, and not the novelty it contains. For example, the result of a competition is another matter. Who will arrive first? The outcome is hard to predict. The more random outcomes the event we are interested in has, the more valuable is the message about its outcome, and the greater is the information. A message about an event that can have two equally possible outcomes contains one unit of information, called a bit. The choice of the unit of information is not random. It is related to the most common binary way of encoding it for transmission and processing. Let us try, albeit in a simplified form, to imagine this general principle of information quantification, which appears to be the cornerstone of the whole information theory.

Obviously, the amount of information depends on the probability of one or other outcomes of the event. If an event has two equally likely outcomes, this means that the probability of each outcome is 1/2. So is the probability of hitting a head or a tail on a coin flip. If the event has three equally probable outcomes, then the probability of each will be 1/3. Note that the sum of the probabilities is always equal to one: one of all possible outcomes will necessarily happen. Events can also have unequally probable outcomes. For example, in a war between a strong, large state and a weak, small state, the probability of the strong state winning is very high, and the probability of its defeat is very low.

The amount of information is a measure of reducing the uncertainty of a situation. Different amounts of information are transmitted over communication channels and the amount of information passing through a channel cannot be greater than its throughput. And it is defined by the amount of information that passes through here per unit of time. An increase in throughput can only be obtained if the information is encoded reasonably, and an economical, sparing language is found for the transmission of messages.

The information is minimized most accurately. Already when the Morse code was created for telegraphic messages, the most frequent letters in the respective language were transmitted with a minimum number of "dots" and "dashes", and those that occurred less frequently with a greater number of these symbols. In cases where the length of the codeword decreases for the more frequent characters and increases for the less frequent ones, there is talk of efficient encoding of the information. But in practice it often happens that the code resulting from a precise "sifting" of information, a code convenient and economical, may distort the message because of interferences that always, unfortunately, exist in communication channels: distortion of sound in the telephone, atmospheric interference in the radio, distortion of the image or "snowflakes" on television, errors in data transmission. These disturbances, or as the specialists call them, noises, degrade the quality of the information, and from this follow the most unlikely and, naturally, unpleasant surprises. Reliability in the transmission of messages deteriorates, and it is this characteristic that assesses the degree of correspondence of the received message with the transmitted one, i.e. this characteristic assesses the quality of the link.

Therefore, to increase the reliability of information transmission and processing, redundant symbols, a kind of protection against distortion, have to be introduced. These extra characters do not carry any actual content in the messages, they are redundant. Of course, if people would use this kind of code without redundancy in messages, the latter would be extremely short. But, unfortunately, security would be lost in their transmission.

Conclusions and suggestions

Modern threats to national security are not only conventional, whether they are external such as terrorism, human trafficking, economic or political migration, smuggling or internal such as political, economic, demographic crisis, corruption, crime, natural disasters, etc. Modern threats are related to the information and communication needs of the individual, from which arise humanitarian, social, political and military crises.

In our modern times, when carrying out the various legally granted activities for the protection of security and the preservation of public order, the specialized state structures may handle the following types of information: Intelligence; counterintelligence; operational-search; investigative; agent-operative; exploratory; informative; operational-technical; ascertaining; expert; processing; establishing; systematic;

thematic; indicative; schematic; raw; incomplete; insufficient; fragmentary, etc.

The following criterion for classifying the types of information was also pointed out by the researchers, namely according to the contribution to strategic direction. We distinguish information-norm; information-custom; information-tradition; information-assessment; information-expertise; information-trend; information-law; information-perspective; information-decision; information-methodological instruction and others.

In all cases, the security and public order services, according to their functional assignment, should not be allowed to take harsh repressive (overt) measures based on insufficient and unverified data, facts, and data obtained from the use of Special Intelligence Means (SID) and data retention.

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THE LATEST DOCUMENT PERSONALIZATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR DETECTION METHODS

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Abstract. *The protection of secure documents has been given great importance at all times. It doesn't even matter if it's a passport, a driver's license or an educational document, any secure document must be protected and made by a public authority. The use of forged documents costs the world billions of euros, as they can be used both to disguise one's true identity and to commit crimes. For the purpose of document protection, the modification of documents is constantly carried out, with the aim - to protect the documents of one's country as best as possible by using more innovative and high-quality methods of both production and personalization. The research will research and summarize the most innovative technologies used in the personalization process, as well as analyze the methods of technology identification.*

Keywords: *border, document, forgery, law, personalization.*

Introduction

Given the large flow of forged documents that are detained at the state border of the Republic of Latvia, it is important to receive timely information on innovative, not only security features used in secure documents, but also on personalization methods to detect and detain forged documents.

The aim of the research is to study and summarize the technologies used in the personalization process, as well as to analyze the methods of technology identification. Research period - 2022. Theoretical, descriptive and comparative research methods were used in the course of the research. In order to achieve the set goal of the research, the following research tasks have been set:

1. to study and summarize the technologies used in the personalization process;
2. analyzed technology detection techniques.

In order to be able to detect and detain a forged document at the state border, it is necessary to know the latest personalization methods, as well as to be able to recognize them.

Document personalization methods

The Law on the State Border Guard states that the functions of the border guard are to ensure the inviolability of the state border and to prevent

illegal migration (State Border Guard Law, 2020). In order to achieve this function, a number of tasks are mentioned, one of which is to carry out border control, to ensure and control compliance with the regime of national borders, national border zones, patrol zones, border surveillance zones, borders, border zones and border crossing points (Law on the State Border Guard, 2020). This task includes the verification of identity documents and documents of vehicles crossing the border, which is the most important stage in the border control process, because on the basis of the presented documents, the border guard decides whether the person has the right to enter, stay or leave the Republic of Latvia.

The Law on Identity Documents stipulates that an identity document is a document issued by a state administration authorized by law, which confirms the identity and legal status of its holder, and which, in accordance with the law, entitles its holder to cross the external border and is intended for travel abroad and is a travel document. According to this law, a passport and an identity card are considered as identity documents (Law on Identity Documents, 2012).

Article 4 of the Immigration Law. Article 2 states that a foreigner is entitled to enter and reside in the Republic of Latvia if he or she has a valid travel document. In turn, a valid travel document is valid if:

(a) it is recognized in the Republic of Latvia,

(b) it conforms to the prescribed model,

(c) it contains the personal data and photographs of all aliens who use the document as a travel document. To apply for a residence permit, every foreigner needs their own travel document,

(d) its period of validity exceeds the intended period of stay in the Republic of Latvia or in the territory of another Member State of the Schengen Agreement by at least three months,

(e) it does not contain any unauthorized alterations, mechanical damage or spotting which makes it impossible to identify the holder of the document, to read the information contained in the document or to detect forgeries,

(f) there shall be a space reserved for at least two border crossing marks on the pages intended for visas. This condition shall not apply if the international legal acts binding on the Republic of Latvia stipulate that border crossing marks may not be made (Immigration Law, 2002).

Every year, state border guard officers seize various types of forged documents at the state border and within the state. It should be noted that sometimes the counterfeits detected are of a very high quality, as secure documents are produced using equipment that is also available to counterfeiters. The number of criminal groups involved in the production of forged documents is also increasing, because depending on the quality of the forged document, it is considered a very lucrative business.

Counterfeit documents can be divided into four groups:

(a) complete forgery of a document: all components of the document have been reproduced in the same way as the original, using arbitrary materials;

(b) partial forgery of the document - some changes have been made to the content of the original document;

(c) "fantasy document" means a document of existing or non-existent States which is not recognized as valid for the purpose of establishing one's identity or traveling;

(d) stolen document form - the document is genuine but arbitrarily and illegally personalized (Indriksons, 2011).

In the case of partial forgeries, changes in the content of a document are most often related to personal data and a personal picture, the so-called personalization methods. Personalization methods are many and varied, such as inkjet or laser printing, which is quite simple and also available to counterfeiters. These are standard printer devices that are available for fairly cheap money. The simplest and, so to speak, the cheapest counterfeits are often made using this type of appliance. As already mentioned, each country makes every effort to protect its documents by constantly modifying them, using more innovative and high-quality production and personalization methods as much as possible.

We will also touch on some of the more innovative personalization methods. In the standard, most often - in polymer documents one method of personalization is used - laser engraving method. When modifying their national documents, so-called combined methods have also emerged, where a single document can contain up to three different personalization methods or variants. For example, the identity card of the Republic of Latvia for modification in 2019 or 2021 - polycarbonate material, with its own protection elements, safe dyes, personalization and production methods.

Fig.1 Identity card of the Republic of Latvia (Document sample library of the State Border Guard (DokAB))

This is the first document of the Republic of Latvia to integrate a color image - the personalization method "LASINK". Personal data in this document is incorporated by laser engraving method, certificate number with tactile laser engraving.

Fig.2 Laser engraving and tactile laser engraving
(Document sample library of the State Border Guard (DokAB))

Laser engraving is always black and white, as the data is laser embedded in one of the polycarbonate layers. Tactile The peculiarity of laser engraving is that it differs from laser engraving - letters or numbers can be touched and explored in the side light, as a relief effect is created. Laser engraving is also used on the polycycarbonate document to create a color image, but on a pre-printed line matrix (Unpublished materials of the State Border Guard).

Fig.3 Black and white picture polycarbonate document
(Unpublished materials of the State Border Guard.)

LASINK technology is a unique process for printing laser inks on polycarbonate. LASINK not only improves the security of your identity document, but also facilitates the automated verification of its authenticity, thus speeding up the verification of passports at borders and giving users secure and unhindered access to online services (Source: Idemia, 2022).

Fig.4 Zoomed image in "LASINK" technology
(Unpublished materials of the State Border Guard)

The irreversible personalization of color images inside polycarbonate credential substrates is a challenge. With standard printing techniques, the color photo needs to be protected by an overlay or a varnish, resulting in compromised document integrity as well as loss of tactile features. Printing the color photo in one of the polycarbonate layers before the lamination step during manufacturing is a secure solution. However, it makes the issuance process inflexible. The now secure and flexible technique is the use of a laser that engraves a photo with gray tones into the polycarbonate. To be this limits personalization to black and white pictures (Idemia, 2022).

With LASINK, the color portrait of the document's holder is directly engraved into the polycarbonate structure by a laser during the personalization stage. LASINK color photos have a unique linear pattern that acts as a signature to authenticate the document. Its recognizable design cannot be imitated with any digital printing technology or forged as the picture is deep in the body and not at the surface of the document. The ID document is impossible to delaminate . The personalization technique is kept secret and prevents the use of stolen blank documents. LASINK gives flexibility to governments: it can either be used in central or decentralized personalization solutions. LASINK is robust and offers a ten-year lifespan (Idemia, 2022).

The next, no less secure and innovative method, also used in polymer documents, to integrate color imaging is "polymer-adapted inkjet printing". It's no secret that inkjet printing (a standard inkjet printer) is used in paper documents, but now it is possible to use the inkjet method (special - polymer-

adapted inkjet printing) in polymer documents to reproduce a color photograph.

When researching 'inkjet printing' and 'polymer-adapted inkjet printing' to distinguish between them, the technical means by which border checks are carried out play an important role. Technical means of border control, these are the means used for the inspection of persons, land vehicles, railway transport, aircraft, as well as vessels and cargo and other property carried by them at border crossing points (Regulations on the Technical Means Necessary for Border Inspection and Border Surveillance, No. 675). With first-line equipment (standard magnification available) - both inkjet and polymer - adapted inkjet printing can be identified by standard features - chaotically scattered dots.

Fig.5 First line equipment (Source: Regulaforensics, 2022)

The standard magnification - both inkjet and polymer-adapted inkjet - can be recognized by standard features - chaotically scattered dots.

Fig.6 Research of personalization methods with first line equipment
(Source: Regulaforensics, 2022)

The second line of document inspection uses in-depth inspection equipment, which is used for in-depth inspection of personal and vehicle documents presented at the border crossing point, as well as other legal documents, in order to confirm and visualize the signs of forgery detected in the primary inspection.

Fig.7 Document check second line equipment
(Source: Regulaforensics, 2022)

When using second-line equipment, ideally a microscope, the difference between inkjet and polymer-adapted inkjet printing is obvious, which is particularly evident in the structure and visual appearance of the ink dots.

Fig.8 Polymer-adapted inkjet printing on polymer documents
(Source: DPR, 2022)

The photograph is printed on an internal layer using an inkjet printing method. The ink consists of polycarbonate particles. After the fusion of the different layers, the polycarbonate ink will diffuse through the different layers. Under magnification the individual ink droplets look elongated.

Fig.9 Inkjet printing on paper documents
(Source: DPR, 2022)

During the examination of border control documents, in order to be absolutely certain that the appropriate personalization method has been used in the presented document - sometimes the technical equipment of the primary documents is not sufficient. Depending on the quality of the forged document, how professionally forged it is, additional in-depth research equipment is often required.

Conclusions and suggestions

Different types of secure documents have been forged at all times, and this is inevitable, so it is very important for every country to think about document protection, constantly modifying it, using more and more innovative personalization and production methods, and using newer and more sophisticated security features. Innovative personalization techniques are quite secure because they are almost impossible to reproduce. Most often, counterfeiters use inappropriate personalization methods when trying to imitate color pictures in polymer documents. Using technical equipment, their theoretical knowledge and practical experience in document research, as well as following the trends of forged documents, which are detained at the state border of the Republic of Latvia, border guards perform their direct duties and prevent forged documents from entering the country.

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ACCELERATED ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN LATVIA, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

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Abstract. *Recent years have brought many challenges to all countries of the European Union in the field of immigration and asylum. Latvia, in the process of involving into the common European asylum system, has made different practical actions to improve the asylum procedure. Being a European Union country Latvia is subordinated to common changes in the field of asylum that are now in process of realization. But the events of recent years have influenced the sphere of asylum. These are: COVID-19, hybrid threat and situation at the Belarus border and recent events concerning situation in Ukraine. The authors have studied most current events during recent years focusing on questions on the topic.*

The aim of this article is to analyse the current situation of asylum in the EU, touching upon main trends in the world of refugees, to identify the main problems in the existing asylum procedure in the EU, in order to define the accelerated asylum procedure in the legal basis and in practical life, and to offer solutions. The object of the article is the asylum system. The subject of the article is the accelerated asylum procedure.

In order to achieve objectives, following research methods were used: monographic research of theoretical and empirical sources in order to analyse and evaluate various asylum domain information, analytical method in order to acquire legislative content and verities, historical method, comparative method, systemic method, descriptive statistics method and correlation analysis, methods of interpretation of legal norms: grammatical method of interpretation, the historical method of interpretation, teleological method of interpretation and the systemic method of interpretation of legal provisions..

Keywords: *accelerated procedures, asylum procedure, asylum, border procedures.*

Introduction

Questions concerning asylum were important to all EU member states since the foundation of the union. Aspects of asylum have actualized in years 2015 and 2016 when migratory flows towards Europe have unexpectedly increased in volumes that EU asylum instruments were not able to deal. This fact showed the necessity of reformations in the Common European asylum system. The common European asylum system (CEAS) sets minimum standards for the treatment of all asylum seekers and applications across the EU.

Main drawbacks in EU migration and asylum policy showed inability of member states to come to an arrangement and set common standards in legal basis and even in practical life. There was different approach to

admission and to decision making process concerning asylum seekers. This caused a wish of asylum seekers to travel across member states in order to find profitable conditions of admission and qualification with higher chance of granting the international protection. Amidst these persons there were such individuals who tried to abuse the asylum procedure to gain profit for themselves. Unable to fulfil the entry conditions foreigners used the asylum procedure as an entry card into the EU. Exactly the fight against the abuse the asylum procedure was one of the main aims of European Union asylum policy.

To prevent asylum procedure abuse the EU reformed different asylum instruments: the reform in Dublin system, regularization of different legal acts. One of the authors has traced the changes in EU asylum policy and made several researches (Adijāne, 2020; 2018). There appeared problems in Dublin procedure fulfilment during COVID-19. Unpermitted movements of asylum seekers during recent years have disrupted the integrity and reliability of asylum system. Today following latest directions of adjustment the asylum procedure are being stressed out: new migration and asylum system (substituting Dublin regulation), new regulations that organize migratory crisis and irresistible force situations, Eurodac data base renew, sustainable relocation system in the EU and new regulations that would state the new asylum system. Undoubtedly all these processes will touch Latvia as well and also predetermine Latvian asylum process and its accelerated order that will be studied by authors in current research.

Asylum situation in Europe and Latvia

As it was stated in the introduction, after facing the unprecedented quantity of migrants, the EU realised that current asylum system doesn't work properly and proposed different aims to mend the situation. At the current moment there are different changes of events considering the asylum questions. Part of the tasks on the topic have been fulfilled, but the current situation shows that part of solutions to these tasks have arrived too late, especially considering current situation in Ukraine.

The new Pact on Migration and Asylum should be mentioned as one of the most significant successes. On 23 September 2020, the Commission issued the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in an attempt to give a fresh start to the stalled CEAS reform. The pact aims to strike a new balance between responsibility and solidarity. The Commission proposes to integrate the asylum procedure into overall migration management, linking it with a pre-screening and return (Schmid-Druner, 2021).

The strengthening of border control and different solidarity outcomes are being stressed in the new Pact on migration and Asylum. Main changes

in the sphere of asylum touch upon desire to amend the boundary between granting the asylum and the return. The actions concerning the asylum procedure are being simplified. The main attention is being paid to the individuality of the asylum seeker and not to his/her asylum application. All necessary legal support is being provided in order to protect main rights of these people especially paying attention to rights of the children, rights for associability of protection and the rights for freedom. Also the attention is being paid to the fast and effective checks before the entry and to the fast data input into the Eurodac data base. The new pact also states the accelerated border procedure that would guarantee the asylum rights. But the decisions would be made much faster and much faster would be the return procedure in case of negative decision. This would safeguard the asylum procedure against abuse and at the same time would grand necessary protection for those who need it.

One of the most significant steps in the EU asylum policy was the creation of the new EU Asylum agency. The sphere of interior and the was discussed during the session of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 9th and 10th of December 2021 (Justice and Home Affairs Council, 2021).

Having a fully fledged EU asylum agency is an important step in the building of our common EU asylum policy. This agency will be able to provide quick, tangible support to member states wherever needed. It will also contribute to our cooperation with third countries, showing in a very concrete way the strength of our joint action. (Hojs, 2022)

On 19 January 2022, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) replaced the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). The new agency is responsible for improving the functioning of the common European asylum system by providing enhanced operational and technical assistance to member states bringing more consistency to the assessment of applications for international protection (The European Council, 2022).

These and planned changes in the sphere of EU asylum system will significantly influence Latvia as well. The migratory situation in Latvia and in the whole world has changed mainly due to COVID-19, hybrid attack and the pressure from Belarus and also due to the situation in Ukraine.

Despite hardships Latvia made different actions to implement the CEAS. For example the training for the Latvian State Border Guard (the SBG) and the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (the OCMA) officials in the work with improved functionality of the Register of the Asylum Seekers, and the aiding actions of the SBG and the OCMA to EU member states. The internal regulations of the SBG were refined in 2020 in order to immediately register the asylum or alternative status application and personal data of the asylum seeker in the Register of the Asylum Seekers. Thus the institutions under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior that are involved into the

asylum procedure are instantly and simultaneously informed about the asylum application fact. The Register of the Asylum Seekers also provided the common procedure of issuing the asylum seeker personal document and information about the place of temporary residence of the asylum seeker.

COVID-19 forced to make unprecedented decisions – after the OCMA direction several limiting actions were performed in the centre for detained foreigners to provide its functionality. From 17th of March 2020 the transit and admission of asylum seekers according to the Dublin Regulation was cancelled (the transit and admission was renewed on 15th of July 2020 according to regulations of the Illness prophylaxis and control centre and rating the individual situation of every asylum seeker). In order to insure the asylum procedure in terms stated in the Law of Asylum, the interviewing of asylum seekers and the court sessions were held in the format of video conference (European Migration Network, 2020).

The crisis that started in 2021 on Poland, Lithuania and, later, Latvia border with Belarus became a large challenge. Large numbers of irregular migrants tried and still are trying to cross the borders of the mentioned countries. Officials of the SBG must prevent illegal border crossing attempts of many people from Belarus to Latvia every day. According to the previous and after making an analysis of situation in Poland and Lithuania, Latvian government declared the state of emergency on 10th of August 2021 for a period from 11th of August 2021 until 10th of November 2021 in Ludza parish, Kraslava parish, Augshdaugava parish and Daugavpils city. Later this state was extended – on this moment until 10th of May 2022 (Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers Nr.518, 2021). As it was stated by European Court of Human Rights in case N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, countries have the right to prevent illegal border crossings and provide that persons who crossed the border illegally would be pushed back from the territory of the state. Mentioned rights of countries could be referred to asylum seekers as well (Initial report on effect evaluation (annotation) to the Project of the regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers "On the Declaration of State of Emergency", 2021).

Also the actual crisis should be mentioned as well. If previous migratory crisis caused movements of people from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, than now we have to speak about refugees from inside of Europe, from Ukraine.

This Statement is attributed to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi Comment: "In just seven days, one million people have fled Ukraine, uprooted by this senseless war. I have worked in refugee emergencies for almost 40 years, and rarely have I seen an exodus as rapid as this one. Hour by hour, minute by minute, more people are fleeing the terrifying reality of violence. Countless have been displaced inside the

country. And unless there is an immediate end to the conflict, millions more are likely to be forced to flee Ukraine." (Grandi, 2022).

The UNHCR official data state that current refugee flow is unprecedented in European Union. On 29st of March 2022 the number of refugees was 4,019,287 Ukrainian inhabitants (Operational Data Portal, 2022).

On 4th of March 2022 European Council made a decision to activate the Directive on Temporary protection. Activating the application of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 by way of a Council implementing Decision establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, having the effect of introducing temporary protection in accordance with the provisions of this Directive (Council Implementing Decision, 2022).

At the beginning of March, reacting on the refugee flow from Ukraine, Latvia developed and adopted the Law on the Aid to the Ukrainian Civilian Inhabitants as a matter of emergency. The aim of the law is to give support to the citizens of Ukraine and their family members who left Ukraine or who cannot return to Ukraine because of the military conflict caused by Russian Federation for the term of mentioned military conflict and to give common aid to the Ukrainian society. This law does not cancel or alter the asylum application procedure, but it introduces additional mechanisms that help Ukrainian civilians to receive support and rights to reside and work in Latvia.

As we can see, the EU and also Latvia give significant input to reform the asylum system regulations in order to fight abuse of the asylum procedure and to support those member states which are mostly affected by migratory flows and giving aid to those who need it by aiming efforts and resources to real help. The border procedure or accelerated asylum procedure is one of the tools that can fight abuse of asylum procedure. This procedure will be analysed by the authors in following chapter.

Conditions of the accelerated asylum procedure in Latvia

Making insight into actual situation in the EU in the field of asylum policy in the previous chapter, the authors stressed the events that are connected to accelerated asylum procedure. The problem is in the different terminology between Latvian and the EU legal acts. The authors of the current research made an express survey among the State Border Guard officials and stated that the term "accelerated asylum procedure" is being understood very differently. Part of the SBG officials consider this term as a border procedure others as shortened asylum procedure. Authors analysed the "accelerated asylum procedure" term in Latvian and EU legal acts and made conclusion

that the EU acts relate the mentioned term as the shortened asylum procedure by Latvian acts because the border procedure is a separate procedure that is supposed to take place in the border crossing point. Looking into the EU legal acts in English and in Latvian translation there appear to be differences in translation and the different Latvian terminology use that obviously confuse a reader.

The directive on asylum procedure allows in the abstract that in order to shorten the overall duration of the procedure in certain cases, Member States should have the flexibility, in accordance with their national needs, to prioritise the examination of any application by examining it before other, previously made applications, without derogating from normally applicable procedural time limits, principles and guarantees. In well-defined circumstances where an application is likely to be unfounded or where there are serious national security or public order concerns, Member States should be able to accelerate the examination procedure, in particular by introducing shorter, but reasonable, time limits for certain procedural steps, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out and to the applicant's effective access to basic principles and guarantees provided for in this Directive (2013/32/EU, 2013).

If we look at the main Latvian legal act in the sphere of asylum – the Asylum Law, we can see that terms "usual order", "shortened order" and "application consideration at the border" were used in Latvia initially. As we can see Latvia stated different asylum application consideration types from the beginning of the process of asylum procedure according to international legal acts.

According to the Asylum Law project of 2002 there was foreseen a possibility to locate asylum seekers in special premises at border crossing points (BCP) if these persons apply for asylum strait at the mentioned BCP (up to 72 hours or longer after a decision of a judge). Negotiations with an asylum seeker in such process had to be made by BCP officials. If, after the negotiations, the Department of Refugees considered the application reasonable, the asylum seeker had to be moved to the closest accommodation centre. On a whole the procedure could last up to 8 days: SBG passes received information in the term of 3 days, the Department of Refugees examine the received negotiation materials in the term of 2 labour days, the decision of the Department could be appealed during one labour day by Appellation Committee of the Refugee Affairs, the complaint has to be examined in the term of two labour days from receiving.

The conditions of visibly unreasonable asylum application were added in the admitted version of the Asylum Law of 2002 to previously viewed project. These conditions are: there are no threats, the person has protection or has rights for such protection in another state or the person has applied

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for protection in another state. Also the Article 19 of the Asylum Law states the shortened asylum procedure if a person applied for asylum in the territory of Latvia and there are valid conditions that were mentioned before. As opposed, during the border procedure the application is submitted at a BCP, but during the shortened procedure the application is submitted inside the territory of Latvia. Also the shortened procedure is longer – the duration could be up to two weeks.

Considering the Asylum Law of 2009 the shortened procedure supposed to be used in case of obviously negative result and OCMA officials used this procedure and made decision to deny the refugee status of alternative status in case there was at least one of predetermined by the Law conditions. These conditions were five: asylum seeker comes from a safe native country; before entering Latvia, the asylum seeker crossed a country that is not a member state and that is considered as a safe third country regarding to the asylum seeker; the asylum seeker already applied for asylum, but using different personal data; the asylum seeker did not apply for asylum previously without a substantial ground although he/she had a possibility to do so, including in order to delay or avoid expulsion from Latvia and the asylum seeker creates a threat to state security or to public order and security (Asylum Law, 2009).

The Asylum Law of 2015 includes the requirements of the Asylum Procedure Directive. Member States may provide that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II be accelerated and/or conducted at the border or in transit zones (2013/32/EU, 2013). The criteria of the shortened procedure were revised, described in details and included according to the Directive mentioned before. But the idea of this procedure did not alter – the procedure has to end with a denial because the asylum seeker does not suffer from threats or he/she tries to abuse the asylum procedure to reside in the EU or he/she provides threat to the EU. When using the shortened procedure, the officials pay attention to rights of children and persons who need special procedural guarantees, evaluating which state could be considered as a safe country to the asylum seeker in every individual situation especially according to the perspective of identifying him/her as a refugee or a person with rights to an alternative status.

The shortened procedure is not used in Latvia very often. According to the data of the Unit of Return and Refugee Affairs, the shortened procedure in Latvia was used 6 times in 2020 and 22 times in 2022. This is connected to shortened terms of hearings of cases and decision making process. These terms are not realizable to keep if the number of asylum seekers is large because the number of the OCMA officials is limited as well. According to the statement of the officials of the Unit of Return and Refugee Affairs of the State Border Guard Riga territorial board, the border guards who state the

possibility of the shortened asylum procedure are able to recommend this procedure to the OCMA officials but the least are the only ones who can make a decision to do so. So, even if there is a possibility to use the shortened asylum procedure, there not always is a possibility to do so because of the lack of resources. In order to provide the just and reliable asylum procedure without the violation the rights of every asylum seeker to it, the officials must use usual asylum procedure that demand larger terms for hearings and decision making.

Conclusions and suggestions

The research looks through a large amount of different materials, both the EU and Latvian, compares and analyzes them. It is clearly seen that Latvian asylum procedure, as a whole and its shortened order, is based on the EU common standards and rules. Thus it is achieved the common understanding and approach to the admission, qualification of asylum seekers and to the asylum procedure. The shortened asylum procedure provides faster decision making process in cases when there is no ground to grant the asylum or alternative protection status.

The decision to use the shortened asylum procedure now is being made only by the OCMA, the SBG officials cannot effect neither the decision to use the shortened procedure, nor the decision to decline the asylum granting. As it is seen, the OCMA is the only institution in Latvia that is competent to use the shortened asylum procedure.

Analyzing current theme it is stated that the SBG is not involved into the engagement of the shortened/accelerated asylum procedure. The only problem is in different understanding of the shortened/accelerated asylum procedure. The authors suggest to perform training to those SBG officials who are in straight contact with asylum seekers and with the asylum procedure in order to achieve the common understanding. It would be useful to involve the OCMA officials in such a training who would thoroughly explain these questions. Despite the fact that the decision in asylum procedure is made by the OCMA, every SBG official that works with asylum seekers should understand correctly the performance of both: the standard asylum procedure and the shortened asylum procedure. Exactly the border guards are the ones who initially explain the asylum procedure to the asylum seekers and ones who regularly inform asylum seekers, who are detained and are under the custody of the SBG, about the course of asylum procedure.

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EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD STANDING CORPS CATEGORY 1 BASIC TRAINING TOPICALITIES IN ENSURING THE EU BORDER SECURITY

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Abstract. *Establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps Category 1 has been recently the most visible change in the European approach in the management of the EU external borders. The political decision of the EU to have its own law enforcement officers for border protection and migration management and return-related tasks, has manifested a paradigm shift, also in training and education. The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has a leading role in capacity building, for example in terms of providing training for the members of the Category 1. The Agency Regulation provides a legal basis for the statutory staff of the Standing Corps, in particular highlighting the importance of training based on common values and culture, and respect of fundamental rights. The European dimension of the Standing Corps training is underpinned by the legal and ethical responsibilities of the Agency to ensure that the members of the Standing Corps are well trained and fully prepared to perform tasks with executive powers. The main aim of the paper is to explore the establishment of standing corps from the perspective of basic training. The context presented supports the thesis that the initial training serves as the foundation of public agreement and investment for common safety and security. The paper builds upon hands-on experience of the author and draws the general conclusion to prove the thesis based on the legal instruments presented and implementation of basic training editions.*

Keywords: *basic training, common core curriculum, Frontex, standing corps.*

Introduction

"Safety and security don't just happen: they are the result of collective consensus and public investment" (Mandela N, 2002).

Training in the context of border and coast guard (BCG) has its specific, exceptional meaning and role. Due to operational context, it significantly overcomes primary purpose of vocational training that aims to support members of organisation to acquire and apply the knowledge, skills, and attitudes needed by a particular job and organization to improve quality, efficiency, and effectiveness. The BCG's responsibility connected with duty of ensuring safety and security of borders and people crossing them, implicates the unique character of the training that should be provided. The law

enforcement training should be seen from the perspective of dynamic operational circumstances, of a need for immediate and constant change to respond to the requirements but foremost from the perspective of shaping values, common culture, the right attitude - ethical behaviour that is based on the fundamental rights. That is the investment that pays off building interoperability and cooperation to guarantee security and safety.

The main aim of the paper is to explore the establishment of standing corps from the perspective of basic training.

The paper builds upon hands-on experience of the author and draws the general conclusion to prove the thesis based on the legal instruments presented and implementation of basic training editions.

Body

Establishment of the European area of freedom and justice expanded the meaning of security to the common, shared responsibility founded by respect to fundament rights, European culture, and values. The concept of security is seen more as the integrated system of managing external borders of the EU, where the role of individual entity and national authorities play equal and vital role.

Since Schengen Agreement in 1985 (Schengen Agreement, 14 June 1985), the cooperation built on mutual trust between the countries is maintained by the effective implementation of law on border control and border management standards. The cross-border cooperation is one of the most important European developments that comprises international law and regulations relevant for creation of international and national security, enabling Member States benefitting from strategic policy and partnership.

Following the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Article 77(1)(c) Treaty on European Union (TEU), 2009), 'the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders' is a necessary component of the European Union policy development. The components, principles, and main stakeholders for European integrated border management were established for the very first time in 2016 in the EBCG Regulation (Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624), and further developed in 2019 (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624), by setting out the European integrated border management (EIBM) policy cycle with a strategic objective on the way of addressing the

challenges in the field of border management and return in a coherent, integrated, and systematic manner by the European Border and Coast Guard.

The European integrated border management is established by 15 thematic components, 3 of which are listed as overarching, thus providing the necessary umbrella for all the activities related (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard, art.4). Education and training are one these three, next to fundamental rights and research and innovation. This fact underlines an important role of training and education that shall be based on harmonized and quality assured training standards, considering operational needs, tasks, and legal competence and with an emphasis on a clear understanding of the values enshrined in the Treaties. Furthermore, it should promote the highest standards and best practices in the implementation of Union border and return law, with a special emphasis on the protection of vulnerable persons, including children, and on the respect of fundamental rights, and promote a common culture.

The political decision of the EU to have its own law enforcement officers for border protection, migration management and return-related tasks, has manifested a paradigm shift, also in training and education. The concept of education and training of the standing corps (SC) category one (cat.1) was elaborated with the view to guarantee EBCG cooperation and interoperability. Such an aim can be achieved, if the core competences and training provided for the new formation is in harmony with the ones provided by the Member States to the national border and coast guards. Utilizing the Agency Common Core Curricula (Common Core Curriculum for Border and Coast Guard Basic Training in the EU (2017), Common Core Curriculum for Border and Coast Guard Mid-Level Management Training in the EU (2019)) as a basis for the training development made that possible. The main approach of the training delivered is that the staff coming from the Member States, as well as the EBCG SC cat. 1 are trained based on the same standards and follow harmonised tactical and operational approaches, therefore have a similar understanding of respect for fundamental rights and promote interoperability.

Numerous generations of European border and coast guards has grown on the common core curricula in terms of education and training. The efforts to develop common European standards for border and coast guard training were already made prior to the formal operationalization of Frontex by launching the Common Core Curriculum for the Border and Coast Guard Basic Training in the EU (known as CCC Basic). Under Agency's patronage the

Common Core Curriculum has been later updated and further developed. Nowadays, the Common Core Curricula for Border and Coast Guard Basic Training, and Mid-level Management Training in the EU (CCC Basic and CCC ML) are integrated into national training systems for border and coast guards in the EU Member States and several non-EU countries, promoting high ethical values, respect for fundamental rights and the operational cooperation among EU and national authorities working on the borders. Interoperability is a necessary component for efficient cooperation thus, it is also important part of European border and coast guard education and training, and some of the core professional competences are built upon it. With the design of the Basic Training for the European Border and Coast Guard SC cat.1 the best practices of the CCC were exercised to develop professional competences of the cat.1 officers enabling them "to operate in a unitary manner in any particular operational area assigned, generating added value to the Member States, fully respecting fundamental rights in all actions, and ensuring the EU border security." (Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, art. 55.7, 82).

The first Basic Training Programme (BTP) for the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps cat. 1 (EBCG SC cat.1) was designed between October 2019 and February 2020 in close cooperation with the experts and trainers from MSs. One of the main objectives of the basic training is to develop a common border and coast guard culture and values as well as harmonised practices for the members of the SC cat. 1 who come from different law enforcement services of the EU, with a rich variety of professional backgrounds. In this regard the basic training is like a "melting pot" - during the training period all students, coming with very diverse professional and personal backgrounds, also from different national ranks and positions, should find a common way of considering the organizational cultural matters and shared values, to be able to operate in a unitary manner in demanding circumstances. Having the duration of six months, the BTP is addressed to recruits with a law enforcement background. It has a modular structure. The advantage of the basic training in comparison to the most common national basic training is that it prepares the learners to all three borders: land, air, and sea, regardless the future deployment.

In 2021 the Basic Training Programme (EBTP), (Executive Direction Decision No R-ED-2022-6 of 13 January 2022 on adoption of the Extended Basic Training Programme for the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps, Category 1 and Assessment Strategy of the Extended Basic Training Programme for the European Border and Coast Guard standing

corps, Category 1.) design was extended to approximately twelve months to address an audience without previous law enforcement background. The extended version of the Programme includes nine weeks of experiential learning (three weeks in the first semester and six weeks in the second semester) – practical part directly on the border. After graduation of EBTP the EBCG SC cat. 1 officer is ready to be deployed on the borders with the border guard officer profile. Furthermore, officers can attend the profile/ specialised training following the same path as after graduation of BTP.

The amendments introduced for the extension of the training programme served as the basis for the update of its six months version in 2022. Thus, in 2022 there are two versions of the basic training running in parallel – one year and six months duration depending on the professional background of the learners. The BTP 2022 equally to the extended version, offers the border guard officer (BGO) profile for all successful graduates. In the future Frontex is planning to have one BTP responding to the needs of all candidates.

Learning about fundamental rights is an essential part of the BTP. Fundamental rights of all persons must be respected and protected in all border control activities, as prescribed by EU and international law. The standing corps are expected to have the skills and the ability to respect fundamental rights in their daily work with different people, no matter their race, gender, age, religion or other. When properly trained, border guards can play a key role in ensuring that people are not discriminated, and they get adequate support and information.

The training programme contains both the theory and practice of fundamental rights, including specific training on protecting vulnerable groups, the principle of non-refoulement, and facilitating access to international protection at the border. The competences are assessed during the modules and final exercises, as well as during the experiential learning phases at the external border organised throughout the training programme.

To develop competences in taking responsibility for a specific range of border and coast guards' tasks, a member of the EBCG SC cat. 1 after graduation of the BTP undergoes a profile training and additionally may attend a leadership/management training or specialised according to the individual training map and based on recognised prior learning.

After successfully completing the BTP or EBTP, the EBCG SC cat.1 member has knowledge and understanding of and is able, with executive powers when applicable, to:

- a defined range of EU and international legislation, policies and procedures related to the powers and tasks of the EBCG SC cat. 1 at land, sea, and air border, including return;
- maintain physical and mental fitness to be able to perform BCG operational tasks;
- use tactical and force measures and firearms under pressure proportionate to a threat, as a last resort, after every reasonable effort has been made to resolve a situation using non-violent means, including by means of persuasion, negotiation, or mediation;
- perform a limited range of basic sea border surveillance-related tasks;
- ensure the respect of fundamental rights in all circumstances;
- perform tasks successfully, demonstrating professional development, as well as values, and ethical behaviour of the SC cat.1, in the field of border and coast guard activities providing added value to the national BCG;
- carry out a wide range of first-line border checks and defined range of second line border checks at land borders, airports, and seaports independently;
- perform border surveillance tasks at land borders and airports, and respond to regular situations independently, and to complex situations as a member of a team;
- act as the first law enforcement officer at a crime scene, carry out non-complex detection measures independently and provide support in more complex cross-border crime investigations;
- perform a limited range of return-related tasks as a member of a team in non-complex, routine situations in the ground support related tasks.

The European dimension of the EBCG SC cat.1 training is emphasized by legal and ethical Agency's responsibilities to ensure that standing corps officers are well trained and fully prepared to perform tasks with executive powers and use of force (Articles 55 (7), 82 and Annex V of the Regulation). It must be admitted that Basic Training for the EBCG SC cat.1 exercised the Agency's common core curriculum not only by developing the BTP for its own law enforcement officers based on it, but also and foremost by putting in practice the human interoperability component in the field of training. The implementation of the Basic Training for the EBCG SC cat.1 requires active involvement of MSs national trainers to embed the leaners into common European border and coast guard culture, values, and attitudes, to set the

real example of interoperability and cooperation and finally to share the best practices for the sake of our common safety and security.

The common culture and promoted values, and feeling of being united does not come automatically, as granted. It must be planned, it must be a visible aim, and the learning methods must support its achievement, it must be considered in all training, and the delivery must be monitored and taken the care of at every step. Furthermore, the common understanding of the core values, tasks, and duties in terms of ensuring security and safety of the borders requires strong engagement of higher management, setting the excellency example and providing constant support.

That is the challenge and the uniqueness of the Basic Training for the EBCG SC cat.1 which is developed and implemented thanks to strong cooperation of all the stakeholders, including higher management, and thanks to shared responsibility for successful training process.

Conclusions

The training activities facilitate the achievement of the Agency's mission and strategic objectives set for our common vision, "The European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice". Frontex supports the MSs to achieve an efficient, high, and uniform level of border control, and develops capacities to tackle challenges focusing on migration flows. The Agency contributes to the fight against serious cross-border crime and terrorism at the external borders. Its mission in the field of training is to provide border and coast guards with quality learning to ensure harmonised operational competences for integrated border management. In all its activities, a common European approach is emphasised, focusing on full compliance with fundamental rights and the highest standards.

On the path career the very first training is often perceived as return on expectations. Regarding the EBCG SC cat.1 officers of the first European formation, the expectations are high on each side: officers, society, management, trainers. Nowadays, the EBCG SC cat.1 officers are on the EU borders. Based on the feedback (no research done yet) and statistics of deployment, they provide the added value to the Member States, fully respecting fundamental rights in all actions, and ensuring the EU border security. It can be said that the methods applied, and the approach taken worked. However, it should be noticed, taking into consideration the specific character of the BCG training, that the process has just started, and it will be developing to ensure the safety and security by professionally trained

European border and coast guards. *Safety and security don't just happen, they are the result of collective consensus and public investment.* - we need to invest to guarantee them, and that investment starts with training.

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PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF BORDER GUARDS IN PROFILING PERSONS

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Abstract. *The author of the paper explores the content of the qualification improvement course "Profiling, Interviewing, Identification" implemented in the State Border Guard College of the Republic of Latvia, the questionnaires given to the course participants in order to develop the guidelines for more effective training of border guards in the field of profiling and provides his point of view, taking into account training on profiling delivered in national and international context and level. The paper is aimed to identify the possibilities of improving the border guards' professional background in performing profiling in line with the current socio-economic, political and migration trends in Europe and in the world.*
The research was done in the State Border Guard College of the Republic of Latvia and several Central Asia region countries. For this purpose analysis and evaluation of documents, scientific, pedagogical and psychological literature was performed and suggestions for the improvement of border guard training system in the field of profiling were compiled.
The author concludes that the current SBGC lecturers` level of proficiency allows to develop and implement any length and content qualification improvement course in the field of profiling. The author recommends to develop a micro-learning approach, namely by creating a variety of short video training materials. Development of profiling methodological instructions at the central level of the State Border Guard would lead to the increase of profiler (border guard) activities efficiency in performing service duties and would allow to operate with profiling related terms, procedures and activities.

Keywords: *border guard, college, course, profiling, training.*

Introduction

The effectiveness of profiling depends directly on the border guard's professional skills. Therefore, special attention should be paid to the training of border guards. In his research, the author explains the implementation of profiling training in the State Border Guard College (hereinafter – SBGC) and describes the experience of lecturers in implementing the profiling courses at national and international levels. Best practices as well possible obstacles in the implementation of profiling practical exercises are revealed. The research covers the period from 2008 to 2020.

During the research, the author evaluates the results of the questionnaires completed by the qualification improvement course participants and introduces the possibilities of solving the discovered challenges and problems, as well as summarizes the best international practice in organizing practical exercises in the field of profiling. Key task of

the paper - in order to prevent the crossing of the state border by terrorists, criminals and fraudsters, promote the development of profiling training in Latvia and in the world.

National training in the field of person profiling

For several years border guards associated profiling mainly with comparison of the person's face to the photograph (portrait) in document. Profiling was perceived as a synonymous word for identification. In order to define and use the unified term, in 2008 the SBGC lecturers initiated the idea of implementing the qualification improvement course for the staff of the State Border Guard (hereinafter – SBG) in the field of profiling. Initially, the qualification improvement course programme comprised only eight contact hours: four hours were devoted to the basics of profiling and four – to the theory of interview. A lecturer with extensive experience in psychology was invited to implement the above mentioned course. Development and after that also the implementation of the course was challenged by the fact that the SBG didn`t have any approved profiling methodology. There was also a lack of clarity in profiling definition and its interpretation.

The SBGC in cooperation with the SBG Central Board encouraged the development of the definition and concept of profiling, which were defined by the SBG Central Board letter No 23/1-6/104 of 9 January 2009 "On the definition of profiling":

"Profiling – division of persons into the risk groups (performed during the border checks and immigration control) by observing them, analysing their behaviour, appearance and response during the interview and document examination, in order to distinguish those individuals who need to be subjected to additional examination or immediate detention."

In addition to the incorrect use of the term, qualification improvement course participants complained about the small or insufficient number of practical lessons. Only in 2017, the duration of the course programme was extended to fourteen hours. After the course programme was updated, seven hours were devoted to profiling. The content of the course topic "Interview procedure" was supplemented with information acquisition techniques and practical exercises in performing interviews of different categories of persons (minors, aggressive persons, etc.) and representatives of other cultures. The main achievement of the programme update was the inclusion of the topic "Identification of individuals". Three hours were devoted to the document verification methodology, facial recognition techniques and identification of person`s possible place of origin.

Taking into account the activity of participants during the qualification improvement course, as well their different competence in performing service duties, a decision to implement this qualification improvement course separately for the SBG instructors and the SBG officers was taken.

At the same time, profiling, interviewing and identification issues were integrated into the SBGC Professional further education programme "Border guarding".

In the foreword of the qualification improvement course programme was stipulated that the course participant should have at least three years of professional experience in the field of border control or immigration control. The State Revenue Service of the Republic of Latvia (hereinafter-SRS) expressed interest in the SBGC delivered course (mainly in basics of profiling for the customs officials). In order to deliver this course also to the SRS officials minor changes in the content of the programme (smuggling indicators) were made.

Important booster for the development of the qualification improvement course was made after the analysis and further activities taken as the response to the results of the European Commission's Schengen evaluation, as well as the material and experience gained in the SBGC and the SBG. It was decided to update the qualification improvement course programme and the duration of the programme was extended from 14 hours to 22 hours. The questionnaires completed by the SBGC Professional further education programme "Border guarding" cadets after six months of the SBGC graduation, showed a great interest and desire of cadets – now working border guards - to get additional and more extensive knowledge in profiling. Due to that the requirement for the course participants' experience - *at least three years of professional experience in the field of border control or immigration control* was deleted from the course programme foreword. In line with the "Sectorial Qualifications Framework for Border Guarding" developed by the FRONTEX Agency (setting standards for training excellence, 2013, 4th level), the objectives and tasks of the programme were complemented by the developed competences and learning outcomes.

Since 2008, 1446 officials were trained at the SBGC implemented profiling course (953 border guards, 453 customs officials and 10 soldiers, see Fig.1).

Fig.1 Number of profiling course participants per year
(SBGC, 2008-2020)

COVID-19 pandemic forced to postpone and later also to cancel the implementation of the SBGC qualification improvement courses. In order not to stop the training of the SBG staff in the field of profiling, in 2021 was decided to amend the programme by transforming it into an e-learning course. The e-learning format allowed the programme to be extended to four weeks. The acquisition of the programme is based on the basic principles of e-learning, i.e. the learning process and the exchange of information between lecturers and the SBG officials are carried out remotely by means of information and communication technologies. The course theoretical topics have to be acquired independently; three weeks are foreseen for self-studies. The seminar on independently acquired topics, practical training and final examination take place during the 4th week, in person, at the SBG Territorial Board.

The lecturer's scheduled time for conducting an e-learning course is 8 hours per training week for one group. In order to support the learners who have an interest to improve knowledge and skills in the programme topics independently, recommendations, instructions and materials for additional learning in the SBGC Moodle platform have been added.

Currently, the course programme is intended for the SBG officials who are involved in border control and immigration control and carry out profiling, interviewing and document examination, aimed at distinguishing between those persons, vehicles, property and objects who need to be subjected to additional checks or there should be taken a decision on their detention or removal.

To provide programme participants an in-depth knowledge in applying profiling and interviewing methods in performing their service duties, the programme again is implemented separately for the SBG instructors and the SBG officers. It is important to underline that for the SBG officers the learning outcomes (knowledge, skills, competences) included in the course programme comply with SQF level 5. This is the first SBGC qualification improvement course, that has been fully developed in line with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereinafter – FRONTEX) standards for inspectors and mid-level officers.

Participants of the course learn remotely: the identification of the person by photograph, the requirements for the interview and the methods of obtaining information, the methods and tactics of questioning, methods of determining the possible place of origin and cultural diversity. In addition, participants need to get acquainted with the history of profiling, the main directions of modern profiling (operational and criminal profiling), factors influencing profiling, as well as methods of obtaining profiling indicators.

Theoretical part of the course programme includes an approach envisaging that every week – after the independent learning of uploaded material in Moodle platform, the course participants have to prepare on Moodle platform or send via e-mail an answer for the specific task or question (up to 1500 words) (hereinafter – weekly report). Such approach proves that the SBG official has become acquainted with the weekly training material in the specified time and quality. The lecturer evaluates the weekly reports giving a grade from 1-10. The grades received for weekly reports are considered in the final course evaluation. The SBG official is not allowed to take part in the course practical part in case of failure in one of the weekly reports. The weekly report can be submitted unlimited number of times. At the beginning of the course practical part, the lecturer conducts an analysis of independently acquired topics by discussing them with participants. Special attention is paid to the profiles (characteristics) of high-risk persons who may be associated with certain criminal behaviour (characteristics of terrorists, victims and organisers of human trafficking, smugglers, drug couriers, etc.). During practical exercises, an emphasis is put also on the risk indicators of travellers' vehicles and luggage. Using the document verification methodology, participants are practically trained to interview different categories of persons (minors, aggressive persons, etc.), persons having diverse cultural background.

The course final examination consists of the test and 1 practical task.

The final grade course participant gets after the completion of the course and it is formed from the average grade received for participation

and activity during practical lessons (incl. weekly reports) and the grade received for the course final examination.

International training in the field of person profiling

Since 2016, the SBGC lecturers have been actively involved in the projects of the International centre for Migration Policy Development (BOMCA) in Central Asia (hereinafter – CA). Main objectives of the activities were:
– to provide knowledge and assistance in establishing and strengthening identification and profiling mechanisms thus leading to the better distinguish among different categories of persons.
– to present European Union (hereinafter – EU) good practices in the area of foreign terrorist fighters (hereinafter – FTF) identification and profiling techniques.
– to improve the competency of involved Uzbekistan authorities to identify FTF in CA region.
– to elaborate FTF' identification methodology.

Basically, technical missions as well as Train of trainer (hereinafter – ToT) seminars last from three to five days. During the first day, participants were generally introduced to profiling methods. The second day was dedicated to the detection of potential terrorists. Third day was devoted to behavioral analysis and interviewing. During the fourth day, participants learnt the methodology of document verification and identification of the person by photograph, as well as identification of the person's possible place of origin by property. On the fifth day, practical exercises were organized.

The author of the paper further describes the Border Management Programme in CA (BOMCA) and the Law Enforcement in CA (LEICA) international practice and specifics for the implementation of profiling practical lessons during ToT.

Such ToT practical lessons are often organized and implemented in different hotels, where people of different nationalities can enter or leave the premises without any special permission. It is worth mention that the hotel itself may be a possible target for the terrorist attack. The world has experienced several examples of terrorist attacks that took place in the hotels. The most important is the Mumbai (India) attacks (2008) that took place in 2 hotels. The terrorist targeted the lobby, the elevators and the restaurants. Another big attack was in 2005 in Amman (Jordan) where a series of coordinated suicide attacks took place in three hotel lobbies.

Based on these assumptions, during ToT in CA, the author of the paper proposed to conduct various practical lessons in the lobby of the world-class hotel where people of different nationalities were moving into and out of the

premises, and the hotel itself was perceived as the possible target for the terrorist attack. In this case, there is no need for an endorsement and trainer can find people that participants are not familiar with. According to the level of knowledge, competences and general preparedness of participants several scenarios could be carried out:

- detection of suspicious person who enters/leaves the hotel: trainer could make tasks for participants evolving a real hotel guest;
- trainer could invite actors – *fake guests* who behave suspiciously according to the scenario;
- *fake guests* could also seek information about the hotel's security, access, schedules. Training participants could observe the *fake guests* or even ask questions to them.

Scenario 1: Controlling the main entry points of the hotel (station). Aim: understanding the baseline. What is the *normal behaviour* taking into account the time, location and the specifics of the hotel (people taking the bus/ train) and its neighbourhood? It's important that participants become familiar with what is *normal- usual* in the hotel, what's *usual* in the bigger perimeter of the hotel, so participants can recognize when something goes wrong and doesn't look *usual*. Evaluate: Is the observed behaviour abnormal? Is the observed behaviour suspicious? Participants don't know and they are not informed that there are two invited *actors* in the hotel (station). Possible examples of things that might happen during the moment of the observation:

- traveller with empty suitcase or heavy back pack enters/leaves the hotel (station);
- a person is leaving a heavy backpack in the restaurant/ lobby of the hotel. After going to the WC – he disappears;
- traveller is wearing a warm jacket in hot weather conditions;
- traveller is having an umbrella when it's not raining;
- a guest is sitting in the lobby of the hotel wearing a warm jacket;
- a person enters the hotel with a ceramic knife in his luggage (no alarm from the metal detector at the entry) or products of dual use (acetone);
- a person is taking many pictures in the hotel even of the staircase and the elevator.

Analysing the implementation of the scenario 1, the author submitted the suggestion that before acting out such scenario, it is important to establish the baseline in order to make it clear what behaviour is "*normal-usual*" and what behaviour is "*deviant*". Certain training and explanation should be performed.

Scenario 2: Every terrorist attack is preceded by a certain amount of planning. Depending on the type of terrorism, certain planning steps are

more or less visible. At any case, these are always the same steps where behaviour detection plays crucial role. These are the steps where offenders (terrorists) are vulnerable. Participants are divided into 3 groups working on 3 dynamic settings of active profiling:

– patrolling;
– *libero*: the *libero* follows the flow of people in the hotel. He is the only one who remains discreet;
– *active spotter*: in this situation, some participants will address as many people as possible waiting to enter the hotel (in the queue waiting to buy a bus ticket etc.) The other participant observes the reaction of other persons (to the taken security actions).

According to the scenario, one of the hotel rooms is regularly booked by the VIP (*male*). The room is booked every month for a week. VIP`s country was strongly involved in the war against *Daesh* in Syria. What the students don't know is that during the practical exercise, one walk-on (terrorist) is observing the surrounding (he is shooting videos and taking pictures of the place, simultaneously he is talking to someone on the phone. Other walk-on (terrorist) is in the neighbourhood of the hotel in order to understand the habits of the VIP during his stay in the hotel. Walk-on (terrorist) find out that VIP is an active smoker and is going to have a smoke often in front of the hotel (smoking is not allowed in the hotel). The terrorists observe that there is no video observation camera and no security in the hotel provided smoking place. The plan of the terrorists is to shoot him from the car when he goes smoking outside. Lesson learned: during the implementation phase, the terrorist has a high chance of success. It is therefore in law enforcement agencies interest to act during the observation phase and dry run.

Scenario 3: Intelligence agency intercepted a phone call of a FTF who is travelling to Syria in order to make a terrorist attack against a Western target in the city. To mitigate the high threat, the law enforcement agencies construct safety rings and perimeters around the hotel (bus station) as many Western high-level guests are staying there. Participants create this safety perimeter. Everyone must remain within his or her perimeter. Participants are not informed that during the exercise - one hotel employee (or person in the police uniform) enters the security perimeter with a security badge of the hotel. A few days earlier he entered from the side of the hotel garage where there is no security control, he left in his car the weapon to commit the terrorist attack. Once he enters the hotel he behaves in a strange and nervous manner. Lesson learned: the participants guarding the outer perimeter fail and the purpose of the perimeter is not functioning. Each perimeter has to do its job in order to avoid an attack. Everyone is potentially suspected! Beware of the insider threat!

All scenarios need to be developed and harmonized with the hotel management. If the manager of the hotel agrees on a terrorist scenario and present the ToT exercise as an opportunity to train the hotel staff (at least the staff at the reception, in the lobby), as well if manager wants to deliver some walk-ons from the hotel staff for a few hours, it would also benefit the hotel and let to avoid possible terrorist threats.

It's much more complicated to secure a shopping mall than a hotel as it has several entries, at the same time it's more complicated to evacuate from the hotel because terrorists could hide in the private / restricted places of the hotel (rooms).

Such practical exercises are very time consuming – for planning and for performing.

The scenarios need to be explained for participants in the classroom and not in the lobby/ station. Everyone needs to be aware of what he or she has to do.

Finally, it is mandatory for the trainer to do the debriefing after practical sessions. Debriefing allows sum-up, making discussions and highlighting the drawbacks and fails.

Practical exercises could be very interesting and helpful in developing participants' skills and competences. However, author indicates some weak points in the implementation:

   – working on the scenario, trainer has to analyse the situation taking into account many factors: there could be situation, that nearby training place is no bus/ train station, shopping moll/ market. Either there is a possibility that in the chosen scenario place is too crowded, but sometimes just few people are present. Places with many entries and soft targets are good for training because it makes it more difficult to secure. The author of the paper experienced the situation that in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) there was no bus station as many Europeans may imagine. There were open areas with lots of routed taxicabs waiting for people;
   – to act out the planned scenarios could be challenging, for example to train participants in situations related to airport BCP in some countries it is very time and budget consuming because the venue is far away from the training institution/ city centre;
   – use of active police officers in the scenarios apart of the group of participants would require endorsements of the Ministry of Interior and Head of Border guard because the actors are supposed to play terrorists outside the designated training location. In case of rejection or delay, the whole practical exercise may be jeopardized;

– for practical exercises trainer needs to identify some people who would like to join the practical exercises (at least 4 walk-ons). These walk-ons cannot be the trainers neither the organizers staff because participants will recognize them. It is necessary to find walk-ons participants are not familiar with. Usually young police officers could be involved (with a mix of officers in uniform and civilians). Mobilization of police officers for the full day of a practical exercise could be difficult due to holiday season or service tasks. The knowledge of language of involved participant is not so important because in a real situation the terrorist might not be the speaker of the local language. The same situation was in the EU terrorist attacks. Some of the perpetrators of the *Bataclan* terrorist attack didn't speak French.

Guidelines for effective training of border guards in the future

In study (Madžuls, 2019), the author of the paper points out that the training of profilers is a key element in discovering possible impostors. Technical equipment cannot replace person when it is necessary to analyse psychology of another person and distinguish lies from true facts. Analysing the experience of other European Union, United States and CA law enforcement institutions, the most considerable training outcomes have been achieved in the United States, i.e. the length of training course are 2-3 weeks; course is followed by at least two months of internship in the workplace. The training programme includes the study of profiling theory, analysis of terrorism cases and terrorist profiles. Special attention is paid to the methodology for document verification and the detection of forged documents. The programme includes also topics on "observation" and "interview" in the context of Aviation Safety Service operational activity. Role-playing and psychological lessons are part of such training. Upon the completion of the training, the profiler starts an independent work, but under the supervision of his superior. It is envisaged that in the future all participants will take qualification improvement training.

Analysing the content of the SBGC implemented qualification improvement course "Profiling, Interviewing, Identification", the author brings forward the following suggestions. It is necessary to amend the course programme with the following learning outcomes. Course participants are able to:
– describe the person's character traits;
– describe criminal behaviour;
– make an assumption about person's age, race, family, social status and profession;

– name person's habits, inclinations, as well as to describe person's behaviour and way of communication.

By developing the profiling skills, in the future it will be possible to train the heads of the SBG structural units to apply the profiling methods in the selection of the SBG personnel and management.

Conclusions and suggestions

1. The proficiency of the SBGC lecturers allows the SBG to develop and implement the training programmes in the field of profiling of any length and content. Due to the lack of staff in many SBG structural units and also due to the influx of Ukrainian refugees in Latvia, participants of the qualification improvement courses – particularly "Profiling, Interviewing, and Identification" are unable to master the entire content of the programme and feel exhausted and too overloaded at work. It can be concluded that extending the content of the programme and duration of the course is not appropriate in case the course participant cannot ensure the full involvement.

2. Qualification improvement course participants are not eager to read scientific literature, as well as materials created by lecturers. It would be an advantage to use various computer programs that automatically play text; in that case lecturers have to gain additional knowledge on video processing programs. Taking into account the popularity of the "*TikTok*" resource, the author would recommend to develop micro training approach, namely by creating short video training materials.

3. The concept of profiling was approved at the State Border Guard in 2009 and the training on profiling is requested not only for the staff of the SBG, but also for the State Revenue Service and the National Armed Forces, the author recommends to develop and issue the State Border Guard profiling methodological instructions.

4. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the qualification improvement course, the author carried out an analysis of the factors influencing the implementation of the profiling course. It was concluded that the SBG has no statistical indicators and data on cases when a person, vehicle or document was detained due to the border guard's profiling skills and using of certain risk indicators. According to the author`s point of view, the absence of such statistics makes it difficult to improve the existing risk indicators and develop the new ones. It also influences the training of border guards and providing information of the present state of things. The documentation related to detention cases, including tactical alerts/ warnings, need to be supplemented with a fact/indicator that has led to the suspicion of the border guard.

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BORDER CHECKS OF PERSONS DURING A PANDEMIC PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

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Abstract. *The article is a study of border checks (hereinafter BCs) of persons during a pandemic – a study of problems and possible solutions. BC problems at different border crossing points (BCPs) are analysed in the study – their importance and possible solutions. In this article, the authors study the influence of a pandemic on efficient performance of the duties of the State Border Guard (hereinafter the SBG) and design recommendations to improve the work of the SBG.*

The research aim is to study BCs of persons during a pandemic, associated problems and possible solutions, make an evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations.

Research objectives:
- *Analyse the legal regulations for BCs of persons during a pandemic;*
- *Study the specifications of BCs of persons during the Covid-19 pandemic;*
- *Study the problems associated with BCs of persons during the Covid-19 pandemic at different types of border crossing points, perform an analysis and suggest possible solutions.*

Primary methods used: Analysis and qualitative methods.

Main results – find possible solutions to the problems associated with BCs of persons during a pandemic.

The European Union (hereinafter the EU) is striving to improve the protection of its external borders by suggesting various modern solutions. The EU border management policies are met with the influx of refugees and migrants in unprecedented numbers, which has also uncovered deficiencies in the EU policy concerning external borders and migration. The EU is also facing the Covid-19 pandemic and the increase in security problems.

The State Border Guard officers have to adapt to new and strained working conditions, have to be able to provide themselves with all the necessary personal protection equipment; if necessary, send officers to serve in other units and test their ability to cooperate with other institutions at a completely different level. They have to be able to successfully ensure the security of the state border in accordance with the requirements of the EU, as well as perform priority tasks in accordance with the situation in any conditions.

Keywords: *border checks of persons, border crossing point, Covid-19 pandemic, European Union, State Border Guard.*

Introduction

At the end of 2020, Covid-19 reached Europe while spreading throughout the world. On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organisation declared a pandemic, and many countries introduced various measures to limit the spread of the disease and declared an emergency. (National

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Encyclopaedia. Covid-19 Pandemic) To confine the pandemic, several decisions and Cabinet regulations were adopted, which had to be observed by government authorities. At the time of writing, vaccines against Covid-19 are already developed. The authors believe that the topic is very relevant because to ensure continuous BCs of persons during the pandemic, the State Border Guard officers had to get vaccinated and design internal regulations for the SBG on the basis of 28 September 2021 Cabinet Regulation No.662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection". During the pandemic, the majority of the officers left service with the SBG or retired based on years of service, the staff were sick with Covid-19 and, of course, there were challenges, mostly due to the shortage of staff.

Research period: year 2021 – 2022.

Research methods – study and analysis of literature, monographic or descriptive method, analysis and synthesis, statistical method, comparative method. The study of literature and the descriptive method are used to study the specific nature of BCs of persons during the pandemic. Whereas analysis and synthesis are used to analyse laws and regulations and statistical data.

Research aim – to study BCs of persons during a pandemic, associated problems and possible solutions, make an evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations.

Legal Regulations for Border Checks of Persons During a Pandemic

This Chapter contains the study of Cabinet regulations. The authors of the study analyse the Cabinet regulations which directly determine and regulate the work of the SBG during a pandemic.

The authors have studied 28 September 2021 Cabinet Regulation No.662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection", the purpose of which is to limit the spread of the Covid-19 infection.

Cabinet Regulation No.662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection" describes general epidemiological safety requirements, special epidemiological safety requirements, conditions for entering the Republic of Latvia, counter-epidemic measures against Covid-19, vaccination against Covid-19, the interoperable certificate, restrictions on the provision of healthcare services, etc. (28 September 2021 Cabinet Regulation No. 662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection")

Since 2020, one of the most prominent political solutions for managing the coronavirus pandemic is the restriction of the movement of persons globally and within the EU. Several EU member states closed international

passenger traffic, which was followed by additional restrictions on international travel in the EU, which involved partial closure of the external borders of the EU and the prohibition to enter the European Union from third countries. (26 March 2020 Joint statement by the Members of European Council, Brussels)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a great challenge for people globally and in Latvia. Latvia had not seen epidemics so extensive for a long time, which is why neither institutions, nor society in general were able to use previous experience for overcoming the crisis. The situation was new and, in a way, unique, and the reaction of society came under the spotlight of science. (https://lvportals.lv/viedokli/323643-komunikacijas-grabekli-uz-kuriem-varejam-ari-neuzkapt-latvija-covid-19-krize-2021. [Communication Rake We Did Not Have to Step On, – Latvia in Covid-19 crisis, 11 January 2021])

The SBG officers were performing their service duties to ensure the functioning of the internal and external border at border crossing points in accordance with the provisions of Cabinet Regulation No.662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection".

When organising its work during the Covid-19 pandemic, the SBG has successfully balanced the resources at its disposal and, if necessary, efficiently sent officers to serve in other units. Personal protection equipment and disinfectants for the staff were also prepared and handed out quickly.

Border Checks of Persons During a Pandemic in Different Units of the SBG

This Chapter is the study of problems in different BC units of the SBG during the Covid-19 pandemic. The authors analyse the responses of the staff of BC units of the SBG to the questions related to BCs of persons during the pandemic and study possible solutions at border crossing points. 70 respondents from different units were interviewed with the aim to learn about the problems related to BCs of persons during the pandemic and to find possible solutions.

As part of the study, the SBG officers were asked the following questions, which were then summarised:

- Did you experience any problems performing official duties in the BC unit during the pandemic?
- Which factors influenced BCs of persons?
- What possible solutions would you suggest?

Fig.1 Did you experience any problems performing official duties in the BC unit during the pandemic? (compiled by the authors)

The majority of respondents believe that they experienced problems (83% of respondents) performing BCs of persons during the pandemic, and 17% of respondents believe there were no problems and they performed their official duties as usual.


Fig.2 Which factors influenced BCs of persons? (compiled by the authors)

70% of respondents believe that BCs of persons were influenced by the shortage of staff and lack of bonuses. A somewhat smaller number of respondents (58%) believe that the high health risk had an effect, and 57% said "morbidity rates among staff". 53% of respondents were affected by the workload, and 46% of respondents were affected by mental state, namely job strain. 30% of respondents did not want to get vaccinated. 24% of respondents believed there was a shortage of personal protective equipment at the workplace. The remaining 15% stated other reasons which influenced BCs of persons (such as no Covid-19 test result, no vaccination, the Covidpass form not completed). It can be concluded that, for various reasons, BCs of persons during the pandemic were hindered.

Fig.3 What possible solutions were suggested?
(compiled by the authors)

The majority of respondents (70%) suggested paying monthly bonuses, another 46% of respondents suggested getting vaccinated, 37% of respondents suggested increasing the number of employees, and only 19% of respondents suggested engaging officers from other units as a solution in this situation.

Having summarised the information received from the respondents, the authors have concluded that controlling the fulfilment of the requirements for entry, leaving, and stay, the completion of Covidpass certification forms, as well as informing the public about these requirements, was not easy at first – there were many incidents of uncompleted forms and many administrative violation procedures were initiated. During the pandemic, a large number of staff were sick with Covid-19 for long periods, which caused

a shortage of staff at the SBG, and people had to work several shifts. There was also a shortage of funding (not everyone received bonuses due to the Covid-19 pandemic) and the staff had no desire to work. People's mental state also became fragile, which applied both to border guards as well as foreigners. During border checks of persons during the pandemic, there were also foreigners who were crossing the State border without a valid Covid-19 test or a valid interoperable vaccination certificate, but the situation was solved right there, and the foreigners were able to have a Covid-19 test taken by a medical specialist at the BCP for a fee and receive the test result right there.

The solution to the shortage of staff due to high morbidity rates was to engage border guards from other units, even from other directorates.

The EU border management policy had to be adapted to the dramatic changes related to the arrival of refugees and non-qualifying migrants in unprecedented numbers, and since the middle of 2015, a set of deficiencies was discovered in the EU policy regarding its external borders and migration. Problems related to the growing mixed flow of migrants to the EU, the Covid-19 pandemic, and increasing security issues have encouraged active action for the protection of the EU external borders, which also affects the internal borders of the Union. (European Parliament Management of the external borders: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/lv/sheet/153/arejo-robezu-parvaldiba#_ftn15)

Conclusions and Recommendations

Following the provisions of Cabinet Regulation No.662 "Epidemiological Safety Measures for the Containment of the Spread of COVID-19 Infection", officials were performing their official duties at their places of duty.

The pandemic has been going on for two years, and the SBG staff numbers have rapidly decreased: some officers used the opportunity to retire based on years of service, others left service and went abroad, and there were also some who simply did not get vaccinated and in accordance with Cabinet Regulation No.662 could not perform their official duties without an interoperable vaccination certificate or recovery certificate, which is why rotations were made in the SBG units.

The pandemic has also had an effect on people's mental state – uncertainty about the future, the feeling of instability, relationship problems with colleagues and management, insufficient renumeration, physical and mental exhaustion, a large amount of work, and Covid-19 are the factors which negatively influence the mental wellbeing of employees at work. Mental wellbeing is significantly affected by sudden changes which bring about the necessity to adapt to something new and unusual. Everyone had to

face such conditions due to the restrictions established by the state of emergency due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the situation in the State.

One of the possible solutions to the problems caused by the pandemic were Covid-19 bonuses and near-border bonuses. Officers were motivated to travel to other units and help because they could receive bonuses. In case of staff shortages, officials from other departments were seconded.

The State Border Guard officers were subjected to a higher risk of infection through direct contact with people and often faced violence and aggression towards themselves from foreigners.

Those officers who were able to perform their official duties during the pandemic remotely from home were provided with a work computer and access to the systems for remote work.

The authors believe that the pandemic has made officers adapt to working in the conditions of an emergency, whereas the SBG has provided everything it could and tried to find solutions in problem situations.

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DEVELOPMENT OF DIGITAL EDUCATION CAPACITY IN THE STATE BORDER GUARD OF LATVIA

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Abstract. *Digital education and education transformation perspectives have particularly become the topics of interest and research during Covid-19 pandemic in all law enforcement institutions. Experience gained by overcoming weaknesses in e-learning and best practices identified need to be summarised and shared in order to strengthen existing border guards e-learning systems as well as timely prepare infrastructure and trainers for unexpected challenges and future education trends. The article outlines research results on the analysis of the current trends in digital learning in context of e-learning in the State Border Guard. Article includes research of main problems, risks and concerns regarding digital education in general as well as well as potential opportunities and recommendations for further development of e-learning for border guards. Existing problematic areas have been identified by historic research method, particularly Covid-19 experience. Future perspectives in developing border guard's digital education capacity and potential have been defined based on scientific researches analysis.*

Keywords: *digital capacity, digital competence development, digital transformation, e-learning.*

Introduction

In order to facilitate border guards training the State Border Guard College (hereinafter – SBGC) has been actively using e-learning system since 2008. Several researches and international projects have been implemented to strengthen the functionality of e-learning at SBGGC. Covid-19 particularly hihlighted the need to further enhance teachers' digital competence in order to raise the effeiciency and accessibility of digital learning solutions to border guards. The inevitable increase of educational technologies and digital learning possibilities continuously sustain the topicality for further researches to meet future education challenges and tackle existing ones. As one of the key challenges to be addressed is to identify further development needs at SBGC, to determine effective steps for development and use of emerging educational technologies. The author of this research analyses and outlines the peculiarities of developing e-learning system in the context of global digital education development trends in the context of specific border guard training environment. The research includes overview of research

analysis influencing e-learning system development, strategic education development documents aiming to enhance the potential of using digital technologies and developing interactive and meaningful training environment and content. The author puts forward suggestions on how to further develop e-learning system of the SBGC which might be applicable to military education contexts.

Current digital education development tendencies and research findings

In order to solve existing gaps and issues in education as well as prepare for possible challenges law enforcement institutions, just like all education institutions have to have a strategic approach and vision of target areas to be improved which can be found in Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027). This plan states that the pandemic has accelerated integration of online and hybrid learning and this shift has uncovered new and innovative ways for students and educators to organise their teaching and learning and interaction activities. According to this Plan the call for a strong and coordinated effort at the EU level to support education and training systems to address the challenges identified and exasperated by the COVID-19 pandemic has been started to put forward a long-term vision for the way ahead for European digital education, namely, developing two key areas:

1. Fostering the development of a high-performing digital education ecosystem, which includes development of infrastructure, connectivity and digital equipment; effective digital capacity planning and development, including up-to-date organisational capabilities; digitally competent and confident teachers and education and training staff; high-quality learning content, user-friendly tools and secure platforms which respect e-privacy rules and ethical standards;
2. Enhancing digital skills and competences for the digital transformation, which requires basic digital skills and competences from an early age; digital literacy, including tackling disinformation; computing education; good knowledge and understanding of data-intensive technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI); advanced digital skills, which produce more digital specialists as well as ensuring that girls and young women are equally represented in digital studies and careers.

Several researchers agree that digital technology in the modern world is not only a tool, but also a living environment that opens up new

opportunities such as learning at any convenient time as well as continuing education (Bilyalova et al., 2020). Results of scientific researches (Balyer & Öz, 2018) conclude that in the digital transformation process, managers must first create a vision to generate and managed accordingly for an effective learning environment which should be supported by appropriate content and technological infrastructure. It is recommended that educational administrators and program specialists are ready for this transformation and have the qualities to manage this transformation. Digital transformation in education is inevitable and it is essential to develop strategic plans for the implementation of educational policies on technology, vision must be established and managed by leaders with this vision. Researchers emphasize that there should be given feedback and made an evaluation about how digital transformation process works, managers, teachers, and students should get training in the direction of digital transformation vision and in-service training activities provided by experts and academicians.

Researches indicate the basic requirements for successful integration of e-learning - definition of vision and strategic planning, the need to create an environment for change, successful integration of e-learning process is possible on planning integration and assessment quality criteria: teaching system, technical system, subject matter, technical services, quality of course leaders and users, basic support system (Engelbrecht, 2003; Vanderlinde et al., 2012; Jeladze & Pata, 2017).

Based on the analysis of theoretical research, it can be concluded that strengthening the capacity of digital education and e-learning is one of the priorities for the development of education policy, which is also relevant to militarized education institutions. Covid-19 pandemic showed us that by effectively integrating traditional teaching methods with modern digital education solutions, it is possible to ensure wider access to education, balancing financial savings without losing the quality of the learning process and achievements. The Covid-19 pandemic proved that e-learning solutions are able to ensure the continuity of the study process in emergency situations, therefore the possibilities of implementing e-learning outside emergency situations should be considered.

The researchers also emphasize the lack of interactivity in the developed teaching materials (Daniela et al., 2019), the topicality of the lecturers' development of digital competence and practical experience in the use of technology (Daniela, 2019; Čižmešija et al., 2018), development of didactic digital competence (Ottestad et al., 2014; Atanu & Bag, 2020).

Lecturers are encouraged to use the principles of SMART pedagogy to develop a technology-enriched learning environment, anticipating, predicting and analyzing the usefulness of using technology (Daniela, 2019), involving students in the creation and sharing of digital content (Barajas & Frossard, 2018).

The development of lecturers' digital competence highlights the need to create communities of practice, where ideas are developed and experiences are gathered and a common understanding is formed to create and implement quality e-learning courses (Starkey, 2012; UNESCO, 2008; Benedek et al., 2012; Gutierrez, 2014).

Successful integration of digital resources in pedagogical activities depends on the development of lecturers' criteria of digital competence - knowledge, skills and attitudes. Research on the development of education (UNESCO, OECD, etc.) indicates that the lecturer has a duty and a direct influence in structuring an effective learning environment, must be able to anticipate and meaningfully combine new technologies with the usual pedagogical work environment. The conclusions of the research emphasize the need to create an effective online collaborative environment by developing socially active interactions through collaborative learning. The role of lecturers changes from knowledge providers to facilitators of shared knowledge and team building.

According to Digital Education Action Plan (2021-2027) effective digital capacity planning and development is vital for education and training systems. This requires the development and ongoing review and updating of digital strategies addressing technology gaps in infrastructure, devices and developing relevant organisational capabilities in education, including the capacity to deliver hybrid modes of learning and teaching (remote and on-site). Institutionalised support is essential for such planning and development, as are interdisciplinary teams including management, technologists and instructional designers, with the needs and experience of education and training staff at the centre.

Very high-capacity internet connectivity is critical for education. Demand for connectivity is increasing due to bandwidth-heavy applications such as video streaming, video conferencing, cloud computing, and other emerging applications (such as virtual and augmented reality). Bringing fast and reliable internet to educational institutions and learners plays an important role in ensuring effective and engaging learning experiences.

The need to enhance digital competence of lecturers

In order to meet the challenges of the digital age and better prepare for possible future educational challenges, the digital competence of lecturers has been updated in both research and EU education development planning strategies, especially after the Covid-19 pandemic, and its development is essential to all education institutions globally. The relevance of the development of digital competences is also confirmed by its inclusion in the European Qualifications Framework, thus defining the basic criterion of people's professional activity - proven ability to use knowledge and skills to use digital technologies effectively (Redecker, 2017; EU Council Recommendations on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning, 2018).

The topicality of digital competences in the education sector is confirmed by the European Teachers developed framework in 2017 (DigCompEdu, 2017), which synthesizes lecturers 'professional and pedagogical competencies with learners' competencies, thus helping lecturers to identify, assess and independently promote digital competencies. To promote a common understanding, militarized educational institutions are bound by the main directions of the Digital Education Action Plan (2018) - to encourage lecturers to research, manage and effectively use the potential of digital technologies in education, constantly monitoring rapid technological progress and regularly increasing digital competence.

Research shows that the theoretical and practical need to improve the digital competence of lecturers has gained new significance due to the Covid-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, along with the challenges of implementing the distance learning process in all education sectors. Research conclusions (UNESCO, 2008; Council of Europe Conclusions on Digital Education, 2020; Latvian National Development Plan 2021–2027; Digital Transformation Guidelines 2021–2027, etc.) emphasize the risk of low digital competence of lecturers, the acute need for the development of digital competence is defined, as well as the improvement of digital competence is set as one of the priorities for the development and challenges of future education.

Based on the theoretical findings, it can be concluded that the improvement of lecturers' digital competence is the responsibility of both the educational institution and the lecturers, which stems from both the institution's strategic vision and the lecturer's personal and collective attitude towards the development of digital competence. Taking into account the specifics of militarized educational institutions, it is necessary to ensure, motivate and control the professional development of lecturers and its integration into pedagogical activities. Taking into account that many

lecturers do not have pedagogical education, professional development courses should pay special attention to the aspects of effective integration of basic principles of pedagogy and digital technologies. Improving the digital competence of lecturers, as also observed during the Covid-19 pandemic, is necessary not only to ensure the continuity of education during sudden emergencies, but also to prepare in time for future educational challenges.

Militarized educational institutions must create an environment with motivating conditions that allow lecturers to simultaneously perform their daily pedagogical tasks effectively, as well as to independently improve their professionalism and conduct research in the implementation of new digital educational solutions. In order to develop the e-learning process in a militarized educational institution, it is necessary to develop a system for strengthening digital capacity and improving the digital competence of lecturers, as a result of which the militarized educational institution is able to ensure and develop effective implementation of the e-learning process.

Taking into account the specifics of the militarized educational institution's environment, current practice, legal framework, as well as common trends (European Teachers' Digital Competence Framework, 2017, Digital Transformation Guidelines for 2021-2027), the author proposes to evaluate the digital competence of militarized educational institutions the following criteria and indicators.

Table 1

Criteria and indicators for evaluation of lecturers digital competence within the system of Ministry of the Interior
(compiled by the author)

Definition	Digital competence is the convincing, critical and responsible use of digital technologies in professional activities, which includes the ability to use information and data, the ability to communicate and collaborate effectively with colleagues and students in the e-environment, the ability to create and meaningfully use interactive digital content security and copyright issues, as well as a focused, development- and cooperation-oriented approach to the use of digital tools and resources in pedagogical work and the development of digital competences.
Outcome	**Criteria and performance indicators**
Excellent - exceeds requirements	Knowledge of the basic principles, needs and trends in the development and use of digital tools and resources in pedagogical work: Excellent knowledge and ability to define the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources in the lecturer's study course, excellent knowledge of educational technology development trends.

	Skills to effectively integrate digital tools and resources in the study process, creating and maintaining an interactive, self-directed and online collaboration environment: constantly use digital tools and resources in the learning process and service needs. Highly interactive digital tools and resources are constantly being developed. The availability of teaching aids in the e-environment is constantly ensured and regularly updated. Able to organize an interactive online collaboration environment. Constantly involves learners in knowledge creation and online collaboration activities with the help of digital tools, using feedback tools. Attitudes towards the development and use of digital tools and resources in professional activities and the development of digital competences: clearly defines the impact of the use of digital technologies in the learning process and future developments. Encourages and supports colleagues in the development of digital learning tools, promotes and encourages innovation, and conveys successful change or innovation experiences. Continuously improves digital competence by organizing and participating in international activities, projects and conferences, constantly researches and publishes research results in scientific articles.
Very good - partly exceeds requirements	Knowledge of the basic principles, needs and trends in the development and use of digital tools and resources in pedagogical work: Very well knows and is able to define the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources in the lecturer's study course. Very familiar with the development trends of educational technologies Skills to effectively integrate digital tools and resources in the study process, creating and maintaining an interactive, self-directed and online collaboration environment: very often use digital tools and resources in the learning process and service needs, actively develop high-interactive digital tools and resources. Ensures the availability of teaching aids in the e-environment on a very regular basis and updates them regularly. Can organize an interactive online collaboration environment very well. Involves learners very well in knowledge creation and online collaboration activities with the help of digital tools, using feedback tools. Attitudes towards the development and use of digital tools and resources in professional activities and the development of digital competences: shows a very good attitude towards the use of digital technologies and the development of digital competences. Actively participates and cooperates with colleagues in the development of digital teaching aids, transfer of experience. Very often digital competence is developed by participating in international activities, projects and conferences, very often researching and publishing research results in scientific articles.
Good - requirements are met	Knowledge of the basic principles, needs and trends in the development and use of digital tools and resources in pedagogical work: is well acquainted with and is able to define the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources in the

	lecturer's study course. Is well acquainted with the development trends of educational technologies. Skills to effectively integrate digital tools and resources into the study process, creating and maintaining an interactive, self-directed and online collaboration environment: Frequent use of digital tools and resources in the learning process and service needs, actively developing high-interactivity digital tools and resources. The teaching aids are regularly available in the e-environment and are regularly updated. Can organize an interactive online collaboration environment. Involves learners well in knowledge creation and online collaboration activities with the help of digital tools, uses feedback tools. Attitudes towards the development and use of digital tools and resources in professional activities and the development of digital competences: there is a good attitude towards the use of digital technologies and the development of digital competences. He is happy to get involved and cooperate with colleagues in the development of digital teaching aids, transfer of experience. Often develops digital competence by participating in international activities, projects and conferences, often researches and publishes research results in scientific articles
Needs to be improved - partly meets requirements	Knowledge of the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources, trends in pedagogical work: students are familiar with the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources in the lecturer's course. Poor knowledge of educational technology development trends. Skills to effectively integrate digital tools and resources into the learning process, creating and maintaining an interactive, self-directed and online collaboration environment: very rarely use digital tools and resources in the learning process and service, rarely develop high-interactivity digital tools and resources. Occasionally ensures the availability of teaching aids in the e-environment and updates them on an occasional basis. Can't organize an interactive online collaboration environment well. Poorly engages learners in knowledge creation and online collaboration activities through digital tools, uses feedback tools. Attitudes towards the development and use of digital tools and resources in professional activities and the development of digital competences: there is a negative or skeptical attitude towards the use of digital technologies and the development of digital competences. Rarely gets involved and cooperates with colleagues in the development of digital learning tools, transfer of experience. Rarely develops digital competence by participating in international activities, projects and conferences, rarely researches and publishes research results in scientific articles.

	Knowledge of the basic principles, needs and trends in the development and use of digital tools and resources in pedagogical work: does not know and is unable to define the basic principles and needs of the development and use of digital tools and resources in the lecturer's study course. Not aware of the development trends of educational technologies.
Unsatisfactory	Skills to effectively integrate digital tools and resources in the study process, creating and maintaining an interactive, self-directed and online collaboration environment: do not use digital tools and resources in the learning process and service needs, rarely develop high-interactive digital tools and resources. Does not ensure the availability of teaching aids in the e-environment. Unable to organize interactive online collaboration environment. Does not involve learners in knowledge creation and online collaboration activities through digital tools. Does not use feedback tools.
	Attitudes towards the development and use of digital tools and resources in professional activities and the development of digital competences: there is a negative and negative attitude towards the use of digital technologies and the development of digital competences. Very rarely or reluctantly collaborates with colleagues in the development of digital learning tools, exchange of experience. Very rarely develops digital competence, very rarely or does not participate in international activities, projects and conferences, very rarely researches and publishes research results in scientific articles.

The criteria and indicators for assessing the digital competence of lecturers developed as a result of the research not only help to identify the necessary development activities, but together with other components of the digital competence development model promote the development of a creative digital environment, motivate lecturers to research, approbate and share experience with other colleagues.

Conclusions and suggestions

Based on research results it can be concluded that it is necessary to strengthen scientific research and technological capacity for the development of digital education technologies by analyzing the historical context of the implementation of the e-learning process, as well as future development trends of digital education. In order to further develop the e-learning process, it is necessary to promote the improvement of digital competence, focus on the integration of modern pedagogical processes.

Researches indicate further development of digital tehnologies in education, hence it is important to find efficient integration paths in military

environment. The attitude of the lecturers towards the improvement of digital competence and the use of the e-learning environment is formed in the environment of the militarized educational institution (management, leaders, team), based on the general attitude of the institution and the strategic vision for the use of the e-learning environment. The effective integration and use of the e-learning environment in a militarized educational institution is also determined by the teacher's pedagogical education, hence the effective implementation of the e-learning process in a militarized education environment is not possible without periodic monitoring, control and evaluation of the results of lecturers' pedagogical activities, as well as the improvement of systemic digital competence. A militarized educational environment needs to develop the integration of a student-centered approach and increase the share of online collaboration in the e-learning process. It is necessary to improve the skills of lecturers to create an effective digital collaboration environment, as well as to develop self-directed learning opportunities in the development of interactive learning content.

Based on the nalysis of the theoretical literature and the results of empirical research, the author offers recommendations for the development of the e-learning process in the SBGC:

1. In order to ensure effective integration of educational technologies in the learning process and their further development for Latvian militarized educational institutions, it is necessary to improve cooperation in the field of digital education development. To strengthen it, it would be useful for militarized educational institutions to develop a common strategy for the development of digital education.

2. For the development of digital education, it is necessary to develop a unified, military-binding didactic framework for digital education (methodological instructions, guidelines, examples of good practice in the planning, implementation and evaluation of e-learning). The didactic framework should include precise and well-defined terms related to the pedagogy of the field and their explanations, descriptions and examples of the types and methods of e-learning organization, duties and responsibilities of the staff involved.

3. In order to develop the e-learning process, militarized educational institutions need to create and maintain a common community of good practice in the implementation of digital education, within which regular digital competence development and experience exchange activities are organized. The main goal of the community

is to provide opportunities for lecturers to innovate and transfer new experiences.

4. In order to develop the capacity of digital education, disseminate examples of good practice and provide mutual assistance and support in a militarized educational environment, it is necessary to create a methodological support unit (department or position) for e-learning, development and updating of materials (instructions, examples and samples of the development of interactive teaching aids), solution of various problematic issues of implementation of digital education innovations, strengthening, implementation and coordination of digital capacity of international cooperation projects.

5. To promote the improvement of lecturers' digital competence, to support mutual experience exchange activities, emphasizing the need to improve pedagogical skills for the full use of digital education opportunities. New lecturers must ensure the improvement of pedagogical qualification both in the acquisition of basic pedagogical principles and in the integration of pedagogy and ICT, emphasizing pedagogical theory, such as behaviorism, constructivism, constructionism, connectivism, etc. examples of pedagogy and ICT integration theory and good practice.

6. To organize regular digital competence development seminars for representatives of militarized educational institutions management, study process administration and supervision structural units (department management, study coordination departments, ICT department management), also envisaging acquisition of theoretically practical qualification improvement courses (seminars), emphasizing pedagogical and digital competence integration opportunities, examples of good practice and strategic issues of e-learning management and implementation.

7. Considering the specifics of subjects, study courses and in-service training courses, within the working group to create lists or categories of eligible and partially eligible subjects, study courses and in-service training courses for e-learning, which due to objective circumstances include a certain part of the acquisition of theoretical knowledge without practical activities) can be partially implemented in the form of e-learning. For partial transformation in the e-learning environment, general education subjects and study courses, such as foreign languages, ethics, political science, history, didactics, communication psychology, geography, basics of economics and logistics, are primarily to be considered.

8. Transforming or partially implementing subjects, study courses, in-service training programs in the form of e-studies, considering objective conditions, developing high-interactivity digital teaching aids and organizing the online learning process, requires workload balancing to provide creative and research opportunities, redistributing workload. For example, while the e-learning course is being developed for a lecturer who is involved in the development of interactive digital learning tools, the study workload is reduced.

9. Considering the development opportunities and tendencies of digital education, it is necessary to envisage the placement and transformation of all theoretical subjects of study subjects and study course materials, for which there is no restricted access, for use remotely in Moodle or other digital environment. In this regard, considering the regular workload of lecturers, it is necessary to provide (compensate) time for the development of digital teaching aids. In order to transfer a common approach and good practice, it is recommended to organize seminars for the development (transformation) of digital teaching aids, project weeks, providing an opportunity to collaborate with other lecturers and students.

10. In order to accurately assess the knowledge skills and attitudes of lecturers, using digital tools and resources in professional activities, to determine the results-oriented tasks of lecturers, professional development opportunities, learning and development needs, the existing evaluation system for lecturers in militarized educational institutions, to introduce and evaluate the digital competence of lecturers according to certain criteria and indicators as well as motivate lecturers to develop effective, interactive and sustainable digital tools.

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FOREIGN (TERRORIST) FIGHTERS AND THEIR FAMILIES: CHALLENGES FOR STATE INSTITUTIONS AND THE BORDER MANAGEMENT OF ESTONIA AND THE EU

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Abstract. *Foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) returning with their families to the countries of origin in the EU after the fall of ISIS caliphate in Iraq and Syria, as well as foreign fighters (FFs) returning to the EU after combating in the conflict zones in (Eastern) Ukraine present a significant challenge for public institutions and border management of the EU member states. While there is differing legislation across member states regarding the treatment of foreign fighters in Ukraine, there are largely common views on and framework for prosecution of FTFs, deradicalisation and reintegration of them and their families, which requires a remarkable multi-agency effort as exemplified by member states like Finland and Sweden. Having served their sentences, FTFs and, possibly, also FFs have a clean profile, but there remains a risk that some of them may resume terrorism-related activities. In this article, questionnaire as well as semi-structured interviews were used to establish how Finland, Sweden, and the Baltic States are handling the issue of FTFs and FFs; also, the impact of the FTFs and FFs on Estonia's as well as the EU's border management is analysed. Major conclusions of the study include the suggestion to use smart gates for the biometric verification of all passengers within the Schengen area as well as the suggestion for the Baltic States to create and develop multi-agency framework for treatment of returnees and refugees from conflict zones.*

Keywords: *(de)radicalisation, border management, foreign (terrorist) fighters, smart borders terrorism.*

Introduction

The research summarized in this article was conducted well before the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. However, the research on foreign (terrorist) fighters is still topical, since, as Mina al-Lami who leads BBC Monitoring's jihadist media team wrote on Twitter on 18 April 2022, a recent issue of a pro-al-Qaeda magazine urged jihadists to go to Ukraine as foreign volunteers to fight Russia in order to receive military training and weapons that could later be used in jihadist attacks.[1] Moreover, in his recent

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[1] https://twitter.com/Minalami/status/1515820795884453888

address on 18 April 2022, ISIS spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir urged supporters of the terrorist group to launch jihadist attacks against Europe and Israel while the West is distracted with the war in Ukraine (Vohra, 2022).

There are thousands of individuals in Europe and in third countries who have been active in combat in Syria and Iraq or in support of terrorist targets. When they return home, they either escape criminal prosecution or serve their sentence. These persons may no longer pose an immediate threat to national security and public order, but some of them may still be active proponents and disseminators of terrorist or extremist ideology or vulnerable to being manipulated into these activities (Klemm, 2022, p. 31). Hence, EU nationals with terrorist intentions, previously having FTF and/or FF profiles, can travel freely across the Schengen Area. Other FTFs and FFs choose to come to the EU covertly, using illegal migration routes and counterfeited documents. Moreover, upon joining ISIS, FTFs gave away their documents, so these documents could be used to send ISIS agents to the EU (Europol, 2020, p. 44)

COVID-19 restrictions on travel had their impact on the return of FTFs to Europe in 2020. Among those who nevertheless returned, there were two ISIS members entering Spain through an irregular migration route from North Africa. (Europol, 2021, p. 8) In 2021, Estonian Internal Security Service detected two Iraqi citizens who were apparently involved in the ISIS massacre of hundreds of Iraqis. In addition, a Russian citizen was detected who, having been prosecuted in Russia for a terrorist offense, was using an illegal migration channel created by the Belarusian hybrid attack to covertly get to Finland with the help of Finnish Chechen community. (Klemm, 2022, p. 31) There are still attempts made to travel to conflict zones. Notably, not only those enthusiastic about Islamist extremism and radicalized islamists are ready to travel to the hotbed of conflict, but more than a thousand women have left Europe (including Estonia) for the Syrian-Iraqi conflict zone to live with their husbands or marry (Klemm, 2021, p.35).

All of the above creates certain pressure on the EU border management. Moreover, the issue of returning foreign (terrorist) fighters lies at the intersection of the fields of expertise of many state institutions, such as security, judicial, and social authorities, with the purpose to ensure fair punishment for FTFs and FFs, but also deradicalisation and reintegration for them and their families and, if necessary, the ability to track their activities and travelling in case of relapse into terrorism-related pursuits. Hence, the solution to the issue of FTFs and FFs lies in the high level of inter-institutional as well as inter-state cooperation. Additional challenge here is in responding

to the potential security threat on the one hand and maintaining the respect for fundamental rights as well as the freedom of movement within the Schengen area on the other hand. OSCE stresses that "effective counter-terrorism measures and human rights are not competing but mutually reinforcing objectives" (OSCE ODIHR, 2021, p. 8).

This research, conducted in spring 2021, aimed at establishing how Estonia[2] and its neighbouring countries Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania were approaching the issue of FTFs and FFs. To reach this objective, experts from these countries were asked to fill out the questionnaire. The questions concerned the (expected) number of returnee FTFs and their family members as well as FFs in the expert's country; the country's policies with regard to these returnees, its disengagement and reintegration programmes; the country's further activities with regard to FTFs and their wives who are released from prisons; difference in the treatment of FTFs from Syria and Iraq on the one hand and FFs from Ukraine on the other hand. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with Estonian border management experts regarding the challenges (recidivist) FTFs and FFs pose to the border management of Estonia and the EU. The questions addressed the existing capabilities of the EU organisations and systems (Europol, Frontex, SIS, and also EES and ETIAS, which are intended to be implemented in the foreseeable future), as well as Interpol in intercepting (recidivist) FTFs and FFs in the EU and ways of improving these capabilities. Responses were received from eleven experts in total. Major conclusions are that the current difficult situation in detecting FTFs and FFs could be improved by enhancing the interoperability between available (and future) databases and systems. Another solution could be biometrics checks of all passengers, including EU nationals, within the Schengen Area.

Foreign (terrorist) fighters: definitions and the background

In this article, "foreign terrorist fighter" (an *FTF*) is a person who, beginning from 2011, went to Syria and Iraq to combat on the side of ISIS terrorist group. Notably, it has been established that there have been very few cases in which FTFs returned to their country of origin in the EU to actually commit a violent attack. Hence, an FTF threat can be characterised as "low probability, high impact" (Scherrer, ed., 2018, p. 26). It is important to bear in mind that, "despite diverse backgrounds, experiences, roles, and

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[2] The country where the author of this work is based.

motivations, all adult and child returnees are considered to have some level of trauma and emotional/psychological issues" (Scherrer, ed., 2018, p. 37). As mentioned above, FTFs are not a homogenous group regarding their backgrounds, motivations, and experiences; hence, some FTFs show utter readiness to disengage from violence and contribute to deradicalisation programmes, while others slide into terrorism-related activities (Scherrer, ed., 2018, pp. 26–27). Nevertheless, due to posing a possible security threat in their country of origin, FTFs are "are viewed almost universally by both public opinion and security officials as terrorists" (Hoffman & Furlan, 2020, p. 10).

Ambivalences described above are also inherent in the wives of FTFs, many of whom were placed in Syrian refugee camps Al Hol and Roj: some of these women are begging to return to their home countries and stand trial, while others are waiting for ISIS as saviours (Prevention Media, 2020). Regarding the children of FTFs, they may be severely traumatised due to exposure to radical beliefs and brutal acts of violence, but they are nevertheless considered a possible security threat due to receiving military training by some of them (Europol, 2020, p. 45). However, according to the UN officials, leaving these children in refugee camps enhances the risk of their radicalisation: "Al Hol will be the womb that will give birth to new generations of extremists" (The National, 2021).

Conditions in refugee camps are harsh and harrowing. In 2019, more than 500 persons died in Al Hol, and 371 of whom were children (Viirand, 2020). Moreover, ISIS perpetrate slayings on Al Hol camp because it is controlled by their perceived enemies, Syrian Kurdish officials. The latter call for countries to repatriate their citizens from refugee camps. In contrast, Syrian Kurdish Autonomous Administration's police force opened fire at women and children from third countries in Al Hol, resulting in the death of a child (Amnesty International, 2022). The UN urges the countries around the world to repatriate the children of FTFs. These people remain their nationals, whose protection and support are required by the national laws and international agreements, let alone children's rights (Viirand, 2020). Moreover, repatriating also FTFs and their wives allows for an overview of terrorist threat. Otherwise, if these people are dispersed around the world after the fall of the caliphate, there are less opportunities to control their activities.

Furthermore, "foreign fighters" in this article refer to persons who, during the period between 2014 and 2022, went to combat in Eastern Ukraine on either side of the conflict. During this period, Russia did not

acknowledge its involvement with the conflict. According to Ukrainian sources, Russia let its fighters across the border to Ukraine but on their way back home, these fighters were demolished (Kharkiv Izvestia, 2014). To Western fighters, Russia provided the corridor through Moscow and Rostov Oblast to the Ukrainian border to fight on the side of the Russia-backed separatists (Rekawek, 2020, p. 4). According to Murauskaite (2020, p. 4), between 2014 and 2019, around 2 000 FFs from 54 countries other than Russia joined the conflict in Ukraine on either the Ukrainian or separatist pro-Russian side. In 2014–2016, two persons from Estonia, 12 persons from Latvia, 21 persons from Lithuania, 7 persons from Finland, and 17 persons from Sweden went to combat in Eastern Ukraine. Major issues regarding returnee FFs is social marginalisation leading to violent outcome and vulnerability to external (first and foremost, Russian) influence which may result in incitement to violence (Murauskaite, 2020, p. 21).

According to Rekawek (2020, p. 3), among Western FFs in Ukraine, there were several hundred individuals with extreme right-wing (henceforth *XRW*) or nationalist beliefs. These individuals with anti-Western sentiments went to Ukraine to combat against the Western establishment on both sides of the conflict. Notably, members of groups like the Russian National Unity of A. P. Barkashov fought on the side of pro-Russian separatists; this group has a track record of terrorist activity in the Baltic States (Rekawek, 2020, pp. 3-4).

Situation with FTFs and FFs in Finland and Sweden

Finland has a clear perspective on the repatriation or return of FTFs and their family members of Finnish nationality. According to Expert T, under Finnish law, Finnish citizens and holders of a residence permit in Finland always have the right to and cannot be prevented from returning to Finland. Finnish Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the coordination of security measures to be applied to returnee FTFs and their families. Various authorities across sectors are working in close cooperation with the ministry. Authorities largely proceed from the returnee policy adopted by the ministerial working group on internal security and justice in 2017. According to this policy, central government municipal authorities and CSOs[3] should work together to efficiently support the reintegration of returnees into Finnish society. Expert T maintains that, regardless of gender, all adults

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[3] Civil society organisations

returning from a region in Syria once governed by ISIS will stand trial for any offences committed there. He maintains that close cooperation ties with other EU members states will allow to detect any recidivist FTFs. As for Finland's treatment of FFs in Ukraine, there is currently not sufficient information. From the media sources, it is currently known that about twenty Finnish nationals fought in Eastern Ukraine on the side of Russian-backed separatists, but the Finnish authorities did not initiate criminal proceedings against them (Aro & Kuronen, 2021).

The treatment of returnee FTFs and their families in Sweden is comparable to Finland. According to Expert W, effective interinstitutional collaboration is achieved in the issue, a joint communication strategy is agreed on, which allows for swift decision-making and identification of the need for changes in the joint approach. In this cooperation, the role of the Centre for Preventing Violent Extremism is essential. Notably, all Swedish FTFs (female and male) are registered in the SIS; this information is also shared in other international channels to facilitate early detection. As for Swedish FFs in Ukraine, there is, as in the case of Finland, not sufficient information. According to (Murauskaite 2020, p. 20), in 2017, "two Swedish members of the neoNazi Nordic Resistance Movement (which is fiercely anti-immigrant) have reportedly gone into Ukraine to train with a Russian battalion fighting there, and upon their return bombed a centre for asylum seekers in Sweden". In addition, there is an organisation called Donbassföreningen in Sweden whose goal is "to support the anti-fascist forces in Ukraine and to expose the one-sided reporting from the Swedish media" (Donbassföreningen, 2015).

Situation in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia

There is not much information regarding FTFs and FFs in Latvia and Lithuania. According to Expert M, at least one Latvian FTF was sentenced in Latvia, while several FFs are wanted. A non-citizen of Latvia, Artem Skrypnik, was sentenced to five years of imprisonment for combating in South-Eastern Ukraine (TVNET, 2019). According to Expert J, six foreign fighters who participated in military conflicts either in Syria, Libya, Iraq or Crimea were sentenced in Latvia. To track FTFs and FFs, Latvia uses SIS. In Expert J's words, the Latvian border guard designed a system of risk indicators which was integrated into the framework of common risk indicators elaborated by Frontex to detect FTFs and other subjects of interest. The Latvian State Security Service is the central authority responsible for the issue of FTFs. In

addition to national information systems, international information systems are used, including Interpol resources such as API, PNR, and SLTD.

Furthermore, according to expert E, there are no FTFs in Lithuania. In Murauskaite's (2020, p. 10) terms, of all the Baltic states, Lithuania had the highest number FFs (up to 20), most of whom were fighting on the Ukrainian side: "historically, Lithuania has been actively advocating the EU to pay more attention to Ukraine and to offer assistance to Ukraine once the conflict started". In Lithuania, there is no public information regarding the prosecution of FFs on either side, despite the investigation of some pro-Russian fighters. One pro-Ukrainian FF said he felt a boost in confidence after returning to Lithuania and started his own business; nevertheless, he was criticised for going to Ukraine despite Lithuania's official support for Ukraine (Murauskaite, 2020, p. 20).

Regarding Estonia, beginning from 2013, around twenty persons, including children, were detected who stay or have stayed in the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq and have connections with extremist groups (Puusepp, 2020, p. 41). One FTF of Estonian nationality left for Syria with his family and died in combat, while there is no information about his wife and children. According to Expert V, Estonia is not repatriating its nationals from the conflict zones; rather, they need to ask for assistance in Estonian embassies and consulates. Estonia then has to establish if a returnee needs to be prosecuted for crimes committed in the conflict zone. Returning ISIS wives will also be prosecuted in Estonia and, if imprisoned, the state needs to have a strategy/plan as to what to undertake with her child(ren), how to accommodate, assist, and monitor them as well as to reintegrate them into society. In case women returnees have served their sentence and their children attend schools in EU member states, the task of monitoring them should only be performed by relevant authorities. It is essential to prevent any possible stigmatization of these people due to their past on behalf of schoolmates, colleagues, etc., which requires a lot of social effort and awareness, given the rise of right-wing extremist movements and other conservative trends across Europe.

According to Murauskaite (2020, p. 10), "it seems somewhat surprising that the 2014– 2016 statistics captured no Estonians backing Ukraine, and only a few fighting on the Russian side". In Estonia, the charges for participation in the conflict in Ukraine (on the separatist side) is terrorism, and the punishment is extradition from the country. In 2016, there has been one instance of extradition of a pro-Russian foreign fighter from Estonia. From media sources it is also known that eight more FFs from Estonia went

to fight on the pro-Russian side in Ukraine (Roonemaa & Laine, 2022). Estonian Internal Security Service intends to prevent travel to conflict zones or otherwise initiate criminal proceedings for travelling for terrorist purposes. (Klemm, 2021, p. 35) In addition, each year, about 40–50 people are known to Estonian security authorities as involved in terrorism move through Estonia and to Estonia (ibid.).

FTFs and FFs as challenges to the Estonian border management

When FTFs and their wives and also FFs have served their prison sentences, they can move freely in the Schengen area, including Estonia. Monitoring these persons after release from prison has no legal basis. Expert T believes that Europol and Interpol databases, the SIS as well as cooperation between intelligence services of the EU member states will allow to track persons with terrorist intentions. However, there are several challenges. Expert L says that it is possible to profile a returnee FF on the basis of passport data, age, gender, appearance, face, facial expression, hands, luggage, attitude, body posture, and the manner of speaking. Upon any suspicion that the person may be a foreign fighter, s/he is referred to a second line check for a thorough interview, examination of things, clothes, travel itineraries, stamps of border crossings, etc. However, as Expert L admits that he does not know whether these FFs are monitored, identified and whether anyone is suspected, "although we realise that there are adventure seekers who want to go and try a firearm somewhere and blow things up, no matter on which side and for what ideas."

Expert R stresses that the Baltic States and Finland have a liaison officer in Ukraine who will start working on the ground to collect information about any possible FF from these countries. Liaison officer acts within the first level of integrated border management four-tier access control model in third countries, providing first inspections into potential returnee FFs from the local sources. For instance, the liaison officer is expected to help gather information about Estonian citizens who are at risk; with regard to a third-country national applying for an Estonian visa in Ukraine, the liaison officer is expected to check their background on the spot and decide upon issuing a visa. According to Expert R, if a person (an FTF of FF, for instance) wants to enter the EU from Russia on a visa basis and Russia failed to provide information about this person, liaison officers working in a member state's consular department in Russia cooperate with local organisations involved in border surveillance to find the information about this person and whether

s/he can be issued a visa. This information is then duly entered into the Entry/Exit system: "Again, it depends on how well or poorly our people work there on the ground. Still, it is a little easier for all of us with this system, as background checks are already starting in third countries".

Another prominent concern is that, according to Expert A, as long as there are conflict zones, there is always the possibility that Estonian citizens will travel there. Despite all of the available knowledge about FTFs and FFs, it is rather difficult to detect them if these persons do not disclose themselves in any way. It is easier to detect and identify those who boast, post pictures or somehow leave a mark. According to Expert V from the Estonian Internal Security Service, FTFs and FFs can indeed travel to conflict zones and return in disguise. Hence, there can be FTFs and FFs in Estonia of whom nothing is known.

Some EU member states restricted the movement of European departees, which is a questionable measure in terms of fundamental rights compliance (Scherrer, ed., 2018, p. 52). According to Expert L, more grounds for detention of a person for participation in foreign fighting arise upon the person's return. There may signs of participation in foreign fighting rather than facts. For instance, if a person presents a passport with the information on all countries the person has visited along with the duration of stay. Or, on the contrary, a person coming from a conflict zone presents a completely clean passport claiming that s/he has lost their previous passport. Other important aspects are luggage and its nature, a person's psychology (signs of post-traumatic syndromes) or appearance (battle-hardened face features), and so on. However, Expert L maintains that detection of these indicators depends on the proficiency, knowledge, and interviewing skills of the profiler.

Another challenge regarding the infiltration of FFs and FTFs into the EU are the shortcomings of issuing visas. According to Expert A, if one EU member state has refused to issue a visa at its embassy, for instance, in Moscow, a person can go to the embassy of another EU member state in Moscow and get a visa there. Unified European Visa Information System is being improved to reduce such risks and provide member states' consular services with the information on refusals. It is difficult to improve the current system as it concerns pan-European data exchanges and risks may occur of conflicts with national legislations, especially those related to personal data. According to Expert R, one component of the integrated border management model is a uniform visa policy. In fact, according to the regulations, there cannot be a situation like the one described above. Entry/Exit and ETIAS

systems are already contributing to solving the issue: an entry ban entered by one member state will be extended to all other member states. However, this may not work if a member state enters an entry ban for security reasons, e.g., based on anti-immigration sentiments.

Another FF and FTF related challenge for the EU border management is that, according to Expert A, one can buy an authentic and valid document in a member state for a bribe. Expert L maintains, too, that the most difficult thing to detect in case of counterfeits is when the document was indeed bought from the public authority for a bribe. In such a situation, the agents issuing these documents, the number and holders of these documents need to be detected. Expert L adds that it is difficult (but still not impossible) to issue an authentic document for a bribe in countries with a central document issuance system, like Finland and Sweden, where all documents are fingerprinted.

Expert A admits that "the bottleneck" of the EU border management is that there are no internal border checks and, in case an FTF or FF crosses one member state's external border, it is essentially safe and risk-free to travel to other member states, as no checks are made unless a person attracts the attention of law enforcement by committing an offense. This is especially true if a person is moving on foot or travelling in a rental car without having to register themselves anywhere. This makes it hard to identify such people unless they make a purchase using a bank card or otherwise leave a trace which would give a hit in the SIS.

In Expert L's opinion, a very serious challenge with FFs and FTFs in the EU is fraud, i.e., presenting documents belonging to other people. According to Expert A, today, it is possible to take someone's mobile phone, open an electronic ticket, enter the restricted area of the Tallinn airport, and pass through the travel gate without presenting a document: "What we actually see in the system is whose travel document is registered, but we do not see who actually uses that document." Also, mobile positioning is limited to showing the location of the mobile phone, not the person. In Expert A's opinion, the solution to this issue is to check the biometrics of all passengers within the EU. However, there are limitations as to what an extent this can be implemented. The freedom of movement of people, goods, and services within the EU is a valuable freedom and a right, so when it starts being limited by additional control measures, this will lead to the restriction of this freedom. Notably, the aim of all technological solutions that are being introduced is to make border crossings smoother and faster. Hence, there are currently exceptions also for Entry/Exit and ETIAS systems as EU nationals

are not entered there. EU nationals, including FTFs and FFs, are in other systems, e.g., the Interpol databases. Interpol is the only international (non-EU) organisation having access to ETIAS.

There will be, thus, a network of systems that supports not only Europol but also EU member states and provides access to Interpol, border control organisations, and, upon necessity, security authorities. Expert R says that the dream of the future, as well as the steps taken at present, are predicated on the idea that if a person has (had) a background related to terrorism, it should be indicated in at least some database. Notably, recommendations of OSCE on how to respect and protect human rights when using new technologies in border management should be taken into account. Among other things, covert and excessive data collection, discriminatory data processing, re-purposing of datasets, deployment of untested or inaccurate technological tools, and arbitrary inclusion on watchlists should be avoided (OSCE ODIHR, 2021).

Conclusion

The FTFs and their families returning to their countries of origin after the fall of the ISIS caliphate has created considerable pressure on the institutions of the EU member states. Revoking citizenship and leaving wives and children of FTFs in refugee camps leads to further radicalisation of these people, while they are perishing in harsh conditions. Repatriation, however, puts returnees in a hazy position between national security threat and subjects of reintegration. Hence, interinstitutional and cross-sectoral cooperation is vital to deradicalise and reintegrate FTFs and their families, prosecute adults for committed offenses, and help children heal from the traumas they experienced during their life in ISIS. Finland and Sweden have created such multi-agency networks based on experiences of previous migration crises while the Baltic States can learn from the experiences of Finland and Sweden in creating their response measures if not to FTFs and their families, then to other instances of immigration from conflict or war zones.

EU nationals can also participate in foreign fighting in other conflict zones, one of which was Eastern Ukraine. It is too early to comment on FFs in Ukraine during Russian aggression against Ukraine that started on 24/02/2022, but before the war, FFs from Ukraine presented a challenge to the EU, especially the far-right extremists that sought to receive military training in the conflict zone to commit violent acts at home.

FTFs and FFs present several challenges to the EU border management. FTFs are effectively trained by Islamist organisations to avoid detection during border checks. One way to do this is to use the documents of EU nationals who joined ISIS or use illegal migration routes. In addition, if an FTFs resumes their terrorism-related activities after having served their prison sentence in the country of origin or their family members become radicalised despite all deradicalisation and reintegration efforts, it is relatively difficult to track the movement of these people within the Schengen Area. Another way for people with terrorist intentions to travel across the Schengen Area is by using documents of other EU nationals on ferries and buses or travelling by a rental car, leisure boat or by foot, so as to never leave a trace which can be checked across relevant databases. Other challenges to the EU border management are shortcomings of issuing visas in embassies of different member states in third countries, the possibility that corrupted EU officials issue an authentic document for a bribe, various human errors, including a huge role of profiler skills in handling FTFs and FFs at the border. In case of FF, the efforts of individual liaison officers also play an important role. However, if a person is absolutely silent about their foreign fighting, s/he may never become detected either by border guards or by security authorities of the EU member states.

To conclude, although there is a strong counter-terrorism cooperation between Interpol, Europol, Frontex, and interconnections between their databases with the databases of SIS (and shortly ETIAS, and EES), there are still options for people with terrorist intentions to avoid hits within these databases. Consequently, taking in a account the principles of free movement within the Schengen Area and the recommendations of OSCE regarding the necessity and proportionality of checking biometric data to achieve a legitimate aim, the proposal is to use smart gates for the biometric verification of all passengers, including EU nationals.

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PRESENCE DETECTION SYSTEMS - EFFICIENCY OF USE, BEST PRACTICE

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Abstract. *One of the features of the development of modern society is the growing need to restrict access to various objects. The main task of the State Border Guard is to ensure the inviolability of the state border, including the prevention of illegal crossing of the state border. Nowadays, presence detection systems are often used for this purpose - devices or functions of a security television system that generate an alarm when movement is detected in the field of view of the camcorder. The aim of the current study is to analyze the efficiency of the use of presence detection systems used in the structural units of the State Border Guard.*

Keywords: *border surveillance, photosensor, presence detection system.*

Introduction

The functions of the Border Guard are to ensure the inviolability of the state border and to prevent illegal migration [Law on the State Border Guard, Section 4].

One of the most important areas of activity of the Border Guard is the organization and implementation of border surveillance measures. *"Border surveillance"* means the surveillance of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border crossing points after the end of working hours in order to prevent persons from evading border checks [REGULATION (EU) 2016/399 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 9 March 2016 governing the movement of persons across borders (Article 2 (12) of the Schengen Borders Code)].

In order to ensure the performance of its functions in the field of border surveillance, the Border Guard shall:
- carry out border control, ensure and control the observance of the regime of the state border, state border zone, patrol zone, border control zone, border zone, border zone and border crossing point regime;
- prevents the movement of goods across the state border outside the border crossing points [State Border Guard Law, Section 5].

Article 15 of the Schengen Borders Code requires Member States to make adequate use of appropriate resources and staff to carry out border control at their external borders, ensuring an efficient, intensive and uniform level of control. Such effective, intensive and uniform control of external borders is unthinkable without the skilful use of appropriate technical resources.

Border Guard performs extensive use of various technical means necessary for border surveillance in order to implement border surveillance measures effectively.

Analyzing the statistical data compiled by the Border Guard, it can be concluded that the number of persons that crossed the external land border of the Republic of Latvia illegally remains high enough. In 2018, a total of 202 persons were detained for crossing the "green" border illegally, 57 persons in 2019, 30 persons in 2020, 458 persons in 2021, and 64 persons in 3 months of 2022.

An important element in the control of the state border of the Republic of Latvia is the presence detection systems, which are used to detect signs of border violations, locate and detect border violators at the state border and in the border zone, at border, territorial sea and inland waters [Cabinet Regulation No.675 "Regulations on Technical Means for Border Control and Surveillance" Paragraph 3].

Characteristics of Presence Detection Systems Used in Border Guard

Presence detection system - a set of components that, in any weather conditions, allows to determine and identify the presence of object, the direction of its movement. Presence detection systems eliminate the need for continuous secondment of border guards in the border surveillance post, ensure continuous surveillance of the border guard facility or a specified border surveillance post.

Currently, the Border Guard uses different types of Presence Detection Systems:
- *SMARTDEC;*
- *Buck Eye;*
- *Burrel;*
- *DefenGuard.*

Each of these Presence Detection Systems consists of different components, various technical solutions and technologies are used to ensure their functioning in order to ensure fast, accurate and complete flow of information between the components of the Presence Detection System and the end user.

SMARTDEC presence detection system *(manufacturer in Estonia).*
Basic components:
-   *Photo sensor* - detects the presence of the subject, takes photos, transmits the captured photos (by radio) to the bridge. The photo sensor is equipped with day and night Full HD cameras (shooting speed - 2 photos per second), infrared light source and passive infrared motion sensor (PIR);
-   *Bridge* - receives information from the photosensors and transmits it to the central server via the network of the mobile operator (GSM bridge) or radio communication network (RADIO bridge). In the process of information transmission, the bridge uses GSM 2G / 3G / 4G (850, 950, 1850, 1900, 2100 MHz) frequencies.
-   *Central server* - receives the information transmitted from the bridge, processes it and transmits it to the end user via the internal network of the Information Center of the Ministry of the Interior in the relevant Border Guard Division of the territorial administration of the SBG.
-   *Programmer* - allows programming of SMARTDEC components of the presence detection system. Any smart device (mobile phone, notebook) with "Smartexp" application and "Bluetooth" option with data transmission possibilities in GSM network can serve as a programmer. An additional connector is required to program the system.

Fig.1 Components of the SMARTDEC presence detection system
(compiled by the authors)

Presence detection system BUCKEYE *(manufacturer in the USA).*
Basic components:
- *Photo sensor* - detects the presence of an object, takes photos or videos of it, transmits the captured photos or videos (by radio) to the base station. Radio frequencies in the range of 902 to 928MHz are used for information exchange. The photosensor software is able to select the frequency of information exchange automatically, eliminating the possibility of interference. The sensor's standard antenna can retransmit information up to 3.2 km. The photosensor can also act as a repeater, thus increasing the information transmission distance. The photo sensor is equipped with day and night Full HD cameras, infrared light source and passive infrared motion sensor (PIR), programming terminal and external 12V battery.
- *Base station* - receives information from photosensors and transmits it to the end user's workstation via the mobile operator's network (GSM).
- *Workstation with software* - allows you to review, list, manage received information and alarm messages, request a test image and sensor status information, change sensor and base station settings, receive system notifications.

Fig.2 Components of the BUCKEYE presence detection system
(compiled by the authors)

Presence detection system BURREL *(manufacturer in the USA).*

Basic components:

- *Photosensor* equipped with a GSM antenna, infrared lighting, a camera, a microphone, a light indicator, a display and a motion detector.

Motion detection working distance is up to 20 m. Motion detector operational time - 1 seconds.

When the subject is detected, it is photographed or filmed. The built-in camera can record up to 30 seconds long video or take 1 to 3 photos. The captured photos or videos are saved on the memory card (maximum capacity of 32GB) and forwarded to the e-mail address provided by the operator. That is, a SIM card with a data connection is required for proper operation of the photosensor.

Photosensor is powered by 12 AA batteries or a pluggable external 6V battery.

Photosensor can be controlled manually - in person or remotely via SMS commands. During the manual test, the operator uses the sensor control buttons and the built-in display to change the sensor configuration. Remote control of sensor operation takes place via SMS commands sent to the SIM card number of the respective photosensor. The SMS command is a code received by the photosensor and running according to a defined algorithm.

Fig. 3 Presence detection system BURREL components
(compiled by the authors)

DEFENGUARD presence detection system *(manufacturer in Slovakia)*

Basic components:

- *MS-Q seismic sensor* - generates and sends an alarm signal in case of movement in the sensor's operational area. Motion detection is

based on the seismic activity shown by a living being or the movement of a vehicle, which can be detected by a sensor.

The MS-Q seismic sensor can operate in two modes:

- *Seismic mode* - the sensor senses the seismic activity of living beings or transport;
- *Sector mode* - the sensor shows the direction of travel in one of the four sectors. One sector of the sensor is a 90° angle in the horizontal plane, while four sectors form a circular motion detection zone.

Interchangeable antennas are used to transmit information. The antenna transmits information at a frequency of 433MHz. Depending on the type of antenna, the transmission distance can vary from 150 m to 15000 m.

- *TV camera* - monitors the area adjacent to the MS-Q seismic sensors. The TV camera is equipped with an infrared light source and can operate efficiently even at night. It can be used to visually detect the presence of pedestrians at a distance of 100 m. The TV camera is activated manually or automatically if the MS-Q seismic sensor is activated. Video recording is transmitted by the TV camera as an analog video signal in the 2.4 GHz band using additional antennas.
- *TV Repeater* - A device that reproduces an analog video signal. As a result, the range of information transmission is increased (to overcome radio shadow areas). Just like a TV camera, the TV repeater repeats alarms and system announcements.
- *Base receiver* - a device whose main task is to convert the received (from the TV camera) analog video signal into digital format and transmit it to the operator's workstation (via the Internet).

Fig.4 Components of the DEFENGUARD presence detection system
(compiled by the authors)

Presence detection system application "KUS @", its operational possibilities

In order to optimize the operation control of the Presence Detection Systems, the processing, grouping and archiving of the received alarms, the Vilyaka Border Guard Regional Board developed the Presence Detection System application "KUS @" for the control of the operation of the Presence Detection Systems "BuckEye" and "Burrel" and the processing of the received signals.

Fig.5 Presence detection system application KUS @ interface
(compiled by the authors)

The KUS @ presence detection system application provides an overview of alarms in a user - friendly way with information about the type of sensor and the time of the event download. A list of devices with information on their status, event statistics and administration section is available, while creating an event archive [Unpublished materials of the Border Guard]. To ensure the four - eye principle, alarms for presence detection systems are displayed both at the workstation of the Border Guard Division of the relevant Border Guard Territorial Administration (*local level*) and at the Operational Management Division of the relevant Border Guard Territorial Administration (*regional level*). The network of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Latvia is used to ensure the protection of the information flow.

Practical aspects of using presence detection systems

Presence detection systems shall be determined by the head of the relevant Border Guard Division. When planning the installation of Presence Detection Systems in a specific border surveillance area, the following aspects shall be taken into account before deciding on their location:

- *results of the risk analysis and peculiarities of the surveillance of the relevant border surveillance section* - possibilities and routes of movement of possible offenders and vehicles, settlements and access roads, season, information received from local residents about ongoing activities in the relevant border surveillance section, advance information, current offenders *modus operandi*, etc.;
- *quality of the mobile communication network at the place of installation of the presence detection systems* - before the installation of the presence detection systems, the signal quality of the mobile operator's communication network is measured at the spot. The measurement is performed using the Android application "OpenSignal". The measurements obtained during the survey are analyzed, processed and a graphical representation of the signal quality of the mobile operator's communication network on a topographic map is developed for each border guard department. Measuring the signal quality of this type of mobile operator's network is necessary because mobile operator's websites do not always provide accurate information on network coverage (especially along national borders).
- Number of Presence Detection Systems available *in the relevant Border Guard Unit - The most important and priority* sections of the border surveillance section that require the installation of Presence Detection Systems and their possible operation should be carefully assessed.

Conclusion

During the process of elaboration of the work, researching the Presence Detection Systems used to ensure border surveillance measures, analysis of their technical parameters and usability, tactics and techniques of practical use, as well as legal regulation of the use of Presence Detection Systems, the authors concluded that the Presence Detection Systems are sufficient and effective means of ensuring and effectively enforcing border surveillance measures. Analyzing the statistics collected by the Border Guard on detainees in connection with illegal crossing of the "green" border, the authors concluded that in the last 2 years, about 20% - 25% of the total number of

persons crossing the "green" border have been detained with the help of Presence Detection Systems. Considering the fact that the border surveillance units of the Border Guard structural units are only partially "covered" by the Presence Detection Systems, in the opinion of the authors, such an indicator of the efficiency of the Presence Detection Systems is sufficiently high. The Presence Detection Systems used in the Border Guard allow to detect and identify the presence of objects in the relevant section of the border surveillance section and to organize and take appropriate measures in a timely manner to detain offenders and prevent violations of the regime.

Analyzing the available information on the Presence Detection Systems used by the Border Guard authorities in Latvia's neighboring countries, the authors concluded that they are very similar, for example, DEFENDEC Presence Detection Systems are widely used in Estonia, "Burrel" type Presence Detection Systems in Lithuania and Poland, etc.

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COMPATIBILITY OF STATE BORDER GUARD AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES IN THE STATE OF EXCEPTION OR WAR SITUATION

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Abstract: *The aim of the current paper is to study the compatibility of the State border guard and National armed forces of the Republic of Latvia in the state of exception or war situation. To achieve the aim, following objectives were defined: to state current status of military training in State border guard, to compare State border guard equipment, armament, procedures and training with National armed forces ones, to make proposals for improvement of current compatibility. Following research methods were used: monographic or descriptive method, document analysis, logic- constructive method, analytic method. Within the topic of military compatibility research, the author thoroughly examined State border guard tasks in military sphere, the cooperation between both institutions and the compatibility of State border guard and National armed forces.*

Keywords: *compatibility, cooperation, State border guard, National armed forces, military, state of emergency, war.*

Introduction

Modern world shows constantly changing situation in politics, economics and other spheres. Concerning this fact, countries develop their security to respond to inner and outer threats. Latvia, together with NATO and EU allies, has faced the upheaval of the European security environment caused by Russia's aggression in Ukraine, by changing the internationally recognized borders and disregarding the international obligations, Russia is undermining the existing international order. In 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea and included it in the Russian Federation. And in February 2022, Russia, violating Ukraine's sovereignty and international norms, invaded Ukraine, where the main directions of the attack were from the territory of Russia and Belarus, and the main target of the attack is Kyiv. Latvia issues new regulatory enactments, as well as amendments to existing regulatory enactments, including norms where Latvian law enforcement agencies should carry out internal strengthening of the state to avoid or prevent internal conflicts, as well as to strengthen the inviolability of the state's sovereignty from external enemies. The State border guard is

improving its direct tasks by improving the infrastructure and integrating basic military skills (military training at the squad and platoon level, communications training) into the training of the State border guard personnel.

Tasks of the State border guard in military sphere

The functions of the State border guard (further in text – SBG) are to ensure the inviolability of the state border and prevent illegal migration (State Border Guard Law, 2020). The SBG law stipulates that the function of the border guard is to ensure the inviolability of the state border and "in cooperation with the National armed forces, to prevent threats to the territory of the Republic of Latvia at the border" (State Border Guard Law, 2020). SBG continuously guards the state border, ensuring its inviolability, and prevents illegal migration. SBG does not ensure the inviolability of the state border alone, it does so in cooperation with the National armed forces (further in text – NAF), in accordance with the NAF law: "The National Armed Forces provide support to the State Border Guard - in ensuring the inviolability of the state border" (National Armed Forces Law, 1999). This is confirmed by the statement of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Latvia, A. Pabriks, that "NAF will do everything to ensure the safety of Latvia's border and society. We will initially involve several hundred soldiers and national guardsmen in providing support to the State Border Guard" (Pabriks, 2020). SBG requested NAF support from March 30 to April 14, 2020 in order to limit the spread of Covid-19 in Latvia. Therefore, the first steps were already taken for the ability of SBG and NAF to integrate and perform joint tasks. Considering the fact that this type of integration took place in peacetime and the aim was to limit the pandemic, there was no integration in the military sphere of SBG and NAF.

In order for the SBG to be able to integrate into the NAF in a state of emergency or war, the Cabinet of Ministers in 2015 supported the procurement of SBG equipment and weapons, applying the NAF weapons and equipment standards (Latvian Ministry of Defense, 2017).

According to the Law of the Republic of Latvia "On Emergency Situation and State of Exception", a state of exception is a legal regime that is declared in the event that:

- the country is threatened by an external enemy;
- internal riots have broken out or are threatening to break out in the country or part of it, which threatens the democratic state system (Latvian Law on Emergency Situation and State of Exception, 2013).

If the country is threatened by an external enemy or riots have broken out in the country, mobilization can be announced in the country, which also includes the involvement of the SBG in ensuring national security, as a result of which the SBG would be integrated into the NAF.

According to the author of the paper, the tasks of the SBG in case of war, when integrating into the NAF, are as follows:

- obtain intelligence (performing Observation Post tasks);
- observe the actions/activities of the opponent (performing Observation Post tasks);
- disrupt the opponent's resupply (performing Ambush tasks);
- destroy small enemy units (up to platoon level unit) (performing Ambush tasks);
- create obstacles (impeding the enemy's movement or redirecting the enemy's units to an area where their maneuverability is limited).

The elements and tasks of the above-mentioned military tactics are taught in the educational programs and advanced training courses of the State Border Guard College.

In order for the successful integration of the SBG, at the end of 2017, the NAF handed over the first "Glock 17" pistols to the SBG, which were purchased as part of the rearming of the SBG (Latvian Ministry of Defense, 2017). As a result, the SBG Makarov pistols were replaced with a new type of firearm, Glock 17 pistols, in 2019, Kalashnikov assault rifles were replaced with G36 assault rifles. From 2019, the G36 assault rifle is not only the basic weapon of the soldiers of the National armed forces, but is also introduced in the armament of the National guard and the State border guard (Sargs.lv, 2019). The replacement of this type of firearms by the SBG is aimed at having a unified resupply of the NAF and the SBG. In 2020, the SBG received additional weapons in its arsenal - UMP submachine guns, grenade launchers, under-barrel grenade launchers and machine guns, thus, the State border guard became mobile in the use of weapons.

Looking back at the period in which the SBG was rearmed from Soviet-era armaments to modern armaments such as those of the NAF and the armed forces of our allies, or NATO, a long time has passed. The author of the research will take the reference time from Latvia's accession to NATO, that is 2004.

Since joining NATO, Latvia regularly participates in various joint exercises of the Alliance's armed forces abroad, as well as military exercises are held on the territory of Latvia. Participation in such exercises allows developing the necessary combat readiness of the NAF, as well as provides an opportunity for NATO members to better familiarize themselves with the combat capabilities of other countries, thus promoting mutual

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interoperability (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). Until 2014, the SBG has not been involved in any joint military exercises with the National armed forces, although the Border Guard Law of the Republic of Latvia, which has already lost its force, defined the role of the SBG: "in cooperation with the National armed forces, to prevent and repel armed incursions into the territory of Latvia, territorial and internal in the waters, as well as in the air space, to prevent armed provocations on the state border, to provide assistance to border residents in case of criminal threats" (Border Guard Law of the Republic of Latvia, 1998). Until 2014, SBG and NAF operated in parallel, ensuring internal and external security, instead of working together to ensure national security. From 2004, NAF developed and improved, but SBG did not develop as actively as NAF. Only when the conflict between Ukraine and Russia started in 2014, Latvia began to pay more attention to the SBG, because the SBG is the first security line of Latvia's sovereignty.

According to the author, the development of SBG depends on external factors and the political situation of other countries. For instance:

1. Since 2004 till 2014, the SBG used obsolete weapons, which are used in the former Soviet Union countries. In 2014, when the conflict between Ukraine and Russia took place, Latvia paid attention to the armament of its security structures only because of the mistakes of other countries, where the armament of the SBG was not compatible with the armament of the NAF at that time. From 2017 to 2020, the rearmament of the SBG took place.

2. In 2022, the war between Russia and Ukraine - Latvia is only now increasing the defense budget and will strengthen the structures of the Ministry of the Interior in order to increase the country's internal security, which previously received only superficial attention, but only external security was strengthened.

In order to prevent the state from being threatened, Latvia needs to develop action plans in time to prevent emergency situations in the event of a threat to the country's external border and to guarantee internal security.

Cooperation between National armed forces and State border guard in military sphere

SBG and NAF are subordinated to separate ministries - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. The two ministries and their subordinate structural units have a common task - to ensure national security.

In order to achieve the goals of the assigned tasks in the provision of national security, the levels of cooperation have been determined - the strategic, operational and tactical levels of cooperation:

1st strategic level of cooperation - Ministry of Interior and Defense. At the strategic level of cooperation, tasks are defined in order to achieve the set goals based on the guidelines set at the political level;

2nd operational level of cooperation – institutions of SBG and NAF. The level of operational cooperation – to arrange tasks in a certain order in order to achieve the goals set at the strategic level;

3rd tactical level of cooperation – SBG structural units cooperate with NAF and National guard units. At the tactical level of cooperation, the tasks set at the operational level of cooperation are implemented and the set results are achieved.

In compliance with the national regulatory framework for ensuring national security, at the operational level of cooperation between SBG and NAF on April 8, 2008, interinstitutional agreement No. SL-2008/2 "On the training of officials of the State border guard and the National armed forces" (hereinafter - Agreement). The purpose of the Agreement is to determine the procedure by which the State border guard and the National armed forces organize training for officials in order to increase their professional qualifications and fulfill the tasks set out in the SBG and NAF regulatory acts in ensuring the inviolability of the state border and ensuring the inviolability of the national territory (State border guard, National armed forces, 2008).

From 2015 to 2021, NBS has trained 188 VRS officials in various military courses. The largest number of SBG officials trained in the period from 2015 to 2021 was in 2018 and 2019, when a total of 101 officials from the total number of trained officials were trained. The most trained SBG officials are in such courses as weapon handling courses, Junior staff officers' course, Boat driver - lifeguard course etc. The purpose of these courses is to work as part of NBS units, plan military operations and fulfill the given tasks (State border guard unpublished materials).

In order to ensure the resources of military knowledge, armaments and equipment acquired in the field of SBG and NAF cooperation, SBG is involved and participates in military exercises, such as "Mazais Namejs", "Namejs" and Summer Field Camp, where various situations in military tactics are played out.

In total, 468 or 22% of all State border guard officials **have completed** various courses related to ensuring national security and 1,632 or 78% of SBG officials **have not acquired** additional knowledge and skills in the military sphere. In the period from 2014 to 2021, a relatively small number of SBG officials have been trained in order to ensure the compatibility of the SBG and NAF in the field of military training as defined in the National defense concept.

Only since 2014 SBG has been involved in the NAF routine (military exercises). On May 19, 2014, the combined armed forces exercise "Namejs

2014" began at the Adazhi base. Although the exercise "Namejs 2014" is an exercise of the National armed forces, it also involves the SBG and certain US military units. In the period from 1998 to 2014, the state and NAF did not pay attention to strengthening SBG. These 16 years are a long period of inactivity for the strengthening of national security, especially in ensuring the security of the external border.

The participation of SBG officials in military exercises allows practicing military skills, as well as developing an understanding of the tasks of the State border guard in X hour.

In 2020, in the unified exercise cycle "Namejs 2020", in addition to the National guard exercises, autumn field tactical exercises of NAF units, Training Command exercises "Wise Adder", Security Command exercises "LOGEX/RSOMEX", Navy exercises "Flotex", Headquarters battalion exercises were also held "Lightning", Air Force exercise "Air Fist", Military police exercise "Core" and Land Forces Mechanized Infantry Brigade military exercise "Silver Arrow".

Both in Riga and in the rest of the territory of Latvia, the presence of the army was clearly visible. Soldiers of the Latvian and allied armed forces, national guards, reserve soldiers, employees of the Ministry of Defense and personnel of the structures of the Ministry of the Interior - employees of the State police, SBG, State fire and rescue service and Prisons administration took part in the training. The legend of the training was that an opponent has come from Vidzeme, who wants to break into the capital and take control (Vingris, 2021).

Since this scenario of the adversary's actions and the allied forces was played out in peacetime, the highest quality of military exercises and the fulfillment of the task of the NAF and allied structures (including SBG) was ensured. But when faced with a real situation, all defense mechanisms may not work, as chaos would arise in society and security structures in response to the actions of the adversary. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure closer cooperation between civil and military structures, e.g., State border guard and National armed forces.

In 2020, the provision of SBG with military means of communication has been started in order to ensure a quick exchange of information with the National Armed Forces. Communication system interoperability is required to ensure SBG compatibility with NAF. Currently, the Ministry of Interior uses the Motorola communication system, which is not compatible with the NAF communication system. As part of the US 333rd support program in 2022, SBG received Falcon third generation military radios Harris AN/PRC-152A and Harris AN/PRC-117G, which will be distributed among SBG structural units. Radio communication devices and equipment of the US corporation "Harris" are used by the majority of NATO member states, as well as many

NATO "Partnership for Peace" countries, therefore their use ensures the efficiency and compatibility of the NAF communication system with the communication systems of other NATO countries (Latvian Ministry of Defense, 2018). Currently, the State border guard college, in cooperation with the NAF and/or the National guard, from 2019, implements the qualification program "Border Guard Special Military Training Course" and one of the parts of this course is "Communication Training", where specific knowledge and skills in military communications are learned.

According to the National Defense Concept, which stipulates that the national security institutions and the NAF are primarily responsible for information to be obtained, analyzed and passed on to decision-makers in a timely manner, the infrastructure of the State border guard system and of the external border must be integrated into a unified early warning system. The effectiveness of early warning is formed by following:

- the ability to detect changes in the situation;
- ability to quickly transfer information to decision makers;
- Prepared response plans for potential scenarios (Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, 2020).

Currently, the SBG is being prepared for the effective execution of the tasks defined in the National Defense Concept, in order to ensure the high-quality operation of the early warning system.

Compatibility of State border guard and National armed forces

The threat of illegal migration with small groups of migrants on the border of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland with Belarus appeared in the summer of 2021, since then the border has been increasingly threatened. Mass activities of illegal migrants can escalate into conflicts, mass riots with national security services, so Latvia has declared a state of emergency on the Latvia-Belarus border and in the administrative territories adjacent to it, restricting the access of civilians to the border zone.

And since September 28, 2022, an emergency situation has been declared on the Latvian-Russian border. An emergency situation has been introduced in the territory of Alūksne, Balvi and Ludza districts, as well as in ports, airports, airport border crossing points and railways (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2022), when mobilization for war with Ukraine was announced in the Russian Federation. The purpose of the implementation of the emergency situation is to reduce the flow of Russian citizens, as well as for the SBG to carry out increased border surveillance and border checks of Russian citizens, attracting additional resources from other services.

Accordingly, in case of declaring a state of emergency, SBG support is provided by the State Police, NAF and National guard.

Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Latvia "On Emergency Situations and State of Emergency" defines what an emergency situation is and in what cases it is declared:

- The state of emergency is a special legal regime, during which the Cabinet of Ministers has the right to limit the rights and freedoms of state administration and local government institutions, natural and legal persons, as well as to impose additional obligations on them, in accordance with the procedures and to the extent prescribed by law.
- A state of emergency can be declared in the event of a national threat related to a disaster, its threats or a threat to critical infrastructure, if the security of the state, society, environment, economic activity or human health and life are significantly threatened (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2013).

Thus, the declaration of a state of emergency imposes both restrictions and obligations, allowing the state institutions, in this case the SBG, the State Police, the NAF and the National guard, to have a greater capacity to act in the prevention of illegal migration, for example, not to accept an application for asylum.

The NAF exercises "Decisive Point" in the Southeast of Latvia started on November 13, 2021 and lasted until December 12. About 3,000 representatives of the armed forces participated in them, including national guardsmen from the National guard's 1st Riga Brigade, 2nd Vidzeme Brigade, 3rd Latgale Brigade and 4th Kurzeme Brigade. The aim of the military exercises was to improve mutual cooperation of large-scale units, force synchronization and mobility, as well as to solve logistical issues. According to the author of the paper, there is no direct participation of the SBG in the training scenario, but the SBG operated in parallel within the framework of these military exercises, ensured the protection of the state border, involving additional human resources of the SBG and National guard units if necessary. As part of the given exercises, the NAF and the National guard moved their units closer to the national border in case the number of illegal immigrants increases or an emergency situation develops with mass riots or armed attacks on the national border. In such a situation, the involvement of the NAF and the National guard in ensuring the inviolability of the state border is shortened. If such a scenario develops, can such a situation be considered an "emergency"? In the opinion of the author, in such a case, the Cabinet of Ministers would have to declare a state of emergency, because the country's border is threatened by an external enemy, and in this case an attack on border guards and soldiers would take place. In the event of a state of

emergency, the SBG would become part of the NAF and the NAF would take over the control and neutralization of the situation under its competence. NAF resources are able to control and neutralize such a situation.

In 2022, SBG organized exercises to suppress mass influx of illegal immigrants and mass riots. Unfortunately, only with theoretical/practical training and role-playing trespassers, it is not possible to fulfill such training in sufficient quality if the resources of special means are limited (shields, long sticks, leg guards, arm guards, helmets with protective glass, light body armor, gas canisters, electric shock devices). SBG needs to find a solution for purchasing these resources in sufficient quantity.

In order to strengthen cooperation and interchangeability with NAF, the SBG needs to create a working group of SBG officials who have graduated from the "Junior Staff Officer Course" of the National Defense Academy of the NAF Training Management Command, because during the 4 months of this training course, the border guards acquire knowledge and skills in battalion-level tactics, planning of various combat operations and headquarters procedures. These officials would be able to analyze possible current and future threats to the state border, as well as to develop plans to prevent or neutralize these threats. According to the author, current development of threat prevention plans takes place without conducting any analysis of situations, and are based only on assumptions. Furthermore, the developed plans require a testing, or MAPEX – a map exercise. This type of play would allow determining the resources of friendly forces in relation to the opponent, time, the involvement of additional resources, and the goals to be achieved. As a result of MAPEX, conclusions could be drawn to implement its objectives, and only then could practical lessons be implemented.

According to the opinion of the author of the research, the conclusions drawn, currently the SBG is not ready to be fully integrated into the NAF, because currently only the armament is unified. But concerning the individual provision of border guards, the integration of communications in the SBG infrastructure, the maximum training of border guards – it is currently impossible to operate as part of the NAF.

Conclusions

Within the research of military compatibility made, the author gave insight into the State border guard tasks in military sphere, the cooperation between both institutions and the compatibility of State border guard and National armed forces.

During the current research the author made following conclusions. SBG rearmed from Soviet-era armaments to modern armaments, such as those of the NAF and the armed forces of our allies, or NATO. In the event of a state of

emergency or war, SBG and NAF will have a unified resupply. The development of SBG is based on foreign policy processes or military/political conflicts of other countries. Latvia began to pay more attention to the development of the SBG and the security of the national border only taking into account the events between Russia and Ukraine of 2014. The threat of mass illegal migration will exist until the diplomatic relations between the EU, USA, NATO and Russia improve. As well as until the Russia-Ukraine war, which is supported by Belarus, ends, because now Belarus can directly affect the security of the EU's external border with artificially created massive illegal migration.

Taking into consideration previous conclusions, the author starts following proposals. The SBG should find opportunities to organize and implement joint military exercises with the NAF, which would allow to understand the possibilities of the compatibility between the two structures. SBG Main Board should urgently find an opportunity to integrate a unified communication system between SBG and the NAF, which would allow timely provision of information circulation between SBG and NAF. The SBG Main Board should create a task group of graduates of the Junior Staff Officer course to develop emergency plans in the field of a military threat to the state border, as a result of which the response capabilities of the SBG and an assessment of the preparedness level would be carried out. The State Border Guard College should provide a training program on Harris Falcon III radio stations for the full-time and part-time students of the State Border Guard College of the first-level professional higher education study program "Border Guard".

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